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Introduction 
 
 There is no good beginning to stories like mine. Or to dissertations like this one. 
If I tell you about my disabling trauma, I risk falling into the exact ideological trappings I 
aim to critique. You’ll see me either as a victim of my own circumstances—as someone 
who is attached to their own woundedness. Or, you’ll see me as an inspiration—as a 
survivor, who never gave up. I am neither. But if I don’t tell you about my trauma—if I 
don’t narrate my experiences—how can I tell you about the embodied, situated 
knowledges that have come to frame this project? How can I tell you about the many 
lives—and deaths—that give rise to this project? There is no good place to begin when 
you’re trapped in a narrative bind.  
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Trauma is everywhere. We see it on every news report: pictures of “natural” 
disasters; personal stories of wounded warriors; images of accidents and catastrophes; 
and innumerable accounts of violence both at home and abroad. Crisis narratives flood 
our newsfeeds and social media accounts. When the “real world” becomes too much, we 
switch to cable or our streaming devices only to find that fictional trauma animates most 
of our favorite TV shows and our most awarded films. Indeed, in the years since its 
official recognition by the American Psychiatric Association as “Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder,” trauma—as a phenomenon—has been transformed from a “suspect condition” 
contained within the psychologist’s office, into a notion so ubiquitous and presupposed 
that it is now embedded in everyday life (Fassin and Rechtman 4-6), so much so that 
media theorists contend that we live in a “trauma culture” with the ever-present 
opportunity for “dark tourism” (Rothe 3; Lennon and Foley). What’s more, with the 
increasing possibilities of digital technologies, it is now becoming harder to separate 
individual experiences of trauma from these representations and cultural responses. Not 
only do we, as a culture, routinely stand spectator to “mass media employments of the 
pain of others,” we may now experience a kind of “secondary trauma” through our 
overexposure to “so-called mediatized trauma” on our televisions and on our newsfeeds 
(Rothe 4; Kaplan 2).  
This ubiquity of trauma—especially alongside the triumph of neoliberal economic 
and social policies, the continual shrinking of the welfare state, and ascensions in climate 
change—seem to position trauma as inevitable, especially for society’s most vulnerable. 
As a result, leading cultural critic Lauren Berlant calls for a move “away from the 
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discourse of trauma ... when describing what happens to persons and populations as an 
effect of catastrophic impacts” (9). For Berlant, the ubiquity of trauma renders it no 
longer useful or effective as social analytic, cultural framework, or hermeneutic device. 
Berlant argues that “a traumatic event is simply an event that has the capacity to induce 
trauma” and that such happenings are better described by her notion of “crisis 
ordinariness” (Berlant 10). Crisis, Berlant reminds us, is not exceptional under 
neoliberalism but rather “a process embedded in the ordinary” (10). She therefore argues 
for replacing trauma theory—with its misplaced insistence on the exceptional—with 
“crisis ordinariness” as a better way to describe the systemic navigation of modern life’s 
overwhelming affect (10).  
While I agree with the critique of traditional trauma theory’s focus on the 
exceptional, as well as the prevalence of crisis both socially and individually, Berlant’s 
analysis is limited in two specific ways. First, call it whatever you’d like, but the affective 
pain that becomes lodged in the bodymind through crisis or trauma is not ordinary, even 
if it occurs regularly. Second, we must ask why, as Berlant notes, “in critical theory and 
society generally, ‘trauma’ has become the primary genre of the last eighty years for 
describing the history present” (Berlant 10). Why is it that trauma has become so 
prevalent? What is it about this discourse that is so appealing to both critical theorists and 
the general public? Especially, if it is, as Berlant argues, so inaccurate? So while I share 
Berlant’s critique of the ubiquity of trauma discourse, I believe that it is precisely 
because trauma has become so pervasive that we must not abandon it.  
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*** 
How can we abandon trauma when culturally it is as though we cannot stop 
talking about it? The question becomes: what is it that we are saying exactly? Who gets 
to know about trauma, and who counts as an authority on trauma? How are we even 
defining the term? Moreover, how do these discourses impact those who are living with 
trauma in their bodyminds? Whose trauma is recognized as trauma and whose is 
dismissed, neglected, and/or criminalized? What narratives of trauma are supported and 
what narratives are foreclosed? How do race, class, gender, sexuality, citizenship, and 
ability play out in our cultural understanding of trauma and traumatization?  
Berlant’s move to “crisis ordinariness” leaves those impacted by the weight of 
these pervasive trauma discourses without recourse or reprieve. Berlant—like so many 
others who study trauma—begins her analysis of trauma through a critic of the event. But 
whether the event is understood as exceptional or ordinary, whether it’s called traumatic 
or a crisis, misses the point. Shifting away from trauma leaves unattended the uneven 
distribution of resources and systems of power and oppression that structure not only the 
embodied experience of trauma, but the narrations that follow. By focusing on the event, 
and not on the embodied, psychological, somatic and deeply affective experience of 
trauma, scholars like Berlant leave undertheorized the dis-abling experience of trauma. 
This mimics the move of able-bodied people who claim that “we’re all disabled” or 
“we’ll all become disabled” without considering the drastically different ways in which 
bodyminds come into the experience of impairment and disablement—depending upon 
social location. While it certainly is true that crisis is ordinary within the everyday of late 
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capitalism, we do not all have the same capacity to respond to these crises. The 
distinction is in the difference: trauma is what happens when you do not have the material 
resources and affective capacity to respond to these “ordinary” crises. 
So, Berlant is correct: trauma is not exceptional in that, just like other kinds of 
disabilities, it is common. Indeed, in this way it is quite ordinary. However, trauma is an 
exceptional experience because of the ways that society’s ableism and sanism dis-able 
those who experience the embodiments of trauma.  
Thus, as this dissertation will argue, the ideologies embedded within the popular 
discourses of trauma make it so that we must not abandon it as a social analytic, cultural 
framework, or hermeneutic device. Its pervasiveness demands our attention. The social 
constructs of race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and citizenship intertwine to inform 
who gets to claim trauma, what kinds of trauma are recognized, and what approaches of 
life and healing after trauma are viewed as appropriate. Thus, we must ask: Why is 
trauma as a cultural frameworks surging in popular discourse in the contemporary 
American moment? What does the concept of trauma do in American popular culture? 
What is it that discourses such as these are telling us and teaching us about trauma? Who 
benefits by and who is left out of these narratives? Which narratives are heard, and which 
ones are foreclosed? What systems of oppression are challenged and what systems of 
inequity are perpetuated by these popular trauma discourses? And lastly, what ways of 
knowing and approaching trauma might help us care for one another when we’ve 
experienced something(s) traumatic? Are there new or other knowledges, modalities, 
collectives, coalitions, and affinities possible if we imagine trauma otherwise?  
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Theories and Methods  
To address these questions, I engage with a number of multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary methods and theories throughout the dissertation. Primarily, I stage a 
theoretical intervention between two interdisciplinary fields of inquiry: Critical Disability 
Studies (CDS) and Critical Trauma Studies (CTS). Bringing these two fields together 
allows my project to better attend to the social, discursive, material, and embodied 
realities of trauma. In the section that follows, I first outline CDS and detail how this field 
conceptualizes the bodymind within systems of power and oppression. Next, I outline 
CTS and detail how this field approaches its subject matter. Lastly, I conclude by 
explaining why I find it pertinent to bring the two fields of study together in order to fully 
attend to the nuances and complexities of trauma as both an individual and social 
phenomenon.  
While Disability Studies as a field has existed since the 1980s, the mid-2000s saw 
scholars reevaluating the major “explanatory paradigms” dominating the field (Meekosha 
and Shuttleworth 49). These reevaluations served as the beginning of today’s Critical 
Disability Studies. In their 2009 article, “What’s So Critical About Critical Disability 
Studies,” authors Helen Meekosha and Russell Shuttleworth argue that there were four 
main theoretical tensions influencing the development of Critical Disability Studies as a 
maturation of the field of Disability Studies (50).  
First, traditional Disability Studies critiques a Medical Model of Disability, or the 
understanding of disability as a strictly medical issue in need of a “cure.” As an 
alternative, Disability Studies presents the Social Model of Disability, which argues that 
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it is society’s ableism and inaccessible environments that dis-able people. However, the 
creation of the Social Model created a binary between the Social and Medical Models of 
Disability, and the Social Model itself relied upon a binary between “impairment” as 
physical/mental limitation and “disability” as societal discrimination.  
Emerging scholars in what is now called CDS call for a “move away from the 
preoccupation with binary understandings” (Meekosha and Shuttleworth 50): rather than 
debating which model or perspective is the correct one, a CDS approach instead 
considers a variety of “key ideas about disability” beyond the binaries, as they aid in a 
“more complex conceptual understanding of disability oppression in our work” 
(Meekosha and Shuttleworth 50). CDS understands that these models often blur, overlap, 
or co-occur, and further that it may be politically or analytically useful to use one model 
in one moment and another model in another moment.  
Moreover, CDS approaches the study of disability by questioning the category of 
disability all together. In other words, rather than assuming we know what we mean when 
we say “disabled” or “disability,” CDS thinks through the ways in which the terms 
themselves are contestable. CDS begins with the understanding that disability is 
determined by society—our location in culture, time, and place. What counts as a 
disability in one context may or may not count as a disability in another. CDS 
understands that the definition of disability is socially determined or socially constructed 
through systems of power and oppression. Furthermore, this social construction is deeply 
intertwined with other systems of power and oppression—like race, class, gender, 
sexuality, and citizenship. From the CDS perspective, disability then cannot be 
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understood without full consideration of these other vectors of inequality and social 
rubrics of meaning-making.  
Because CDS begins by troubling the category of disability itself, and instead 
looking at the systems of power and oppression that create the categorization, it's easy to 
think of CDS as a method of study rather than an object of study. As a methodology then, 
CDS “involves scrutinizing not bodily or mental impairments but the social norms that 
define particular attributes as impairments, as well as the social conditions that 
concentrate stigmatized attitudes in particular population” (Minich). So, while CDS can 
certainly study disabled people or experiences, it can also be utilized to study other 
scrutinized and chastised peoples and embodiments (Minich).    
Second, Disability Studies has deep roots in disability activism and remains 
attentive to the social, economic, and political struggles of disabled people. However, 
while this work continues, CDS also calls needed attention to the “psychological, 
cultural, discursive, and carnal” impacts on disabled people (Meekosha and Shuttleworth 
50). Put another way, in Disability Studies’ efforts to identify and critique the 
sociopolitical barriers to disabled people, it often overlooks the actual material, physical 
realities of the bodymind. Indeed, in focusing on social barriers and political climates, 
much of the foundational Disability Studies work failed to address the role of the disabled 
bodymind and its relationship to mental disabilities, pain, fatigue, and illness. CDS takes 
up this work centering the bodymind while also attending to the political, social, cultural, 
and discursive.   
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In fact, CDS calls attention to these material embodied realities through the use of 
the term “bodymind” itself. Throughout the dissertation, I use this combined terminology 
following Margaret Price’s materialist feminist disability reading of Barbara Rothschild’s 
work on trauma (Price, Hypatia 269). Refusing the Cartesian split of western thought, this 
approach emphasizes that the “mental and physical process not only affect each other but 
also give rise to each other” (Price. Hypatia 269). I am specifically pulling from Price’s 
theorizing of bodymind, not just Rothschild’s, because Price extends the term to 
encapsulate the belief that “mental disability matters” (Price, Hypatia 269).  
A third tension within Disability Studies that gave rise to Critical Disability 
Studies grew out of concern about the cooptation of the language of disability studies by 
“applied disciplines” like rehabilitation and special education (Meekosha and 
Shuttleworth 51). Here, CDS critiques how institutions and systems map meanings on to 
bodyminds in a way that produces a hierarchy where the more abled you are, the more 
worthy and valued you are in society. This hierarchy is then used to justify an unequal 
distribution of life chances based on the meanings we’ve put onto bodyminds. CDS 
centralizes understanding and critiquing the meanings that are mapped onto the 
bodymind in order to attend to a study of power and oppression.   
Here, I take up Sami Schalk’s use of “(dis)ability” when referencing “the 
overarching social system of bodily and mental norms that include ability and disability” 
(Schalk 6). Like Schalk, I do this to differentiate between the system of oppression and 
the individual experience. Throughout this dissertation, (dis)ability will be used to signify 
the social system of privilege and oppression and “disability” will be used to signify the 
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identity or experience of being disabled.  I also appreciate Schalk’s use of the 
parenthetical, rather than a hyphen or backslash, as a visual reference to the “shifting, 
contentious, and contextual boundaries between disability and ability” (Schalk 6).  
Fourth, and last, CDS came about through the influence of other emerging 
interdisciplinary fields of study such as critical race theory, critical legal theory, and 
critical queer studies (Meekosha and Shuttleworth 51). With this, CDS is also deeply 
interdisciplinary, meaning that it thinks about disability as a vector of privilege and 
oppression and category of meaning-making that simultaneously moves through society, 
history, art, literature, culture, language, philosophy, politics, medicine, etc. As such, 
CDS cannot be bound to any traditional disciplines but instead it always 
multidisciplinary, transdisciplinary, or even antidisciplinary in nature.   
 
I didn't know it had a name, this Critical Disability Studies business. I came to 
graduate school thinking I was going to do Queer Theory and narrative theory and study 
how we dealt with the struggles we face when society tells us our body is one thing but we 
experience our body as another thing altogether. The only place I had found that kind of 
work was Trans Studies/Queer Theory. Then I found Disability Studies and Critical 
Disability Studies and the community that is there, and it felt like my heart exploded. This 
matters because it’s lonely here. As a disabled grad student. It was lonely as a disabled 
undergrad student. I hear it's lonely as a disabled faculty member. Finding people—my 
people; finding scholarship—scholarship that speaks to my world—made me realize that 
maybe I could do this. Maybe I could find my own path and forge my own way, and 
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maybe there would be people along that path that could help me. It made me realize I 
wouldn’t be so alone. That matters. That has to be included because these words 
wouldn’t be here. I wouldn’t be here if it weren’t for finding the theory and the people. I 
always quote bell hooks—I know people are tired of hearing me quote bell hooks, but it’s 
so real— “I came to theory because I was hurting—the pain within me was so intense 
that I could not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting to comprehend—to 
grasp what was happening around and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make 
the hurt go away. I saw in theory then a location for healing” (59).  
 
Like Critical Disability Studies, Critical Trauma Studies begins by questioning 
the social categorization of trauma itself. Since the mid- to late-nineteenth century, 
trauma has been framed—through one term or another—as a “disease of the mind” 
(Casper and Wertheimer 3). Whether it was “traumatic neurosis,” “shell shock,” or 
“PTSD,” trauma was firmly a biomedical and psychiatric concern (Casper and 
Wertheimer 3). I argue that in dominant discourses trauma is still understood in this 
manner. To be traumatized was/is to be seen as “psychically wounded and vulnerable, 
unwhole” and “therapeutic practices were aimed at ‘restoring’ normalcy or stasis’” 
(Casper and Wertheimer). In other words, trauma has been rooted in the Medical Model 
of Disability, and CTS seeks disrupt that understanding.  
Indeed, CTS challenges these biomedical and psychiatric understandings of 
trauma by positioning trauma as a cultural object worthy of study in its own right (Casper 
and Wertheimer 3). Early CTS scholarship began questioning trauma’s history and 
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relationship to memory; trauma narratives and their limits; the memorialization of trauma 
in culture and society; representations of trauma; and genealogies of trauma (Casper and 
Wertheimer 3). Through these framings, CTS allows us to see that trauma is primarily a 
“product of history, and politics, subject to reinterpretation, contestation, and 
intervention” (Casper and Wertheimer 3).  
However, the majority of this early CTS scholarship remained focused on 
European and U.S. histories, as well as overshadowed by theories of trauma derived from 
Freudian psychoanalysis (Traverso and Broderick 3). As CTS developed in the mid- to 
late-2000s, scholars sought to “redress the balance” of the field. In 2010, Antonio 
Traverso and Mick Broderick co-edited a journal volume ushering in new work that first 
focuses on “diversity of regions around the world,” and second, “seeks to interrogate the 
methodological limits of the dominant theory of trauma” (4).  
Their journal volume, and CTS more broadly, questions how the concept of 
trauma is “used—often problematically—to theorize the cultural representation of human 
suffering and atrocity” (Traverso and Broderick 4). CTS questions the cultural processes 
by which events that happen are denoted as traumatic events. What does this 
categorization and response do? Open up? Foreclose? CTS asks: “What does it mean to 
use the discourse of trauma? To represent events as ruptures, breaks and other deviations 
from the normal? And what, then, is normal?” (Casper and Wertheimer 3). Again, like 
CDS, CTS is interested in disrupting the binaries created by the systems of power and 
oppression that come to define people and populations.  
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Furthermore, like CDS, CTS is also interdisciplinary and intersectional. However, 
unlike CDS, CTS has “little structure coherence” which is to say that there is—as of 
yet—no uniting organization or broader institutionalization of the field (Casper and 
Wertheimer 4). In their anthology, Critical Trauma Studies, Monica J. Casper and Eric 
Wertheimer argue that the field “such as it is” has come together through shared 
intellectual considerations and processing through a set of conceptual tensions (4). CTS 
establishes itself through its approach to “‘modern catastrophes such as war, genocide, 
forced migrations, and 9/11, alongside everyday experiences of violence, loss and injury” 
(Casper and Wertheimer 4). What's more, Casper and Wertheimer note that the 
“conceptual heart of critical trauma studies,” if there can be one, is found “between the 
everyday and the extreme, between individual identity and collective experience, between 
history and the present, between experience and representation, between facts and 
memory, and between the ‘clinical’ and the ‘cultural’” (4).    
With this last tension, CTS make gestures at attending to the bodymind. 
According to Casper and Wertheirmer, “the material body in not absent from the 
imaginings of critical trauma studies” in that “the body has always been present if not 
fully theorized, its material insistence grappled with through investigations of somatic 
ruptures, such as railroad accidents and traumatic brain injuries” (4). Casper and 
Wertheimer’s own language is telling— “not absent” and “present if not fully 
theorized”—speaks directly to the level of theoretical attention the bodymind receives in 
CTS.  
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Therefore, my project calls a merging of CTS with CDS, as CDS is the field of 
academic inquiry that attends directly with both the cultural and material realities of the 
bodymind. Moreover, there is conceptual overlap between the two fields because CDS 
examines how society maps meanings onto bodyminds through the category of 
(dis)ability, and Trauma has historically been situated as a mental illness or psychological 
disability with somatic renderings. As I'll explain in more depth in Chapter Two, for 
various reasons the two fields have not historically engaged with one another. However, 
if CDS is to fully consider the socio-cultural and psychosomatic realities of mental 
disabilities as disabilities, it must engage with trauma and CTS. Thus, I am arguing for an 
extension of each field through a conversation with the other. It is only through the 
utilization of both lines of inquiry together that we may simultaneously attend to the 
social, material, discursive, and embodied realities of trauma as an individual and cultural 
phenomenon.  
A merging of CDS and CTS will also, by necessity, be an intersectional project. 
CDS insists on analyzing (dis)ability as a vector of privilege and oppression that 
intersects with other forms of privilege and oppression, most notably race, class, gender, 
sexuality and citizenship. CTS similarly looks at how trauma disproportionately impacts 
people and populations across axes of socially constructed differences, with a particular 
emphasis on the politics of trauma transnationally. Taken together, the two fields demand 
an approach to trauma that centers both the embodied realities of traumatization and its 
socio-political renderings.  
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 Lastly, when theorizing about trauma from an interdisciplinary CTS and CDS 
perspective, it becomes important to distinguish between the various discourses that are 
circulating. I contend that there are at least two kinds of discourse about trauma 
circulating within contemporary U.S. culture. First, there are ways of 
knowing/knowledge about trauma that come from studies of trauma by experts, theorists, 
clinicians, psychologists, etc. Second, there are ways of knowing/knowledges about 
trauma that comes from the experiences of trauma—the embodied, often subjugated 
knowledges traumatized folks hold. Of course, sometimes both kinds of knowledges can 
be held at the same time or become produced together (i.e. traumatized theorists/experts). 
These knowledges and discourses are deeply intertwined, and co-constitutive of one 
another. However, because of the power of language, it can be necessary to break them 
apart to analyze how power is operating in the given moment.  
Therefore, I will use the lowercase-t “trauma” to signify the aforementioned 
embodied knowledge that may or may not be recognized socio-culturally, politically, or 
medically as Trauma. One example of what I am calling lowercase-t “trauma” would be 
the trauma people of color experience living in the U.S. police state that has given rise to 
the #blacklivesmatter movement. As I will elaborate in Chapter Four, I understand 
trauma not as an event, but as an embodied affective structure that falls outside the 
hegemonic norms that constitute social recognizability—even as it is inscribed into and 
held deep within our bodyminds.  
When I use the capital T “Trauma” I will not be speaking about an affective or 
embodied experience, but rather about the culturally mediated category—the rubric for 
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meaning-making—often extrapolated from the affective structure. In other words, I use 
Trauma to designate the pathologization, medicalization, categorization, and theorization 
of experiences of trauma that have been recognized, legitimized, and valued by U.S. 
culture. What I am referring to as Trauma is also commonly known as or referenced by 
terms like: Post-Traumatic Stress, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Post-Traumatic 
Growth, Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or even Developmental Trauma 
Disorder. Regardless of the name, Trauma, as a category of meaning-making, is deeply 
embedded in systems of inequality, wherein ideologies of race, class, gender, sexuality, 
ability, and citizenship are both interpellated and contested in order to reinscribe 
hegemonic ideologies.  
Of course, an experience and/or affective structure can be both trauma and 
Trauma at the same time. Indeed, as many disabled people have argued for decades, 
navigating the medical-industrial complex itself is traumatic. However, it is from within 
the rubric of meaning-making ascribed by Trauma knowledges that trauma knowledges 
so often become rejected, erased, foreclosed, dismissed, partial, and subjugated. This is 
despite the fact that trauma is common. It is an everyday-ness of trauma for people of 
color, queers, women, immigrants, disabled people, poor folk. Furthermore, the extent to 
which trauma is recognized as Trauma so often dependent upon political and social 
access and proximity to resources, chiefly recognizability and whiteness. Consequently, 
trauma is often pathologized in other ways—criminalized and managed via other 
technologies of biopower. 
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Overview  
This dissertation seeks to investigate these broader questions regarding 
trauma/Trauma discourse and Trauma theory that Berlant’s work gestures toward. In 
doing so, there are four primary goals. First, by analyzing the popular discourses of 
trauma/Trauma through CDS and CTS this project seeks to understand what Trauma, as a 
concept, does in contemporary American society. I do so in order to understand how 
power is circulating in dominant discourses about trauma/Trauma. Second, I aim to bring 
together disparate fields of study and activism around the critical study of trauma, as I 
situate trauma as a coalitional site for affinity groups and political connections. Third, 
this project works to imagine trauma otherwise, specifically to reimagine trauma/Trauma 
theory in ways that disrupt the current circulation of power and oppression within its 
discourses.    
And lastly, I do this work with the desire to create more breathing room for all of 
us. I do this work make space for more narratives about trauma. More kinds of narratives 
including fractured narrative, and anti-narratives, and futuristic narratives, and no 
narratives at all. I do this work to break the weight of the narrative. It’s that weight that 
crushed me. I say it all the time: It wasn’t the semi-truck that killed me. That made me 
undead, or unalive for so many years. It was all the narratives that I was forced to carry. 
“You’re so lucky you’re not ‘really disabled!’” … “I can’t even tell you had an 
accident!” … “You’re just the same as you’ve always been” … “Well if you work really 
hard, you’ll overcome all that!” … You’ll never be able to finish college, let alone go to 
grad school. People with your ‘challenges’ certainly don’t get Ph.D.’s.” … “Have you 
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considered a more ‘realistic’ path?” … “I think maybe you’re determined to your own 
detriment” … “But I don’t know why you need an accommodation—you write such smart 
papers?” … “But hasn’t it been, like, a bunch of years?” … “But you’re not a veteran?” 
… “Have you tried yoga, acupuncture, or CBD Oil?” … I’ve been writing this 
dissertation for decade because these trauma narratives are still killing me...  
 
To do this work, I have chosen four sites of analysis. I begin the dissertation 
looking broadly at public discourse and analyzing TIME Magazine and a well-known 
political rally. I chose these discourses of Trauma because of their movement through and 
potential to influence, as well as reflect, mainstream American culture. I then move to 
analyzing a situated discourse—analyzing how higher education discusses potential 
traumatization in the classroom and on campus. This allows me to analyze our cultural 
responses to trauma when the conversation gets specific—when we are asked to do 
something about trauma, rather than just read about it or listen to its stories. Moreover, as 
an educator, the classroom is of particular personal importance to me because I believe 
profoundly in the power of an education to challenge social inequalities. Lastly, I turn to 
literature as a site of analysis because of the possibilities within the literary genre for 
imagining otherwise. Through literature we are able to imagine ways of being, ways of 
knowing, and ways of connecting that push us beyond what we might “know” of now. 
Literature is a space for other world-making, and as such, a space for remaking this 
world. If trauma theory tells us that this world needs to be remade with less suffering, 
than perhaps a literary approach to theorizing trauma will help us come to imagine how. 
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And so, I begin in Chapter One by analyzing thirty-six years of TIME magazine 
through both quantitative methods and close readings in order to understand how the 
popular discourses of Trauma and PTSD have shifted since the diagnosis was 
incorporated into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 
Through this analysis, I conclude that the last few decades have given way to the 
emergence of what I am terming a traumatocracy, or a socio-political discursive regime 
wherein the rhetorics and narratives of Trauma/PTSD are utilized not only in service of 
broader hegemonic ideals, but also certain forms and figures of U.S. citizenship. 
Moreover, my readings of the data show that while narratives of Trauma have always 
been deeply hegemonic, it was not until after 9/11 that they become wedded to the 
veteran and the U.S. Military in this manner. I then outline the three major tenets of 
traumatocracy, which include but are not limited to: 1) who can claim Trauma, what 
counts as Trauma, and what narratives of trauma are recognized as such are determined 
by and work in service of normative citizenship; 2) the refusal to consider or critique—let 
alone work to change—any of the systemic, institutionalized causes of trauma; and 3) the 
wide dismissal of cultural differences/preferences in understanding and processing both 
traumatic events themselves and living life afterward.    
Chapter Two of the dissertation, “Toward a Feminist Queer Crip Theory of 
Trauma, OR: When Emma Gonzalez’s Silence Said Everything” works to imagine 
trauma otherwise by presenting my full theory of trauma. Guided by Alison Kafer’s 
work, I begin by proposing a Feminist Queer Crip approach to trauma as the necessary 
bridge between Critical Trauma Studies and Critical Disability Studies. What's more, I 
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contend that it is this particular interdisciplinary trifecta that allows for a critical approach 
to both to the sociocultural implications of trauma and the embodied material realities of 
traumatization that are not otherwise available. Next, I analyze Emma Gonzalez’s 
“March For Our Lives” speech from March 24, 2018, through this Feminist Queer Crip 
approach. In doing so, I offer my reconceptualization and working definition of trauma as 
an embodied, affective structure that must be taken out of the medical model of disability. 
Here, I argue that Gonzalez’s speech allows for alternative frameworks to emerge for 
understanding trauma itself; for recognizing its knowledges; and for situating its political 
and coalitional potentiality. Lastly, I situate González’s speech, as trauma writ large, 
within Kafer’s Political / Relational Model of Disability, and detailing the four tenets of 
such an approach to trauma (Kafer 4). When trauma is approached in this way, I conclude 
that both personal and collective healing become possible—not through overcoming or 
individualized recovery, but through collective modalities like disability justice, 
restorative justice, and broad-based social transformation.  
Chapter Three turns from the looking at mainstream discourses of Trauma to 
analyzing how a specific institution responds to claims of trauma/Trauma. Here I analyze 
the recent debates in higher education regarding trauma/Trauma and trigger warnings in 
the classroom. When contextualized within the intersecting politics of disability and 
feminist pedagogies, three fundamental misconceptions within this debate become 
apparent. First, grave misunderstandings remain regarding practices of accommodation, 
politics of access, and the possibility of establishing the classroom as a “safe space.” 
Second, resistance within the academy toward understanding trauma as a pedagogical 
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issue illustrates a failure to consider experiences of and responses to trauma as issues of 
disability (in)justice. Lastly, the backlash against student requests for trigger warnings 
reflects a final misunderstanding about what students were actually requesting: 
recognition of their lived experiences and institutional support of how those experiences 
influence their education. Through an exploration of these contentions, this chapter 
argues that the conflicting approaches to trauma in the classroom demand the praxis of a 
more integrated, collaborative “Feminist Disability Studies Pedagogy” (FDSP). When 
approached through this hybrid pedagogy, the conversation shifts from whether we 
should use trigger warnings to why trauma itself is an imperative social justice issue 
within our classrooms.  
In Chapter Four, I return to imagining trauma otherwise through a close reading 
of A little Life by Hanya Yanagihara. Here I argue that, through Yanagihara’s writing 
style and in particular through her depiction of the main character of the novel, Jude St. 
Francis, A Little Life presents “cripistemtologies of trauma” that push against the 
dominant, mainstream narratives of Trauma and PTSD explored in previous chapters. 
Through a Critical Disability Studies-informed close reading of the novel, I show that 
Yanagihara’s work privileges disabled and traumatized ways of knowing and being. In 
particular, this chapter explores three elements of crip trauma knowledge that appear in 
the novel. First, crip narratives of trauma are woven in both Yanagihara’s writing style 
and in the ways in which Jude does and does not speak of his past. Second, the 
experiences of instability that come along with trauma are illustrated throughout the 
novel without perpetuating the common narratives of the supercrip or the helpless 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
22 
 
 
dependent. Third, and last, the novel shows in great detail what a crip affect of trauma 
might look like through an outlining of Jude’s affective structure. Taken together, the 
chapter argues that even with its limitations, the novel presents a cripistemologies of 
trauma that subvert the dominant narrative frameworks of trauma that are so popular 
today.  
I’m supposed to tie the dissertation up in a conclusion that brings everything 
together somehow or shows a final creative approach to the topic in some way. I’ve been 
told some people gesture toward future questions to be asked or the next steps in the 
project. I just need to write a few pages that bring closure for the reader and for me, the 
writer. But that's not what trauma does. So why should a dissertation on trauma do that 
work? Maybe my conclusion will start at the beginning and explain where the project 
came from and what I hope it will do in the world. Maybe my conclusion will refuse to 
conclude but instead list all the unanswerable questions this work brings forward. Maybe 
my conclusion will be a letter to one or of all the ghosts of this dissertation—including 
the ghost of myself—who haunted me and guided me as I wrote. I’m supposed to end this 
dissertation with a conclusion, but I don’t know how to do that. Trauma doesn’t 
conclude, so, how can I? 
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Chapter One:  
 
“Wounds That Don’t Bleed”: 
News Media, 9/11, and the Discourses of U.S. Traumatocracy 
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Hypervigilance. Mood swings. Cycles of uncontrollable rage and deep 
depression. Isolation. Indifference to life. Confusion. Guilt. Suicidal tendencies. Trouble 
sleeping and sleep disturbances.  Anxiety. Recurring and uncontrollable memories... 
  
These symptoms, now commonly recognized by the American public as signs of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), are reported in a 2004 TIME article not as 
symptoms of PTSD, but instead as “wounds that don’t bleed,” a phrase coined by Major 
David Rabb of the Amy’s 785th Combat Stress Company (Zabriskie). The article, that 
takes the phrase as its title, reports “how severe stress is taking a toll on U.S troops in 
Iraq—and what Washington is doing about it.” In it, Major Rabb—a mental health 
practitioner working at the front lines—notes that the Army has mobilized various 
“psychiatrist, psychologists, occupational therapists, social workers, chaplains, and 
nurses” in order “to let troops know they’re not going crazy because they have some 
emotional and physical and psychological aftereffects of the traumatic events that they 
witnessed” (Zabriskie). Rabb goes on to describe the “restoration zone” where his 
company is based as a space serving soldiers or Marines who need a few days “off line” 
to get some rest, have hot meals, and “talk through their problems.” While some are sent 
home, TIME reports that “the prime purpose is to prepare them to re-enter the fray, 
‘healed’ enough to undergo combat again.”  Although TIME cannot get Major Rabb to 
provide a number of troops with “combat stress injuries,” Rabb does tell TIME that “his 
team of counselors alone conducts up to 800 informal visits a month to troops in and 
around Bagdad” (Zabriskie). Later in the article, psychiatrist and Navy Captain Bill Nash 
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explains that the biggest issue is that “most soldiers and Marines engage in denial and 
dissociation to get through.” Still, Lieutenant Troy Fiesel, a social worker in Major 
Rapp’s unit, says that they are seeing more and more soldiers ask for help all the time. 
Major Rapp contends that it’s because his team makes the rounds “‘just smoking and 
joking, letting them know we’re available’” (Zabriskie). 
While the specifics of military trauma and the war in Iraq serve as the contextual 
background for this particular TIME article, I propose that the complexities and 
paradoxes within both Major Rabb’s account and TIME’s reporting epitomize broader 
dominant discourses of Trauma/PTSD in the post-9/11 U.S. context. In this chapter, I 
begin with a close reading of this article to illustrate these popular discourses of Trauma, 
and then turn to a broader historical/archival study to demonstrate the pervasiveness of 
these discourses. Using the archival material, this chapter does two things. First, I 
demonstrate the changes that have occurred in the dominant narratives of Trauma/PTSD 
since 9/11 that have sutured Trauma to certain forms and figures of U.S. citizenship. 
Second, I provide a close reading of how Trauma is narrated in relation to the most 
paradigmatic figure of the solder. Through these close readings of dominant discourse, I 
argue that Trauma is made hypervisible and simultaneously erased as part of a socio-
political regime of U.S. nationalism that I call traumatocracy. 1   
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*** 
 
In only 1,650 words, “Wounds that Don’t Bleed” foregrounds a number of 
paradoxes and contentions about psychological trauma and traumatic events that are now 
ever-present within post-9/11 U.S. discourses. First, with his use of metaphor, Major 
Rabb relies on an assumed cultural understanding of physical injury (wounds) to make 
sense of an assumed cultural misunderstanding and mistrust of psychological suffering. 
Yet, while he wants to make the soldiers’ struggles knowable and “real” in this way, he 
doesn’t want it to be made too real. Unlike others who may experience similar symptoms, 
the TIME article reports that the soldiers are not “going crazy” because they are 
experiencing “some...aftereffects.” In using the determiner “some,” and reassuring the 
soldiers of their sanity, Rapp minimizes the soldiers’ experiences—distancing them from 
their own symptoms—and, in doing so, also shrewdly re-centering able-mindedness as 
the default and norm. 
Moreover, the article in its entirety shows that the military works to distance the 
psychological struggles of its soldiers from those of others who have experienced similar 
traumas and/or mental anguish. Historically, PTSD was first incorporated into the Third 
Edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorder (or, DSM-III) in 1980, after decades of advocacy by Vietnam veterans 
toward “recognition, treatment, and compensation” for the atrocities they experienced 
(Kutchins and Kirk 116). Yet, 24 years later, the TIME article reports on the 
psychological suffering of these soldiers in Iraq as “classic symptoms of combat stress: 
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the emotional, physical, and psychological fallout from living through—or under the 
extended threat of—traumatic events” (emphasis added). In carefully chosen language 
throughout the piece, TIME refrains entirely from using the diagnostic term PTSD, 
despite its decades-long history and deep military legacy. While there are numerous 
socio-political reasons why the military—and TIME’s reporting of the military—might 
do this, its many effects include segregating traumatized populations and consequently, if 
even inadvertently, creating a hierarchy of traumatization. 
In yet another nuanced moment of distancing, Major Rapp notes that the soldiers 
are experiencing these aftereffects because of the “traumatic events they witnessed” 
(emphasis added). Discursively, trauma is once removed. It is not that the soldiers have 
experienced or endured trauma, and it is certainly not that the soldiers unquestionably 
enacted trauma on the lives of countless Iraqis. Rather, trauma is positioned here as 
something the soldiers observe, as though they are passive spectators in the very war they 
are waging.  
Then, in only a matter of sentences, the TIME article reports that the primary 
purpose of mental health units, like Major Rapp’s, is to help soldiers return to service, not 
aid soldiers in processing and managing their distress. The wording here is telling; the 
goal is to help soldiers become “healed enough to undergo combat again” (Zabriskie, 
emphasis added). Healed “enough” does not mean having found peace with the 
psychological and somatic symptoms listed above so that your life is more livable, but 
rather it means being able to work—to serve the U.S. military in its neo-imperial 
endeavors. Furthermore, the use of the word “undergo” suggests that TIME at least 
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acknowledges that it is military combat itself that is traumatizing, and that returning to 
service will likely mean enduring further trauma, even if military officials like Major 
Rapp use distancing rhetoric and refrain from giving official diagnostic statistics.  
Lastly, there is a move toward victim-blaming in the attention paid to soldiers’ 
denial and dissociation. While there was one short paragraph noting the increase of 
soldiers using mental health services (70 words), there were two larger paragraphs 
describing the denial and refusal of services by the majority of soldiers (232 words). It is 
as though TIME’s article says that all of the resources are readily available, just waiting 
for the traumatized soldiers to utilize them, and that the soldiers themselves are not 
interested in attending to their own suffering. Not only does this ignore both the 
everyday, material realities of life in deployment and the psychological embodied nature 
trauma itself, it also fails to consider the effectiveness of military’s methodological 
approaches toward recovery. Perhaps there are other more effective ways to approach 
processing, or even ending, cycles of trauma beyond “smoking and joking.” 
In this way, this particular TIME article epitomizes the national narratives 
surrounding Trauma/PTSD in a post-9/11 world. Over and over again, the archive shows 
a limited understanding of mental health issues, a distancing of trauma from other kinds 
of disabilities and mental illness, and a re-centering of able-bodymindedness as the 
default, or norm. There is a continued hierarchization of Trauma, including what kinds of 
trauma are recognized, who is positioned as an expert on trauma, and who gets to claim 
traumatization as such. It is not coincidental that only men were quoted in the TIME 
article. As my analysis will show, men—particularly white male veterans—are positioned 
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within the mainstream news reporting on Trauma/PTSD as the most traumatized 
population. Relatedly, as in the article above, the U.S. Military and U.S. Government are 
routinely positioned as altruistic caregivers, arriving on the scene, resources on hand, 
ready to save their passively traumatized soldiers. Rarely do dominant discourses 
question the U.S. Government’s role in traumatizing its own citizens, never mind 
populations aboard (Klein 2012). What's more, the problem of trauma within these 
discourses is found not within the intense suffering it brings into the lives of those who 
endure it, but, just as in the TIME article above, within the ways it disrupts the 
traumatized person’s (and population’s) ability to perform productivity in service of U.S. 
citizenship and late capitalism.  
These themes—a distrust of psychological suffering; a centering of ablemindness; 
a hierachiarcialization of Trauma; a distancing from the systemic causes of trauma itself; 
a focus on returning to work as evidence of recovery; and victim blaming—dominate the 
current discursive landscape. In order to gain a fuller understanding of the development 
and prominence of these narratives within contemporary U.S. discourse writ large, the 
chapter that follows analyzes 36 years (spanning pre- and post-9/11) of articles from 
TIME magazine, such as this one. In doing so, not only do these themes become apparent 
as paradigmatic, so too do the hegemonic ideologies and institutionalized inequalities that 
serve as their foundation. 
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Trauma Culture 
Cultural and media theorists have argued that the U.S. has lived in and thrived on 
a “trauma culture” since narratives of horror, suffering, and survival began crossing the 
Atlantic after the Holocaust (Rothe 7). While the U.S.’s history of trauma far precedes 
the 1940s, and indeed is based on violence and trauma, these theorists argue that U.S. 
consumption of trauma in mass media began or became widespread in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries.  
According to Ann Rothe, since “the popular stage and film adaptations of Anne 
Frank’s diary in the 1950s, American Holocaust discourse shifted in focus from victims 
to survivors with the television broadcasts forms the Eichmann trial and the rise of Elie 
Wiesel to preeminent Holocaust representative” (7). With this shift in discourse, critics 
began to question the ethics of mass media productions that project the suffering of others 
as plot devices and entertainment commodities, and challenge the commonplace self-help 
inspired overcoming narrative where “weak victims” are transformed into “heroic 
survivors” (Rothe 4-5). Theorists like E. Ann Kaplan have further considered the 
implications of trauma culture by interrogating “the complex interconnections between 
individual and cultural trauma—such that, indeed, where the ‘self’ begins, and the 
cultural reactions end may seem impossible to determine” (2). In her work, Kaplan 
argues that the distinction between consumers of Trauma and experiences of trauma 
becomes blurred as we are “‘hailed’ into the dominant images and discourses of trauma” 
from mass media (2). In the introduction to her book Trauma Culture: The Politics of 
Terror and Loss in Media and Literature, Kaplan focuses particularly on the “political-
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ideological shaping of 9/11 through the United States media,” and from her position as a 
New Yorker she argues that, as a traumatic event, “9/11 produced a new subjectivity”—
not only for herself but for New Yorkers and Americans more broadly (2). 
Building on scholarship which has interrogated “trauma culture,” I analyze the 
discourses of Trauma/PTSD within popular news media using an archive of 36 years of 
TIME magazine articles before and after September 11, 2001. I do so in an effort to track 
what discursive changes may have occurred because of the events of 9/11. By comparing 
pre-9/11 reporting to post-9/11 reporting in the TIME archive, I show that the national 
response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 altered the frameworks for who can claim 
Trauma, what counts as Trauma, and what narratives of Trauma are recognized as such. 
In these and other related ways, the archive I analyze shows that Trauma/PTSD within 
the U.S. imaginary is deeply rooted in hegemonic notions of U.S. citizenship. Despite the 
overwhelming prevalence of trauma in the lives of marginalized peoples, the archive 
illustrates that the social construction of Trauma/PTSD is predicated on ideologies of 
whiteness, masculinity, cis-heteronormativity, neoliberalism, capitalism, ableism, and 
U.S. exceptionalism. 
Thus, through both quantitative and textual analysis of the TIME archive, I 
contend that a traumatocracy has emerged in the post-9/11 era. I argue that under a 
traumatocracy, the discourse of Trauma/PTSD eclipses the embodied experiences of 
trauma which can do irreparable harm to the vast majority of those who are traumatized. 
The devastating and lasting impact of this rhetorical maneuvering, on both traumatized 
individuals and historically traumatized populations, cannot be understated. I conclude by 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
32 
 
 
reviewing some of the material and ideological consequences of life under our current 
traumatocracy for those most who are vulnerable. In doing so, I aim to better understand 
how trauma is shaping the contemporary socio-political moment so that we might 
imagine—and build—a different future. 
 
Research Methods 
While much can be (and has been) said regarding fictional accounts of trauma, in 
both literature and cinema, I turn to popular news media as a leading producer of cultural 
discourse on PTSD in the U.S. imaginary for a number of reasons. First, where fiction 
and social media can be more easily dismissed as sensational or melodramatic, news 
media purports to offer accurate and verifiable accounts of the phenomena it reports. The 
reporting at hand is regarded as carrying a particular kind of truth value. Second, and 
consequently, journalistic standards ensure that the U.S. public will also regard such 
reporting as a serious and substantial investigation of legitimate problems within U.S. 
culture and society, regardless of whether or not the reader agrees with the reported 
assessment. In other words, news reporting not only determines what counts as “real” 
trauma, but also what kinds of trauma are considered causes of concern for the U.S. 
public. Furthermore, news reporting both dictates and represents what counts as a “real” 
or serious consideration of said trauma by its implicit endorsement of and collaboration 
with various national and international institutions (the U.S. government, The United 
Nations, the National Institution of Mental Health, various research universities, the 
military, etc). 
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I chose TIME magazine specifically because of its important historic and 
contemporary influence on American news culture. With its publication in 1923, TIME 
became the original weekly newsmagazine—indeed creating the genre itself (Angeletti 
7). Its founders, Henry R. Luce and Briton Hadden, conceived of TIME as a place to 
aggregate, “synthesize, edit, and make sense of” the news for the everyday reader, a 
reader “who had other things to worry about” (Angeletti 7). Though TIME has struggled 
with the impacts of the digital revolution on print journalism, with this founding 
emphasis on news aggregation and synthesis, TIME’s reporting style still stands a 
precursor to today’s ever popular smartphone news feed (Angeletti 320-323). I chose 
TIME, in part, because of such appeal to today’s busy “everyday” reader. TIME is a quick 
and easy read, often in a doctor’s office waiting room or a hotel lobby. With its variety of 
sections, TIME attracts readers from across demographics with varying interests. The 
writing is not dense or difficult, and with its brevity, the articles can be read in full within 
short amounts of time. 
Indeed, this is precisely how the magazine was designed 95 years ago (Angeletti 
22). Although the specifics and nuances have shifted over the course of the last nine 
decades, TIME is still praised because of this iconic writing and editorial approach, 
known as Timestyle (Angeletti 32). Among other things, Timestyle emphasizes a 
summarized style of writing with limited verbiage, short and concise reporting, and a 
focus on the people within the news, or “newsmakers” themselves (Angeletti 32). I 
contend that it is because of this approach that TIME has remained one of the most-read 
news magazines in circulation. In fact, TIME was notably the only national news 
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magazine listed in the top 25 magazines in circulation in the U.S. in 2012 (Byers). 
Furthermore, because of TIME’s long history of photojournalism and the cultural 
significance of its single-topic special issues, particularly the “Person of the Year” issue, 
TIME has established itself as one the world’s most influential magazines—as a 
magazine that “not only mark[s] history but make[s] it too” (Stengel in Angeletti 7). It is 
for these reasons that I turn to TIME as a kind of popular journalistic authority in 
American news culture. 
In doing so, I am situating this project within disability media studies and 
feminist/cultural media studies. Simply put, these interdisciplinary fields approach the 
study of cultural production as a study of the circulation of discursive power and 
ideological formation, and they centralize questions of normativity and marginality. 
Within disability media studies, this chapter is direct conversation with work like Aly 
Patsavas’s 2014 article, “Recovering a Cripistemology of Pain: Leaky Bodies, 
Connective Tissue, and Feeling Discourse.” Patasavas’s project offers critical readings of 
cultural discourses of pain—alongside personal narratives of pain—in order to make 
important claims about the knowledge production of pain within/through the bodymind 
(203). In the context of feminist/cultural media studies, this chapter pays reverence to 
work such as Catherine A. Lutz and Jane L. Collins’ Reading National Geographic. 
Following Lutz and Collins, this project too seeks to explore how representations and 
cultural narratives of “the Other” reinforce the norm.  
There are, of course, limitations to my choice in TIME magazine as an archive 
and cite of cultural production. First, as recently reported by the Pew Research Center, 
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news media is continuing to shift from print journalism to digital content, and TIME 
remains most-read in print form (Mitchell 87). In 2016, TIME reports a total U.S. print 
readership of 17,400,000, 52% of this which is reported as male and 48% is reported as 
female, with the average age of this audience noted at 50 (TIME mediakit). Second, 
TIME has been known to back Republican lawmakers, and it has been highly criticized 
for the decades of time it took for women to reach its highest offices, and then for their 
short tenure in those positions. Similarly, it has had—at any given point in time— “a very 
limited number of writers of color on staff” (Angeletti 11). Taken together, these acts and 
attributes constitute TIME with a more conservative reputation within the American news 
media landscape. However, while this may certainly show the archive to have an 
ideological slant toward the right, these characteristics and ideological slants are 
indicative of those currently holding positions of power within American institutions, 
both public and private, if not reflective of American culture at large. Thus, I see TIME as 
not merely a reporter or reflector of U.S. news, but perhaps more importantly as a major 
actor within the formation of U.S. news discourses and culture. 
 
*** 
Using the University of Minnesota Library system, I used six databases for my 
research: Masterfile Premier, Academic Search Premier, Time Archive, Factiva, Gale 
Expanded Academic, and LexisNexis. From these databases, I searched articles 
pertaining to Trauma/PTSD in TIME magazine from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 
2016. I chose this 36-year time span to capture the discourses of Trauma/PTSD both in 
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the 15 years before and after September 11, 2001, while also capturing the official 
introduction of PTSD into the DSM-III in 1980. I center this analysis in the years 
surrounding 9/11 because of the ways in which this event was and continues to be 
described as a national trauma (Kaplan). Focusing the analysis on this time frame allows 
me to establish how trauma was conceptualized prior to, in relation to, and following this 
major event.  
In every database, I used the following variations of seven search terms to locate 
articles tagged by the databases as having the noted term in either the title, keywords, 
subject line, or used within the body of the article itself: 
  
1. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; Stress Disorder, 
Post Traumatic. 
2. Post-Traumatic Stress; Post Traumatic Stress, Traumatic Stress Syndrome 
3. PTSD 
4. Trauma; Trauma (Tragedy); Emotional Trauma 
5. Traumatic Neuroses 
6. Post Traumatic Growth 
7. National Trauma 
  
From this archival search I collected 198 articles from TIME magazine. TIME 
certainly reported on many more than 198 potentially traumatic or traumatizing events in 
this thirty-six-year time span. However, my archival search shows that this reporting was 
done without the aforementioned language of trauma or PTSD. This illustrates one 
limitation of this methodology: I rely on the databases’ coding system to identify these 
articles. It is possible that TIME reported more frequently on Trauma/PTSD, but the 
databases did not tag the language used in the articles accurately. Knowing this, I still 
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chose to use the search terms and databases noted above because I wanted to make sense 
of how Trauma/PTSD was understood in the specific and shifting cultural contexts of 
1980-2016. Not only would it have been impractical to go back through the entirety of 
TIME magazine and determine what articles discussed Trauma/PTSD according to my 
contemporary understanding of the terms but doing so also would have compromised the 
integrity and aims of this analysis. 
         After collecting the 198 TIME articles, I conducted a three-part coding process. 
Using NVIVO coding software, first I went through all 198 articles coding for the 
language of trauma. I noted the language used to discuss trauma, in order to determine 
the types of trauma being reported. I coded each article for: 1) the use of the word 
“trauma” in a general sense; 2) the use of some variation of the term and diagnostic 
category PTSD; 3) the discussion of medical or physical trauma, not psychological 
trauma; 4) the discussion of traumatic brain injury specifically; 5) the metaphorical use of 
concept of trauma; and lastly, 6) instances where psychological trauma was alluded to, 
but not directly named. 
This coding process identified 38 articles that discussed medical trauma (i.e., 
discussing trauma solely in terms of medical jargon), and 2 articles that briefly used 
trauma as a metaphor.2 In the first part of my analysis below, I include all 198 articles to 
show the increase in coverage post-9/11. For the latter part of my analysis below, I 
excluded these 40 articles given my focus on the experience of trauma, leaving 158 
articles for analysis.  
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I then conducted a second round of coding. To begin, I noted the type of articles 
within the archive in order to determine the kind of reporting space given to the topic. I 
made distinctions between four kinds of articles: cover articles, feature articles, letters, 
updates/reports, and articles pertaining to the various aspects of the entertainment 
industry, or popular culture. Given TIME’s historic writing style and reputation for 
brevity, any article over two paragraphs was deemed a feature article (Angeletti 34). Out 
of the 158 articles, 3% were archived as cover articles and 74% were feature articles. 
Thus, nearly 80% of the archive presented substantial coverage of the topic at hand. From 
there, I continued my readings through the 158 articles coding for each of the following 
categories using the NVIVO software: 
  
●   Origins of Trauma (gun violence, sexual violence, war, etc.) 
●   Personal Responses to Trauma (denial, suicide, therapy, etc.) 
●   Public Responses to Trauma (disbelief, search for cure, victim-blaming, etc.) 
●   Symptoms of/from Trauma (nightmares, flashbacks, dissociation, etc.) 
●   Intersections with Other Systems Oppressions (discussion of race, class,  
sexuality, geopolitics, disabilities, etc.) 
●   Who is Traumatized (note subject of the article: children, veterans, first 
responders, etc.) 
 
  In my third, and final, round of coding, I went back through each of these 
categories, double-checking the articles that were coded for accuracy, and also making 
sure that all 158 articles had been accounted for within the terms of each category. While 
doing so, I also edited and rearranged the categories to better reflect the ways the archive 
presented itself that I had not anticipated. For example, in this third round, I deleted the 
subcategory of “disabled people” under “Who is Traumatized” because there were zero 
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references to disabled people experiencing trauma. I also added in the subcategory of 
“financial cost of PTSD” under “Public Responses” because of the high number articles I 
noted while coding that mentioned the great expense of treating PTSD.  
After completely these three rounds of coding, I used the quantitative data 
provided by NVIVO to analyze trends across time and category. This quantitative review 
provides a particular kind of data that allows us to ask specific questions about the 
sociopolitical and cultural forces within a historical moment, or across time. While there 
has been a great deal of scholarship on popular trauma culture (Rothe; Kaplan; Farrell), 
to my knowledge there has not been a quantitative study on representations of 
Trauma/PTSD in popular media. Hybrid, quantitative-qualitative analyses, such as this 
one, provide a definitive foundation for an analysis of the dominant discourses and 
ideological formations of Trauma/PTSD that surround us. Such methodologies provide 
evidence to support what is understood as common knowledge or even “common 
sense”—that certain figures or subjects are overattributed to experiencing Trauma while 
others are erased. My goal is not to “even the playing field” and allow for more trauma 
narratives to be recognized, but rather to illuminate the ways in which particular 
narratives of Trauma/PTSD are mobilized to perpetuate violence within and through 
citizenship.  
Throughout the chapter I use the information provided by my analysis of the 
quantitative data to inform my qualitative analysis and theorization of the archive. For 
example, Trauma/PTSD is commonly understood within U.S. public discourse as 
associated with veterans and the military in an almost ahistorical manner. However, 
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quantitatively the archive shows that before September 11th, 2001, children were the 
dominant subject of Trauma narratives, not veterans. It was only after 9/11 that popular 
narratives of Trauma/PTSD became fixated on veterans. This quantitative data opens up 
numerous questions, including but not limited to: Why were children the primarily 
subjects of Trauma/PTSD in the years 1980-2001? Why did 9/11 shift Trauma/PTSD 
narratives in this way? What systems of power were served by narratives of childhood 
Trauma/PTSD? What systems of power are currently being served by narratives of 
veteran trauma/PTSD? How do these narratives inform what kind of trauma is recognized 
as Trauma and by whom? How do these dominant narratives of Trauma inform what 
kinds of trauma are erased, dismissed, or disregarded? Lastly, how do these narratives 
shape how we come to “know” what trauma and recovery look like in the first place?  
  
Traumatocracy Defined 
  As this archival analysis shows, in the post-9/11 era, Trauma/PTSD has become 
much more than an event, an experience, or even a diagnostic category; it is now an 
ideology. In fact, I am arguing that this analysis of TIME magazine shows that we live in 
a full-scale traumatocracy: A socio-political discursive regime wherein the rhetorics and 
narratives of Trauma/PTSD are utilized to mobilize certain figures and forms of U.S 
citizenship. More specifically, the popular narratives and dominant discourses of 
Trauma/PTSD work to uphold what Amy Brandzel theorizes as “the violence of 
normative citizenship” (5).  
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In her work, Against Citizenship, Branzel rejects notions of citizenship that 
centralize ideals such as membership and belonging, and instead presents citizenship as 
“a normativization project… that regulates and disciplines the social body in order to 
produce model identities and hegemonic knowledge claims” (5). This is precisely what 
appears throughout the narratives of Trauma/PTSD within the archive. While the articles 
appear to be raising awareness and affectively seeking belonging within the U.S. 
imaginary, they work to normalize, regulate, and discipline traumatized subjects. They 
produce a model traumatized subject and hegemonic knowledge claims about trauma. In 
doing so, they subjugate countless Others who cannot (or will not) narrative their trauma 
in this manner.  
Along these lines, Brandzel argues that citizenship—as a set of practices that 
sorts, distributes, and assigns rights, resources, and social value—stands as “not only the 
central structure for reifying the norms of whiteness, heterosexuality, consumerism, and 
settler colonialism within the United States” but also as a nexus where “these norms are 
brutally enforced against nonnormative bodies, practices, behaviors, and forms of 
affiliations through oppositional divide-and-conquer logics” (4). I am arguing that under 
our current traumatocracy, the discourses of trauma are now deeply intertwined with 
these violences of normative citizenship as Brandzel has defined them.  
Brandzel goes further to position claims to citizenship as violent in two main 
ways. First, demands for inclusion by some automatically reproduce and extend the 
subjugation and exclusion of abject others (Brandzel 15). Second, following Foucault, 
Brandzel writes that “inclusion always comes at a cost, whereby recognition spawns 
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regulations, and becoming a subject begets subjection” (Branzel 13). In other words, in 
order to gain recognition and inclusion one must submit to the processes and standards of 
the social norms.  
 
Under the citizenship project of traumatocracy, at least three core tenets are at play: 
  
1. The frameworks for who can claim trauma, what counts as trauma, and what 
narratives of trauma are recognized as such, are determined by and work in 
service of normative citizenship. 
2. There is a refusal to consider or critique—let alone work to change—any of the 
systemic, institutionalized causes of trauma. 
3. There is wide dismissal of cultural differences/preferences in understanding and 
processing both traumatic events themselves and living life afterward. 
  
By looking at trauma systemically—even while it is discursively structured as an 
individual issue—I am drawing from Jasbir Puar’s theorization of debility and maiming. 
In her book The Right to Maim, Puar discusses the biopolitics of debilitation as “the slow 
wearing down of populations” and “the violence of what constitutes ‘a normal 
consequence’” (xiv, xvi). She situates debility as an “in-between-space” for “those whose 
inevitable injuring is assumed by racial capitalism” (Puar xvii-xviii). While Puar does not 
directly address psychological trauma in her work, the archive shows these same 
biopolitical forces at play. As I understand it, trauma is a form of debilitation, and the 
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systemic enactments of trauma on marginalized populations serves as a form of 
psychosomatic maiming, wherein maiming works as “a source of value extraction from 
populations that would otherwise be disposable” (Puar xviii). I am not arguing that the 
U.S. government is purposefully plotting to traumatize us all through a top-down 
sovereign form of power (although that point is debatable), but rather I am understanding 
power in a more diffuse, Foucauldian, multi-directional manner where impact matters 
more than intent. Following Puar, I see these current biopolitical forces of debilitation 
mobilizing in nuanced ways, and in the post-9/11 era, the discourses of Trauma/PTSD 
have become cemented to the narratives of normative citizenship in such a matter that can 
only be described as a traumatocracy. 
  More specifically, just as the myths of meritocracy obscure the legacies of 
institutionalized oppression, the ideological frameworks embedded in this traumatocracy 
similarly shift the responsibilities of psychological crisis and adversity away from 
broader socio-political forces that subjugate, and onto the citizens (and populations) who 
experience the subjugation. As with the “bootstraps mentality” of the American Dream, 
Americans internalize and perpetuate the myths of this traumatocracy (McNee and Miller 
2). Through it, we have been taught how to understand trauma, what kinds of trauma are 
“real,” who we should honor as survivor-heroes, and who we should question as 
untrustworthy drains on the nation-state. We have been taught to see the U.S. 
government, and its subsidiaries, as fundamentally humanitarian and doing the best they 
can to improve the lives of those to experience trauma—especially our “Wounded 
Warriors”. We’re taught that the problem of trauma lays in the individual. It is up to us to 
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overcome our hardships and become a fully realized person—a fully legitimized 
citizen—because of it. Lastly, just as with the ruse of meritocracy, we have been taught to 
overlook the systemic inequalities and intersecting matrices of oppression that so often 
cause trauma in the first place. 
 
What 36 Years of TIME Shows Us: The Emergence of a Traumatocracy 
  In the twenty-one years prior to September 11, 2001, TIME magazine published 
relatively fewer articles each year related to Trauma/PTSD. After 9/11, there was a 
dramatic increase in reporting (Graph A). The medical and social constructions of war-
related mental disorders have shifted after every major U.S. military conflict. What came 
to be known clinically as PTSD after the Vietnam War was known as “Nostalgia” during 
the Civil War, “Shell Shock” and “War Neurosis” during World War I, “Battle Fatigue” 
during World War II, “Brainwashing” during the Korean War, and was also referred to as 
“Gulf War Syndrome” for a time after the Gulf War (Hyams 402, in Kutchins and Kirk 
102). Given this history alone, it is reasonable to assume a similarly discursive shift 
would occur after 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--and indeed 
Graph A shows at least a dramatic shift in the frequency of reporting on Trauma/PTSD. 
This project seeks to understand what that discursive shift might be.  
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Graph A: TIME Magazine Reporting on Trauma, 1980-20163 
 
 
Prior to 9/11, TIME had published only 46 articles related to Trauma/PTSD. 
Twenty-nine of these articles focused on psychological trauma, while 16 used trauma as 
medical jargon (to refer to an event such as surgery), and one article used trauma in a 
metaphorical manner (Graph B). After 9/11, TIME’s reporting increased dramatically to 
152 articles: 129 articles focused on psychological trauma, while 22 used trauma as 
medical jargon, and one additional article using trauma metaphorically (Graph B).  
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Graph B: Pre- and Post-9/11 Reporting on Trauma 
 
 
Trauma-focused articles increased 344% after 9/11—roughly 1.4 articles per year 
focused on trauma prior to 9/11 and 8.6 articles per year focused on trauma afterward. In 
other words, the fifteen years following 9/11 garnered nearly 3.5 times as many TIME 
magazine articles on Trauma/PTSD than the entire two decades prior. Even without 
further analysis on the discursive content of these articles, the numbers themselves show 
that it was after 9/11 that American news media begin to provide substantial 
consideration to Trauma/PTSD in its reporting (Graph A). 
 Graph A shows that the most notable spikes in reporting came during the years of 
2001, 2003-2004, and 2013-2014. The increases in reporting in 2001 and 2003-2004, of 
course, correspond with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. 
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However, the most dramatic surge in reporting came during 2013 and 2014 for several 
significant reasons. First, these years mark the 10-year anniversary of the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq, as well as the revision of PTSD in the DSM-V (Friedman). Moreover, 2014 also 
marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the National Center for PTSD. In 
2013, the Center received a 45-million-dollar research initiative funded by the VA and 
Dept. of Defense to “improve understanding and treatment of PTSD” (U.S. Dept. VA). 
Then, in 2014, the Center received further congressional funding to expand its work to 
non-VA providers through establishing the National PTSD Brain Bank (U.S. Dept. VA). 
Furthermore, in popular culture, Slate magazine named 2013 “The Year of the Trigger 
Warning” noting a broad rise in cultural conversation regarding responses to, and 
experiences of, trauma (Marcotte). While the articles in TIME did not report on any of 
these topics directly, I see the substantial increase in reporting during 2013-2014 as 
reflective of this socio-cultural and political moment. 
Although the increase in reporting after 9/11 indexes a change in the discourse at 
large, even more telling are the shifts within in the content of the articles themselves. 
Most notably, 9/11 substantially impacted what kinds of trauma were recognized and 
reported on as trauma (Graphs C, C1 & C2). In my analysis, I coded for thirteen kinds, or 
so-called “origins,” of trauma: national disasters; wrecks/accidents; family violence; 
sexual violence; generalized violence/assault; gun violence; kidnapping; terrorism (other 
than the events of 9/11); intergenerational trauma; police/prison violence; war/military; 
psychological trauma in a medical setting; and general or otherwise unspecified trauma. 
Under the “war/military” category, I further coded for the following: 9/11; the first Gulf 
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War; the American war in Vietnam; and World War II. Graph C shows the origins of 
trauma from the archive taken as a whole. As Graphs C1 and C2 show, the focus on 
war/military-originated trauma dramatically increased following 9/11.  
 
Graph C: Origins of Trauma, 1980-2016 
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Graph C1: Origins of Trauma, Pre - 9/11 
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Graph C2 Origins of Trauma, Post - 9/11
 
 
  TIME’s reporting on Trauma/PTSD did increase briefly from 1988 to 1992 and 
from 1995 to 2000, corresponding with the first Gulf War, an earthquake in California, 
the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Columbine High School shooting. These two 
moments of increased reporting also show a general increase in discourse around 
childhood trauma, trauma and the brain, and mental illness. However, it is not until after 
9/11 that the archives show a broad trend upward in discussions of trauma. More 
specifically, it was not until 2003, when the U.S. entered the war in Iraq, that the specific 
language of PTSD took hold and moved into a general realm beyond the language 
surrounding Veterans /U.S. Military.  
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From January 1, 1980, to September 10, 2001, the reporting on Trauma/PTSD in 
TIME magazine was far broader than that which came after September 11, 2001 (Graphs 
C1 & C2). Prior to 9/11, only 28% of the trauma TIME magazine reported was related to 
the U.S military. Two percent of the articles are unspecified or discuss trauma as a 
concept or experience in general terms. Twenty percent of the articles report about the 
family, domestic violence, or trauma in the home. More than 5% of the articles recognize 
the psychological trauma that can result from experiences with police/prisons, gun 
violence, physical violence/assault, sexual violence, wreck/accidents, and natural 
disasters. Taken together, this means that the remaining 70% of the reporting prior to 
9/11 addressing trauma originating from something other than military or war. This is 
significant because there is a colloquial understanding within the U.S. imaginary that 
Trauma/PTSD is—and has always been—directly associated with the U.S. Military. Yet, 
this archival data shows that during the 20 years prior to September 11th, 2001, 70% of 
the narratives of Trauma/PTSD focusing on trauma originating from elsewhere, with a 
particular emphasis on trauma as a localized danger interrupting the heteronormative 
family.  
For example, in a letter to the editor from February 27, 1989, a family therapist 
writes in to substantiate the “trauma of divorce” on children (Smullens). Another article 
from 2000 reports on new research from the University of California that has found that 
PTSD affects “children as young as 7, more often than previously believed and for longer 
than parents think, even after minor accidents like bike crashes and fails” (Mclaughlin). 
The article goes on to warn parents of “changes in grades, loss of concentration, 
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increased tearfulness or jumpiness.” Lastly, an article from 1997, entitled “Finding 
Trauma Next Door,” details the case of a sexual assault and murder of 11-year-old Eddie 
Wener by a 15-year-old neighbor, Sam Manzie, who had previously been involved in a 
sexual relationship with a 43 year old “convicted pederast” with whom Manzie had met 
on the internet (Bellafante).  
 As previously stated, after 9/11 there is a dramatic shift in U.S. news media 
reporting on Trauma/PTSD. The percentage of war/military related trauma increased 
from 28% to 53% (Graph C1 & C2). With this, the percentage of articles discussing 
trauma generally or in an unspecified manner also increased from 2% to 9%. Conversely, 
reporting on every other origin of trauma decreases from 70% to 38%. The percentage of 
reporting decreases in every other category of trauma, except for sexual violence, which 
stayed the same at 6%, and kidnapping, which increased from 0% prior to 9/11 to 3% 
afterward.  
         Historically, there is nothing particularly new or surprising about the claim that 
military trauma is the trauma that matters. After all, it is the trauma that so often gets the 
most attention. That is not by accident. Indeed, the figure of the “Wounded Warrior” is 
routinely mobilized to bolster both national and neo-imperial agendas. With this, as the 
archive shows, the prominence of the traumatized veteran and his particular Trauma 
narrative overshadows other claims to trauma. However, the data from this archive show 
that narratives of military trauma only became dominant after 9/11. Thus, it was not until 
9/11, and only because of 9/11, that the dominant discourses of Trauma/PTSD have 
become what they are today. Quantitatively speaking, this also appears in the archive in 
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that, among the trauma-focused articles whose “origins” (as in Graphs C1 & C2) are 
war/military, the total number of articles specifically about 9/11 and its associated wars, 
equal the number articles on all other U.S. wars and conflicts combined (Graph D). 
 In the sections that follow, I outline three major tenets of the traumatocracy that I 
argue dominate U.S. discourse: first, that Trauma works in service of U.S. citizenship; 
second, that Trauma is individualized; and third, that Trauma is medicalized and 
understood without consideration of its cultural specificity. These tenets, I argue, bear 
heavy consequences for those who fall outside normative definitions of citizenship. 
  
Graph D: References to War/Military 1980-2016 
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Tenet One: Trauma in Service of the U.S. Citizenship   
Narratives of Trauma/PTSD, as they have been culturally constructed in the post-
9/11 era, mobilize certain figures of U.S. citizenship as the proper traumatized subject 
and hold up other figures as failed citizens for not managing or recovering from their 
trauma in the proper way. While this has been true in some way for members of the U.S. 
Military throughout the last century, it is now true for individuals and populations outside 
of the military-industrial complex. First, under this socio-political discursive regime, the 
frameworks for who can claim trauma, what counts as trauma, and what narratives of 
trauma gain recognition are determined by, and work in service of, both the medical-
industrial complex and formations of normative U.S. citizenship. If your trauma cannot 
be recuperated or repaired so that you may serve these ideologies and institutions, it is 
unlikely that your experience will be recognized as trauma. Furthermore, even if your 
experience is recognized as trauma, that does not necessarily mean that there will be an 
investment in addressing that trauma on the individual or collective level.      
In identifying this tenet of U.S. traumatocracy, I read through the archive, noting 
when trauma was reported as having happened to the following subjects: celebrities, 
children, family members, first responders, LGBTQ+ persons, global “others,” Jewish 
persons/populations, indigenous peoples, People of Color, disabled people or 
populations, men, women, and veterans. I also noted when there was no specification as 
to the subject of the trauma. In my first round of coding, I noted that there were no 
instances in which indigenous peoples were discussed has having experienced trauma. 
The only discussion of disability in relation to trauma came under through discussions of 
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veterans, not as a discussion of disability community or identity outside of military 
service or trauma. I also noted that there was discussion of trauma experienced by 
animals and by the U.S. Nation at large, so I added these categories before conducting my 
second round of coding (Graph E2). Lastly, because of the limitations of the coding 
software to process an intersectional analysis, many of the traumatized subjects may be 
counted in multiple categories.  
 In coding for whose trauma is recognized by TIME magazine, I am establishing 
both whose trauma is recognized as Trauma within dominant U.S. culture and also who is 
put forth as a valid subject of trauma within dominant U.S. culture. For example, there 
are five articles discussing various moments in the #BlackLivesMatter movement, but the 
only one that references trauma or PTSD directly is a 2015 article quoting Sandra Bland, 
who said that she was suffering from “a little bit of depression as well as PTSD” 
(Stengle). None of the other articles mention or reference any kind of trauma that Black 
Americans live with or have endured in this country. These articles talk about Ferguson, 
MO; Mike Brown; police violence; prisons; slavery; and while they used the word 
“tragedy,” they never once used the word “trauma.” This is not by accident.  
Relatedly, in a 2014 article, TIME reported “astounding” new research that shows 
that for “poor minorities living in segregated neighborhoods,” involving the police in 
domestic violence situations might be a bad idea (Luscombe). What’s telling here is that 
the article doesn’t get into the horrors of possible police violence or the injustices of the 
criminal legal system. Even in an article purportedly examining the traumas of minority 
women, TIME magazine still refuses to name trauma as such. After explaining that the 
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study found that women whose abusers were arrested had drastic health problems 
compared to women whose abusers were not arrested, the article reports that “the authors 
believe similar mechanisms to those in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) might be 
at fault” (Luscombe). The researchers quoted in the article then go on to say that this 
must be bio-social, but that it leads to higher rates of death from heart disease and other 
illness far more for African-Americans than for whites. The nuance and distancing here is 
telling, that “similar mechanisms to PTSD” are reported—not PTSD as such—because 
abused women of color are not understood under U.S. racial formations and white 
supremacy to be potential subjects of PTSD, even after their abusive partners have been 
arrested. Within the TIME article itself, the researchers locate the cause of this “similar to 
[but not actual] PTSD” phenomenon in the bio-social, again without interrogating 
systems of oppression, instead mapping it onto biological questions of race (Luscombe). 
Both of these examples show how the subjects of trauma are racially coded within 
the archive so that the trauma of People of Color is minimized, even when articles cover 
these traumatic experiences. As previously noted, there were no instances or reports on 
the trauma of settler colonialism and genocide of native peoples in the Americas. 
Similarly, the traumas of LGTBQ+ folks were barely mentioned, if at all. References to 
gays and lesbians appeared in the archive twice—once in a report regarding the “loss of 
12,000 gays and lesbians” in the armed forces due to “Don’t Ask - Don’t Tell” and once 
again in an opinion piece wherein the author noted that they were not going to sugarcoat 
anything because “gays have been through too much adversity” for that (TIME Letters; 
Stein). The Holocaust and references to trauma in relation to Israel for Jewish people 
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appeared in the archive in six instances. This is telling for many reasons. First, this is the 
only reporting on genocide that appears in the archive under the search related to Trauma. 
Second, there are no reports on trauma in relation to life for the Palestinians.  
Indeed, the reporting coded purposefully as the “Global Other” shows how TIME 
magazine understands people and populations that experience trauma beyond the borders 
of the U.S. Of the thirteen articles coded as directly referencing a population outside of 
the U.S. as experiencing trauma in some way, five articles actually center the imagined 
U.S. reader as the subject of the article. For example, an article from 2016 mentions the 
terrorist’s attacks at the Brussels airport and metro station, but only as an entry point into 
discussing why some people react differently to news about terrorism (Cook). 
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, four articles report on saving children or the 
heteronormative family from trauma, including transnational adoption (Brunton; Kher; 
Pickert; Regan). One article discusses the toll of the war in Afghanistan on U.K. veterans 
(Tasch). Another article simply reports a study on trauma using data from multiple 
generations of families that survived an earthquake in Armenia (Health & Science). 
Lastly, in the first TIME article mentioning trauma published after 9/11, the author claims 
that part of the issue that led to the terrorist attacks is that “the Muslim world can’t seem 
to get over the trauma of colonialism” (Saghiyeh). Thus, while these articles purportedly 
report on the traumas of people and populations outside of the U.S., they routinely do so 
in ways that minimize these traumas, while bolstering domestic and global interests of the 
U.S. nation-state.  
 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
58 
 
 
*** 
  As with the origins of trauma, whose trauma is recognized also shifts in similar 
and significant ways after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Prior to September 2001, reporting 
on trauma experienced by children, as well as ways to prevent children from experiencing 
trauma in the first place, outnumbered all other reports on trauma in the archive, with 
33% of reports focusing on childhood trauma. (Graph E1). Other populations whose 
trauma was recognized prior to 9/11 include veterans (16%), civilian women (13%), 
civilian men (9%), global “others” (5%), family members of traumatized individuals 
(5%), and celebrities (5%). Four percent of the traumas discussed before 9/11 did not 
specify an individual who was traumatized, but rather talked about trauma in general 
terms. As noted, 16% of the mentions of trauma were attributed to military personnel. 
This leaves 80% of the trauma reported on before 9/11 open to other populations outside 
of the military. However, after 9/11 we again see that it is the military members whose 
trauma is heard. After 9/11, the reporting on military-related trauma increases from 16% 
to 43%. This increase, coupled with the increase of unspecified trauma, wherein reports 
do not reference a specific traumatized individual (up from 4% to 6%), leave all other 
subjects of trauma to be recognized in the remaining 51% of post-9/11 reporting. The 
only other categories that increased in percentages after 9/11 are those that had zero 
reporting prior to 9/11: reports of animals being traumatized, report of LGBTQ+ people 
experiencing trauma, and reports of the U.S. Nation at large being traumatized (Graph E1 
& E2).  
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 E: Whose Trauma is Recognized, 1980-2016 
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Graph E1: Whose Trauma is Recognized Pre - 9/11
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Graph E2: Whose Trauma is Recognized, Post - 9/11 
 
 
Before 9/11, there was no reporting on the idea of the U.S. nation-state 
experiencing trauma as a collective. This alone is noteworthy, considering all of the 
potentially traumatic national and global events that occurred between January 1, 1980, 
and September 10, 2001. Throughout the archive, 9/11 is made exceptional both by the 
attention it is given and by the corresponding erasure of other social traumas. In this way 
the dominant discourses of Trauma/PTSD align—even merge—with the discourses of 
U.S. exceptionalism in order to justify political and military action across the globe. 
Trauma/PTSD is made to be exceptional when its exceptionality serves political 
purposes. When President George W. Bush stated that “everything changed after 9/11” he 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
62 
 
 
invoked the notion of collective trauma in order to position the U.S. as “the divinely 
ordained exception” to the “world of nations”—a nation now exceptionally positioned, 
because of our trauma, to “defend the globe against the threat of Islamic Terrorism” 
(Pease 112).    
This exceptionality surrounding the discourse of national trauma emerged within 
eight articles that directly position the U.S. as collectively traumatized. The first article 
published after 9/11, entitled “Attack on the Spirit,” poses: “shock waves from the 
terrorist blasts shook the nation’s psyche. How do we recover?” It goes on to say that 
“the public has made a great show of declaring that no terrorist is going to make 
Americans alter the way they live. And while such swagger has served us well in the past, 
this time it may simply be discouraging us from admitting how downright scared we are. 
Doing so could be a vital step toward recovery”. The article concludes by noting that “the 
mental fallout may spread but there are ways to control the damage,” before listing 
information under the headings: “What to expect,” “How to cope,” and “When to seek 
help” (Kluger 2001).  Then, published on October 1st, 2001 a piece by Joel Stein notes, 
“the initial shock of the World Trade Center attack has passed. But as Americans return 
to work, to school and (gingerly) to play, the impact of the disaster on everyday life is 
just beginning to be felt.” Stein goes on to quote a psychoanalyst from Kansas City who 
says that as a nation, “we’ve had our sense of safety and security profoundly shaken.” 
Similarly, in a 2015 interview, Wall Street Journal columnist and former Reagan 
speechwriter Peggy Noonan explains that “9/11 was the trauma that changed everything. 
We lost the national luxury of assuming nice things will happen” (Duffy 2015). 
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Even in just a cursory reading of these narratives of national trauma, two themes 
emerge. First, there is a presumption of a prior state safety and security that has been 
interrupted; second, there is a heavy emphasis on the immediacy of overcoming and 
recovery. Unsurprisingly, these frameworks directly align with the medical and clinical 
approach to trauma that historically been used to pathologize individuals through the 
DSM. In the post-9/11 era, we now see these frameworks of trauma projected onto the 
nation collectively.  
Here trauma is almost always imagined as an exceptional interruption to the 
“good life,” rather than one trauma among a whole litany traumas or generations of 
traumas. By discursively positioning trauma in this way—as an interruption rather than a 
normal consequence of life under racialized capitalism, heterocispatriarchy and 
neoliberalism—it becomes possible to ignore the systems of violence that enact endemic 
trauma. Socially, we cannot comprehend the alternative. If one had to acknowledge 
previous collective or social traumas and/or also acknowledge that these traumas have not 
been healed, the implication is that there would be a lot of traumatized people in the 
world. Paradoxically, even while the U.S. supposedly claims its own collective trauma—
after 9/11—it cannot face the possibility of a traumatized world.   
 And so, throughout the archive, there is unsurprising an overabundance of 
articles that emphasis overcoming, recovering, and/or curing PTSD. These narratives 
come from both individuals who have experienced trauma themselves and from the 
“expert opinions” quoted in the TIME’s reporting. In my analysis, I coded for the 
following themes within the articles: overcoming/recovering; notions of the supercrip4; 
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curing PTSD; recovery through a return to military/community service; recovery through 
medication; and lastly, recovery through therapy.  
 
Graph F: Pre- and Post- 9/11 Recovery Narratives  
% of all articles in each time period that contain each narrative theme 
 
Narratives Pre 9/11  
(29 articles)  
Post 9/11 
(129 articles)  
Percent Change 
(in percent of 
articles 
containing each 
narrative) 
Overcoming  24% (7 
occurrences) 
13% (17 
occurrences) 
-46% 
Supercrip  3% (1 occurrence) 5% (7 occurrences) +67% 
Curing PTSD 31% (9 
occurrences) 
34% (44 
occurrences) 
+10% 
Recovery through 
Service 
0% (0 occurrences) 7% (9 occurrences) +700% 
Recovery through 
Pharmaceuticals 
7% (2 occurrences) 12% (16 
occurrences) 
+71% 
Recovery through 
Therapy  
34% (10 
occurrences) 
26% (34 
occurrences) 
-24% 
Total 29 occurrences 127 occurrences  +338% 
Note: Many articles contained more than one of these narrative themes, while others (e.g. 
articles on animals’ experiences of trauma) contained none. As a result, the number of 
narrative occurrences may not correspond to the number of articles in a time period, and 
percentages may not sum to 100. 
 
As Graph F shows, the dramatic increase in articles on trauma after 9/11 came 
with an overall increase in percentages of narratives of recovery. More specifically, post-
9/11 narratives of recovery emphasize the use of pharmaceuticals, curing PTSD, recovery 
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through a return to service, and overcoming stories that invoke the notion of the 
supercrip. Most articles presented narratives that blended these themes together.  
Take, for example, the 2013 article “Can Service Save Us” wherein readers are 
told about Ian Smith, a veteran who had done two tours in Iraq (Klein). Ian “lived on his 
couch, with his pistol. He didn’t sleep much… got drunk every night and slept with his 
gun under his bed. He gained 60 Ibs. since leaving the army… his girlfriend left him. He 
put the gun to his head several times” (Klein). Most importantly, “he absolutely refused 
to believe he was suffering from PTSD” (Klein). This was until Ian was recruited to come 
to St. Louis for a weekend service project with the organization Mission Continues. 
There, “almost without noticing it,” Ian started feeling better (Klein). Ian recalled, 
“Nobody can argue with helping to paint a wall for a disabled or homeless kid. That’s 
just good. There’s no bad in that” (Klein). That night, TIME reports, Ian “really slept… 
for the first time in months” (Klein). From there, Ian applied for a sixth month public-
service fellowship with Mission Continues, then joined its staff (Klein). Eventually he 
served as an intern with Joining Forces, Michelle Obama’s organization to help Iraq and 
Afghanistan veterans (Klein). The article concludes by telling the reader that Ian is now 
completing a degree in international studies at Washington University in St. Louis.  
In narratives like this, we see examples of what David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. 
Snyder have termed “ablenationalism,” wherein disability is “an increasingly malleable 
form of deviance tamed for the good of the nation, a potential participant in the inflows 
and outflows of globalizations” (17). Within ablenationalism, disabled people are 
increasingly positioned as a population ready to serve others for the good of the nation-
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state, and as such they are no longer positioned as burdens or financial drains on social 
resources (Mitchell and Synder 17).  Within the archive, there exists a paradox where one 
must be “made of the right stuff” in order to claim trauma, and also “made of the right 
stuff” in order to “overcome” it (McNamee and Miller 25). It is one’s proximity to 
whiteness, to upper-middle-class socioeconomic financial stability, to 
cisheteronormativity, to ablebody and ableminded norms—to normative citizenship—that 
determine whether your experience of trauma will be recognized. Most alarmingly, it is 
people and populations who do not have these privileges that are more likely to 
experience systemic and endemic traumas. Moreover, narratives such as Ian’s are 
positioned as the proper way to be a traumatized subject. 
This is because under traumatocracy, the problem of trauma is not the impact of 
trauma on the traumatized person but the potential impact of trauma on nation. If a 
traumatized person does not recover properly (like Ian did), PTSD leads the traumatized 
person to crime, to domestic violence, to the inability to hold a job, to drug use, to failure 
at parenthood, to suicide, and to significant financial burden on the U.S. Government. 
What's more, because veterans (and others who experience trauma) have so much shame 
around their trauma, they don’t ask for help when the resources they could use are 
available. In these ways, the archive illustrates that, as it is constructed, the 
overwhelming problem of trauma is not the debilitation of the traumatized person or 
populations that have been traumatized, but that this instance of trauma will now cause an 
innocent bystander to become traumatized. Traumatized people are therefore threats to 
the nation. 
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As Graph G indicates, this shows up in the archive in several alarming ways. 
Traumatized individuals are shamed/blamed for denying or rejecting their own traumas. 
They are criticized for failing to hold down jobs, not getting out of bed, drinking too 
much, or having legal trouble. Suicide rates and ideation are reported regularly. 
Traumatized individuals are represented as poor or improper family members. Articles 
report on traumatized individuals as criminals or turning to crime. Even as the above 
narratives of ablenationalism emerge, the financial costs of PTSD for the U.S. 
Government are still routinely reported, as well as the negative impact of PTSD on 
military operations.   
 
Graph G: Pre- and Post- 9/11 Socially Unacceptable Consequences of Trauma  
% of all articles in each time period that contain each consequence 
 
Consequence type Pre 9/11  
(29 articles)  
Post 9/11 
(129 articles)  
Percent Change 
(in percent of 
articles containing 
each consequence) 
Denial/rejection/ref
usal to recognize 
they have trauma 
7% (2 occurrences) 10% (13 
occurrences) 
+43% 
Failure to perform 
proper adulthood 
17% (5 
occurrences) 
11% (14 
occurrences) 
-35% 
Financial burden 14% (4 
occurrences) 
13% (17 
occurrences) 
-7% 
Criminality 31% (9 
occurrences) 
25% (32 
occurrences) 
-19% 
Negative impact on 
family 
31% (9 
occurrences) 
16% (20 
occurrences) 
-48% 
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Negative impact on 
military 
0% (0 occurrences) 3% (4 occurrences) +300% 
Suicide 7% (2 occurrences) 9% (12 
occurrences) 
+29% 
Total 31 occurrences 112 occurrences  +261% 
Note: Many articles contained more than one of these consequence types, while others 
contained none. As a result, the number of consequence occurrences may not correspond 
to the number of articles in a time period, and percentages may not sum to 100. 
 
 Again, after 9/11 we see an overall increase in percentages of these narratives of 
socially unacceptable consequences to trauma. After 9/11, we see a strong increase (43%) 
in traumatized people denying, rejecting or refusing their traumas. Looking at the 
archival evidence alone, this could be because pre-9/11 discourse positions people with 
PTSD as failed subjects, citizens, and family members. After 9/11, we also see reporting 
for the first time on the negative impacts of PTSD on the military and a rise in reports on 
suicide. All other narratives of the socially unacceptable consequences of trauma trend 
downward in percentages after 9/11. I contend that this directly corresponds with the data 
in Graph F. Taken together, these two data sets show that 9/11 ushered in a discursive 
shift wherein the dominant discourses of Trauma/PTSD emphasize overcoming and 
recovering as requirements of normative citizenship.      
 
Tenant Two: Trauma is individualized  
  Under the current traumatocracy, we see an overarching refusal to consider, 
critique, let alone work to change any of the systemic, institutionalized causes of or 
inadequate responses to trauma. This is followed by little to no consideration of the 
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unequal distribution of resources toward living within traumatic circumstances or 
rebuilding livelihood after traumatic experiences. This, of course, builds upon the 
narrative framework outlined above wherein a prior state of presumed safety and security 
is predicated on proximity to whiteness, upper-middle-class socioeconomic status, 
cisheteronormativity, able-bodymindness, and U.S. citizenship. Moreover, throughout the 
archive, there is a general understanding that trauma is something that occurs naturally 
both within society and within the person who becomes traumatized.  
It can certainly be argued that there are traumatic accidents where no person or 
institution could be found at fault. However, these instances are used as red herrings. The 
vast majority of traumas can be attributed either to systemic, institutional violence or to 
systemic, institutional neglect. As has been theorized by countless Women of Color 
feminists, these traumas—acts of enslavement, state violence, war, settler colonialism, 
genocide, imperialism, etc.—are deliberate, endemic, systemic and ongoing. Even when 
direct interpersonal violence or neglect may be found responsible for the trauma at hand, 
it is often part of broader systemic and cultural issues and cannot be taken out of that 
context. Then, after the trauma has been experienced, the underlying assumption serving 
as a foundation for this tenet of traumatocracy is that Trauma/PTSD is an individual 
problem that must be addressed on an individual basis. Here, just as with other forms of 
violence, even when trauma is experienced collectively or nationally, it is up to the 
individual to address the problem of trauma and recover to their presumed pre-
traumatized state. Those who cannot do so are deemed failed citizens.  
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For instance, a 2003 article details the “surprisingly high percentages” of children 
vulnerable to PTSD and discusses a research study with youth (ages 12-17) who have 
experienced traumas such as sexual and physical assaults, or violence involving guns or 
knives (Gupta 2003). In a survey of over four thousand American youth, nearly 4% of 
boys and 6% of girls had symptoms of PTSD and “nearly three quarters of those who met 
the criteria for PTSD had also experienced major depression, substance abuse or 
substance dependence,” the article reports. The article goes on to say that “treatment 
techniques have also improved” based on reports from a program developed in “two 
economically disadvantaged schools in East Los Angeles” (Gupta 2003). Here, even 
though the trauma is situated systemically—where race is coded through class and 
location—trauma is still understood as an issue affecting individual children. After 10 
sessions in the treatment program, “students had significantly fewer symptoms of PTSD 
than children who got no treatment” (Gupta 2003). In other words, it is up to the children 
to receive treatment properly and to alter their behaviors accordingly (e.g., to show fewer 
symptoms). There is no consideration of the systemic oppressions that produced the 
context from which the traumas arose. Put another way, in order to elevate trauma as a 
recognizable category, the dominant discourse emphasizes that we change the 
traumatized person rather than the traumatizing environment.  
Along with a lack of systemic understanding of trauma, U.S. dominant discourse 
rarely holds the U.S. nation-state accountable for its traumatizing actions. On the 
contrary, the U.S. Government is routinely positioned as either a benevolent benefactor 
working to elevate the harms of PTSD or as the encumbered overseer carrying the 
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burdens of PTSD for us all. Out of 158 total articles discussing psychological trauma, 
there were three articles that came close to holding the government responsible for its 
traumatizing actions. In an article from 1986, TIME reports that a Philadelphia 
commission ruled against the police who in 1985 bombed the fortified MOVE row house 
destroying 61 homes, killing six radical activists and five of their children. The 
commission goes on to note that “the bombing would not have happened had the house 
been in a comparable white neighborhood” (TIME 1986). While the word trauma is not 
used in the article, but rather alluded to, this is the only instance of the three articles, or of 
the archive at large, wherein the U.S. government is held accountable in any way for its 
racialized traumatizing actions.  
The other two articles in the archive that come close to holding the U.S. nation-
state accountable for its enacting of trauma came after 9/11. However, these two articles 
are far more nuanced and forgiving. In an article from 2012, entitled, “Enough is 
Enough,” Joe Klein details the horrors U.S. veterans experience overseas and when they 
come home suffering with traumatic brain injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Klein’s title proclaims, “Ten is Enough”—and yet he concludes, “we have accomplished 
a lot.” So, while on the one hand Klein holds the government responsible for the troops’ 
trauma, he justifies it on the other.  
The last article that attempts to hold the U.S. nation-state accountable is a 2016 
interview with Sebastian Junger. Junger is a journalist whose book Tribe: On 
Homecoming and Belonging asserts that “vets aren’t messed up. We are. We as a society” 
(Vick 2016). While some of Junger’s finer critiques may be valid, his overall arguments 
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is problematic at best. Junger asserts that things are “clearer and simpler at war” because 
we can find meaning, purpose, and a sense of belonging (Vick). That veterans lose this 
sense of belonging when they come home—not war itself—lies at the root of the problem 
of PTSD, according to Junger. Here, an astute critique of the U.S. as a “consumer-driven 
individualistic society” that’s alienating and bad for our mental health, ultimately gets 
lost in a diatribe that promotes further neo-colonial violence, war, and trauma.  
Moreover, rather than hold the U.S. nation-state accountable for its role in 
traumatizing people and/or populations, the narratives within the archive repeatedly 
characterize the U.S. Government and its subsidiaries as working to help those who have 
been traumatized and/or as carrying the burden of trauma for the nation. While in 
actuality the State permits and perpetrates traumatic violence, within these narratives the 
State is positioned as a savior. For example, a 2014 article notes that a $1.9 million 
federal Department of Education grant “will help pay for therapy and support after the 
Sandy Hook massacre.” What’s striking about this article is that it is the only piece in the 
archive to mention Sandy Hook—again, with no critique of national gun culture or gun 
laws, but instead with praise of the government’s grant toward “assisting and supporting 
the healing and recovery of Newtown” (Nicks 2014). With the rise in articles addressing 
veteran- and war-related trauma, there is also repeated attention to the Department of 
Defense and the Veterans Administration for mental health care, with a total of 44 
articles that position the State as the medical authority for trauma care. Similarly, there 
are 35 articles discussing research that is attempting to find a cure for PTSD.  
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This reporting does not appear without critiques of the State. For instance, a 2014 
article, titled “Veterans Affairs Needs to Get a Clue About PTSD Treatment” notes that 
the DOD and VA spent $294 million and $3 million on respectively on treatment in 2012, 
but neither agency “have a clue” if the treatment is helping (Frueh 2014). Indeed, this is 
where the narrative shifts insofar as the U.S. Government is not only the benevolent 
caretaker, but also carries the burden of PTSD. While many articles do question the 
government's spending, it is never that they should spend less on our veterans, but rather 
that they should do so more wisely, i.e., “get a clue.” As shown in Graph H, there are a 
total of 21 articles (or 10%) that mention the financial cost of PTSD to the nation-state. It 
is this considerable financial burden that bears repeating and critiquing, not the wars 
themselves or the other systems of violence and oppression that traumatize in the first 
place. 
Lastly, and consequently, there is little to no consideration of the relationship 
between the unequal distribution of life chances, or of experiences of precarity and 
debility, among historically oppressed populations, both nationally and globally, and their 
propensity to experiences of trauma. In the archive this appears in two ways. First, three 
out of five articles discussing trauma occurring outside of the U.S. after 9/11 pose trauma 
in such a way that “we” can help “them” overcome their tragedy. Second, this kind of 
global othering is of course paired with very little mention of any kind about systemic 
inequalities in the U.S.  
For example, in a 2010 article on the BP Oil Spill the author notes the limited 
resources in New Orleans, only to follow it up with two paragraphs explaining that “if 
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anyone can bounce back from the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history, it’s the 
people of this region who’ve survived hurricanes, corrupt state governments, the once 
hopeless New Orleans Saints, and more.” The article goes on to explain that for residents, 
“surviving and eventually thriving may require residents to let go of their anger and 
perhaps even put aside a quest for legal justice.” (Walsh). The article reports that research 
has shown that “the biggest predictor of sustained stress years after” such an event comes 
from when residents are forced to relive the experience as litigants in a court case. It is 
for this reason that Kenneth Feinberg—the independent lawyer running the $20 billion 
compensation fund, who previously in the article explained that he doesn’t think mental 
health claims will qualify—advises Gulf residents to “get a check, and move on as best 
you can” (Walsh).   
Here we see that historically oppressed populations within the U.S.—specifically 
poor racialized populations—are narratively framed as resilient to trauma. While the 
nuances of the racialized discourses of resiliency are beyond the scope of this chapter, its 
significant to note that they appeared in the archive alongside narratives that encouraged 
traumatized populations to forgo legal recognition/retribution for their traumas. As the 
archive shows, traumatized people are made resilient when institutional, systemic, or 
endemic traumas need to be minimized for the sake of the nation-state.  
 
 Tenet Three: The Medical Model  
  Lastly, traumatocracy demands that there is wide dismissal of cultural differences 
or preferences in understanding and processing both traumatic events themselves and 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
75 
 
 
living life afterward. Put another way, the formation of trauma as it is presented 
throughout the archive is defined by dominant knowledge epistemes.  Not only does this 
erase other subjugated ways of being and knowing in the world—this, of course, also 
elevates an understanding of trauma rooted in Freudian psychoanalysis, understood 
through the DSM, and conferred through the U.S.-based medical-industrial complex. As 
with other ontological or phenomenological experiences denoted as mental illness, 
narratives of Trauma/PTSD are deeply structured by the Medical Model of Disability.   
In addition to way trauma is positioned as an individual problem in tenet two, this 
becomes apparent in the archive in two other ways. First, as one might expect from 
journalistic endeavors, there is an over reliance on “experts” to name and explain trauma 
with very little room for the voices of traumatized individuals to speak themselves. Out 
of 158 articles on psychological trauma, only three (merely 1.9%) were penned by 
authors writing about their own experience or perspective as a person living with 
Trauma/PTSD (Cossett, Owen, Smith). This leaves 98.1% of the articles turning to 
“experts” of all kinds - military, medical, psychological, and legal to further makes sense 
of trauma. With this, there is an attentiveness to sorting out “who is at risk” for trauma, 
how to “cure” trauma, and kind of narrative assurance of the rates at which PTSD can be 
treated with both therapy and medication (see Graph G). As one 2004 article proclaims, 
“the good news is that PTSD can be successfully treated by a wide range of techniques 
including cognitive-behavioral therapy and drugs like Paxil and Zoloft” (Wallis). Here 
we see what is repeated throughout the archive—therapy and medication are touted as the 
paths toward recovery—with no historical consideration toward reasons why individuals 
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or populations may find these particular recovery methods unappealing, problematic, or 
oppressive.   
  Second, there are limited narratives of alternative approaches to recovery or living 
life with trauma—all of which appeared after 9/11. Two articles discussed research on 
MDMA, or ecstasy, as a possible treatment or cure for PTSD (Cloud 2001, 2007). One 
article from 2016 reports on the use of virtual reality technologies to treat PTSD and 
chronic pain (Sifferlin). Lastly, two articles from 2016 discuss “post-traumatic 
marijuana” or marijuana’s therapeutic value for traumatized individuals, particularly 
veterans (Thompson). What’s important to note about these narratives is that while they 
offer alternative approaches to the traditional medicines and therapies, they do so within 
the same narrative structure of overcoming and curing PTSD. Indeed, one of the 2016 
articles on marijuana use among veterans ends with a quote by Jose Martinez who 
explains that he used to fear “the outside world” (Thompson). The article concludes that 
now, “he credits marijuana with reintroducing him to the human race. ‘Smoking 
marijuana,’ he says, ‘has slowly made me become the person I used to be.’”  
Under this tenet of the current traumatocracy, the narratives of Trauma/PTSD that 
are recognized within the dominant discourses are those narratives that align with either 
the medical-industrial-complex and/or the imperative to transcend trauma via recovery. 
Again, here I situate discourses of Trauma/PTSD within Foucauldian notions of 
disciplinary and biopolitical power (Brandzel 12).  
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Conclusion: Life Under a Traumatocracy  
 TIME magazine does not just reflect trauma culture, it produces it. As the archive 
has shown, throughout this chapter, certain narratives of Trauma/PTSD are made 
hypervisible while others are minimized and/or erased. This is no accident. It is a socio-
political discursive regime that I call a traumatocracy and it bears heavy consequences, 
particularly for oppressed populations. These dominant discourses shape how we come to 
know trauma culturally. They establish who gets to claim trauma, what traumas count as 
Trauma, and what kinds of trauma narratives are recognized as such. Furthermore, these 
discourses shape how we come to think about recovery and healing. Thus, I am arguing 
that, in producing trauma narratives such as it does, TIME magazine participates in a 
project of normative citizenship. This is constitutively an act of exclusion and violence. 
TIME is not unique or an exception, but rather indicative of dominant and mainstream 
U.S. culture.     
Indeed, I am arguing the cultural dominance of these narratives and this 
discursive construction of PTSD cannot account for the traumatic experiences of 
society’s most vulnerable, most notably, those who are relegated outside the bounds of 
normative citizenship in some way. In short, this is why after coming out years ago in a 
very uncomfortable conversation with a colleague as having been diagnosed with PTSD, 
I received the response: “But wait—you’re not a veteran! How can you have PTSD?” 
Despite my educated whiteness, as a queer disabled woman, my trauma is suspect. While 
it may seem like all the recent talk about Trauma is “raising awareness,” I’m arguing that 
in this traumatocracy, dominant discourse around Trauma is actually doing irreparable 
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harm to a vast majority of those who are traumatized. Under a traumatocracy, these 
discourses of Trauma/PTSD are not meant to account for the lives of the most 
marginalized, or those most likely to experience systemic and historical traumas, but 
instead to serve the nation-state’s interests via formations of normative citizenship. This 
is why we must begin to conceptualize new ways of thinking through trauma altogether.  
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Chapter Two:  
 
Toward a Feminist Queer Crip Theory of Trauma 
OR: When Emma González’s Silence Said Everything  
 
I may feel that without some recognizability I cannot live. But I may also feel that the 
terms by which I am recognized make life unlivable. This is the juncture at which critique 
emerges, where critique is understood as an interrogation of the terms by which life is 
constrained in order to open up the possibility of different modes of living; in other 
words, not to celebrate difference as such but to establish more inclusive conditions for 
sheltering and maintaining life that resists models of assimilation.  
- Judith Butler, Undoing Gender, p.4 
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In a high-profile opinion piece for Time magazine’s “100 Most Influential People 
of 2018,” President Barak Obama wrote that the survivor-activists of the February 14 
mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, had 
changed the gun debate in America (Obama). There is a usual and predictable response to 
these tragedies, President Obama tells his readers. “We mourn. Offer thoughts and 
prayers. Speculate about the motives. And then… the political debate spirals into 
acrimony and paralysis” (Obama). This time, though, something was different. This time, 
according to the President, the students of the high school who survived the mass 
shooting were changing this response pattern—changing the terms of the debate—all 
together.  
Obama is not alone in this assessment. Within weeks of the shooting, the media’s 
focus shifted from the narrative trajectory the then-president so astutely described to the 
survivor-activists who were now dominating the news headlines and social media 
newsfeeds. On February 20, 2018, David Cullen of Politico Magazine wrote, “I’ve been 
covering mass shootings for decades. I’ve never seen a phenomenon like these students” 
(Cullen). On February 21, The Washington Post published a piece deliberating “Why the 
Parkland Kids Might Be Different” (Roberts). And on February 28, Michelle Cottle of 
the Atlantic contemplated “How Parkland Students Changed the Gun Debate.” These are 
but a few examples of the media frenzy surrounding the survivor-activists from Parkland.  
 Indeed, the organizing efforts and media savvy of the Parkland survivor-activists 
is to be commended. Through not only protests, marches, and visits to their state capital 
and to Washington D.C., and more importantly through their continued disruption of the 
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gun debate via social media, the Parkland survivor-activists were refusing to allow the 
discourse to “spiral into acrimony and paralysis” (Cottle; Obama). Their ability to 
manipulate the media to their advantage, utilize social media to further their cause, and 
publicly outwit their opponents left even the most “jaded political and media types” 
impressed (Cottle). However, as I will argue in this chapter, the Parkland survivor-
activists were doing much more than disrupting our nation’s tired response patterns to 
mass shootings, gun violence, and trauma. In what follows I will analyze a nationally 
broadcast speech of one of the survivor-activists, Emma González, to contend that the 
youth of Parkland were creating new, alternative narratives of trauma writ large—if only 
we know how to hear them.  
 
On March 24, 2018, Emma González stood at the Capital rallying youth around 
the country. González is a bisexual-identified young person of color, whose shaved head 
and green jacket, adorned with countless pins and patches, signify a kind radicalism that 
makes her not only a target of the far Right, but unfortunately also that of many so-called 
“mainstream Americans”.5
In her speech, González emphasizes the unpredictability and incomprehensibility 
of trauma, the tragedy of unfulfilled lives, and the unsettling knowledges that the 
survivors now carry with them. In a poetic refrain, González explains: “No one 
understood…” “No one could believe…” “No one knew…” “No one could 
comprehend…” (González). She then speaks the names of her classmates killed in the 
shooting. “Aaron Feis will never call Keira Miss Sunshine. Alex Schachter will never 
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walk into school with his brother Ryan” (González). She continues to name every slain 
classmate trailing off with the words “would never…” “would never...” “would never…” 
(Gonzalez). Then she stops speaking entirely. For more than four minutes, González 
remains completely silent, creating an unnerving tension and holding her audience in it. 
She refuses to break this tension even as the live audience in D.C. shouts, claps, chants, 
and does everything possible to interrupt the pain they see in González, who at one point 
closes her eyes in tears and visible distress. The cameras shuffle nervously back and forth 
between the crowd and González during this silence at nine times the rate they had 
shifted during the first part of her speech. The silence and tension continue until 
González has been out on the stage for six minutes and twenty seconds, in silence for 
over half of that time. 
One of the coping mechanisms I’ve developed over the decades of my life in 
trauma has been not to cry. It's a way of surviving in a world that bombards you with 
narratives about your existence that do nothing but negate your existence. But I can’t stop 
crying when I watch Emma’s speech and feel her silence as my own silence. I am so 
angry, so intensely angry that no one will shut up and be quiet with her. It seems as if no 
one in the crowd can just be with her and be what she needed right then. No one knew 
how to hear her. They push their narratives onto her. “GO EMMA!” shouts some loud 
man. “Go EMMA! You can do it!”  
She knows she can do it. She is doing it! Shut up and listen to her. She is saying 
everything. She is saying everything! Right now! You just aren’t listening because she 
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isn’t speaking in your words. She’s speaking in silences, and you don’t know how to hear 
it.  “NEVER AGAIN! NEVER AGAIN! NEVER AGAIN!” you shout. Stop shouting. 
Stop talking. Listen. Listen to Emma. Listen to us. Listen to us. Listen to me.  
Then, Emma starts to cry and I cry harder. I think about all the narratives people 
have been putting onto me my entire life. So many have said, “You’re such an 
inspiration,” and “It’s such a miracle you didn’t die,” and “See, if other people like you 
just worked as hard…” And I think about how Emma is experiencing these sentiments on 
national level on top of dealing with the trauma she is living through and within her 
bodymind every day. It feels like my heart is breaking. I just cry. I break. I cannot 
breathe… and then the room starts to spin… and all I can think about are the people who 
can’t breathe because of their trauma… all the people, alive and dead… 
This is why I was in tears when I heard Emma speak. I didn’t realize it exactly in 
that moment, but my heart has been searching for a narrative like Emma’s for decades. 
While the audience couldn’t sit still with her silence and her apparently unfinished 
thoughts, her silence said everything to me.  
I’ve never lived through a school shooting. Emma’s trauma is not my own. But 
our traumas are not so disconnected either. You see, I was a child who lived through gun 
violence in the context of domestic abuse within the first ten years of my life. As I grew 
up, I grew into more traumas, including sexual violences and a disabling car accident—
all of which are compounded into my bodymind and into my selfhood. I risk the 
vulnerability of naming my own traumas publicly, purposefully to break the unspoken 
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code in academia wherein we pretend not to be fully human. But in doing so, I also risk 
the performative wherein, despite the qualifiers, my narrative of trauma is read as 
authenticating me into a wounded subjecthood. This is the paradox of trauma narrative. 
Many presume that trauma cannot be spoken because the experience is so horrifying that 
it cannot be narrated. No. Trauma can be narrated. The problem is that there are few 
discursive spaces that allow the speaker to be heard.  
Once traumatized, you’re trapped in a narrative limbo; a discursive bind. If you 
speak of your trauma(s), you’re pitied. You’re broken. You’re in need of help. Therapy. 
Recovery. God. Healing. You’re a part of tragic story to be learned from, avoided, 
analyzed, and/or debated. Your life becomes a hashtag and news headline. You're 
someone for whom others should feel sorry, or perhaps someone toward whom others 
should focus their empathy. You’re a miracle, maybe. Perhaps, you’re told you’re here 
because God had other plans for you. You are inspirational. You’re motivational. You 
certainly now know the meaning of life. If you speak your traumas, your experience is 
turned into platitudes. If you want your story to be understood—to be heard—you must 
tell it in a typical narrative structure, despite the fact that nothing feels typical or 
structured about what you’re going through or living with now. 6 Regardless of what you 
say, your narrative will likely be taken from you and become an Oprah Special or a 
Lifetime movie. You become a poster child. These narrative frameworks turn trauma into 
a commodity, easy for others to consume—a spectacle for an audience to take in without 
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having to truly bear witness to the atrocity at hand or having to face their own 
sociopolitical belief systems.  
Indeed, how we come to understand trauma is deeply political. What counts as 
trauma, who gets to claim trauma, and what narratives of trauma are recognized as such 
are all deeply political questions. In using the term political, I mean to suggest that 
trauma is embedded within the sociocultural systems of privilege and oppression that 
distribute life chances based on intersecting forces of inequity. However, if by chance 
trauma is recognized as political—as situated within these structures of violence and 
inequalities—the current narrative frameworks are not much better. In these instances, 
one quickly becomes what Yasmin Nair calls the “ideal subject for neoliberalism” 
wherein one’s trauma is used to authentic their subjecthood and place the State, or other 
neoliberalized bureaucracies, as their savior (Nair). Under current social movements, 
narrations of trauma become a prerequisite to legitimate one’s access to resources and/or 
to make claims for broader social transformation (Nair). Yet, if one doesn’t speak of their 
trauma then what pathways toward healing do they have? What resources toward justice? 
What possibilities toward social and/or communal recognition?  
Nair’s critique haunts me. I know that my attempts to resist the “Poster Child” 
and the inspirational “trauma-and-recovery” narratives have meant that I’ve been 
interpellated into this ideal subject for neoliberalism. I have played this game for access 
to resources so that I could live a livable life in a bodymind rife with pain and suffering. I 
know that in every instance that I speak of the trauma knowledges—the cripistemologies 
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of trauma—that I carry in my bodymind, I further risk someone concluding that I am 
using my trauma to authenticate my claims for social justice. I risk someone concluding 
that I am relying on a “wounded identity.” As though my claims for social justice could 
not stand on their own. (They can.) As though I would not be making them if I did not live 
with this trauma in my bodymind. (I would.) And still, my claims for social justice come 
not despite my disabling trauma but through it, and with it fully. They are a part of my 
trauma knowledges – my cripistemologies. I find myself agreeing completely with Nair 
that social justice movements and claims for social transformation should not and cannot 
need trauma to authenticate them. I also find myself believing in the power of opening up 
the concept of trauma and its epistemologies, because in doing so we move toward 
Disability Justice. We move toward new ways of being and knowing with one another 
that do not rely on “woundedness or injury” but rather on interdependence, wholeness, 
sustainability, accessibility and anti-capitalist politics (Berne). Nair’s critique is sharp, 
partly in that it astutely penetrates the ways that trauma narratives are usurped by 
neoliberalism for its own gain, and partly in that it cuts—it cuts out potential for 
cripistemologies as a building block for collective and social transformation.  
In this chapter I analyze González’s speech as a Feminist Queer Crip theory of 
trauma. This chapter is part analysis, part theory, and part process. Methodologically, it’s 
messy, but that’s because trauma is messy and demands nothing less of us as scholars. In 
Part One, I begin by proposing a feminist, queer, and crip approach to trauma as the 
necessary bridge between Critical Trauma Studies and Critical Disability Studies. What's 
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more, I contend that it is the particular interdisciplinary trifecta of feminist, queer, and 
crip that allows for a critical approach to both to the sociocultural implications of trauma 
and the embodied material realities of traumatization that not otherwise available. Next, 
in Part Two, I read González’s speech to offer my reconceptualization and working 
definition of trauma as an embodied, affective structure that must be considered outside 
the medical model of disability. Here, I extend the Critical Trauma Studies argument that 
we must situate trauma as a socially constructed rubric of meaning-making that is deeply 
embedded within the intersecting social systems of power and oppression. Then, Part 
Three situates González’s speech, as trauma writ large, within Alison Kafer’s 
Political/Relational Model of Disability and proposes four tenets of a Feminist Queer 
Crip approach to trauma.  
Taken together, I argue that González’s speech offers a new way to understand 
and respond to trauma, outside the strongholds of hegemony. By utilizing feminist, queer, 
crip methodologies to analyze González, new frameworks emerge for understanding 
trauma itself; for recognizing its knowledges; and for situating its political and coalitional 
potentiality. In doing so, complex narratives, counter-narratives, and multiple narratives 
of trauma become possible. Trauma knowledges become possible. Cognization, political 
coalition, and collective action become possible. Most importantly, healing becomes 
possible – both personally and communally.  As President Obama remarked, González—
as a survivor-activist from Parkland—is in fact changing the debate on gun violence in 
America. But she is doing so in more ways than just disrupting the media and political 
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spectacle of it all. She is offering a new narrative of trauma—if only we learn how to 
listen.  
 
Part One: Redefining Trauma  
While the definition of trauma is highly debated, leading trauma theorist Cathy 
Caruth explains that trauma is generally described as "the response to an unexpected or 
overwhelming violent event or events that are not fully grasped as they occur, but return 
later in repeated flashbacks, nightmares, and other repetitive phenomena” (Caruth 91). 
While González’s experience may certainly fit within this generalized definition, I 
contend that such a mainstream, pathologizing understanding of trauma limits the 
audience's ability to hear and sit with her trauma narrative. In order to make space for 
more narratives—and narrative recognition—of trauma, we must begin by establishing a 
new framework for understanding such experiences. More specifically, we must start 
with redefining trauma; we must come to understand trauma from outside the scope of 
pathology that currently defines and overshadows it.  
In recent years, critical theorists have moved away from such frameworks of 
trauma (Casper and Wertheimer 2). My work is indebted to and in conversation with 
scholars within critical trauma studies that attend “to the ways that the category of 
‘trauma’ reveals and unsettles cultural classification systems” (Casper and Wertheimer 
6). Indeed, critical trauma theorist Maurice E. Stevens remarks that “trauma is not simply 
a concept that describes particularly overwhelming events, nor is it simply a category that 
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‘holds’ people who have been undone by such events; but it is a cultural object whose 
function produces particular types of subjects and predisposes specific affect flows that it 
then manages and ultimately shunts into political projects of various types” (20). As a 
field, great work is being done within critical trauma studies to interrogate these political 
projects, particularly with regard to the relationship between trauma and the nation-state 
(Fassin & Rechtman).   
While any individual may experience hardship, crisis, and catastrophe, trauma is 
marked by an affective embodiment - a disabling phenomenological modality that is 
specific, not to the horrendousness of an event or events, but rather to the nuanced, 
affective structure that follows. It is a way of being, feeling and knowing in the world. 
This affective structure may be, but is not always, accompanied by temporal-spatial, 
ontological, and epistemological instabilities. For individuals and populations who have 
access to resources, the embodied affective structure of trauma may come and go. For 
those individuals and populations who are denied access to resources and life chances, 
the affective structure of trauma hardens and is passed down through generations. It is 
rarely recognized as trauma though, but rather it is racialized, gendered, pathologized, 
and criminalized.  
In this way, I am arguing that the hyper attention placed on the so-called 
traumatic “events of origin” is misguided and that our definition of trauma must be 
untethered from the “event” that caused it. Focusing on what causes trauma only leads to 
a hierarchy of “what counts” as trauma and what events are “traumatic” enough. The 
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affective structures of trauma may come from a catastrophic “exceptional” event for one 
person, or it might come from what Lauren Berlant calls “crisis ordinariness” for another 
person (10). Again, the affect of trauma may be passed down from one generation to 
another (Yehuda). The causes of trauma matter only insofar as we are concerned with 
working to elevate the structural inequalities that leave certain, particular (read racialized, 
classed, disabled) populations more vulnerable to trauma than others. While González’s 
speech centers her reflections after a horrifying event, analyzing her words from this 
feminist queer crip perspective makes it clear that trauma is not about the event per se, 
but rather about the affect and its proceeding ontological, epistemological and spatial-
temporal shifts. Indeed, my close readings of González’s speech shows that her trauma 
narrative emphasizes these trauma knowledges, rather than the event itself.  
While these ideas appear to be theoretical in nature, I present them with a 
profound belief in the power of theory for healing. Something dramatic happened for me 
when I began to think about my trauma as an embodied affect that I no longer needed to 
“overcome,” but rather needed to accept as a new way of moving through and knowing 
the world. I was able to find a kind of composure during my “break downs” when I 
started to think about my selfhood as fluid rather than in need of fixing. I begin to find a 
way to keep calm during my “flashbacks” when I began to imagine myself as 
experiencing a journey through crip spacetime - one that I need not forcefully interrupt 
but instead let play out with compassion. None of this came from therapy; it came from 
theory.  
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However, until very recently, disability studies has remained “remarkably silent” 
on matters of trauma, and trauma studies has said little about the social construction of 
“abnormality” (Morrison and Casper 2). In his 2004 piece, “Trauma without Disability, 
Disability without Trauma: A Disciplinary Divide,” James Berger argues that the two 
fields have differing “premises, methods, and goals” and that there is no shared 
conceptual vocabulary (Berger 563; Morrison and Casper 2). “Important political and 
intellectual work has been done” within Disability Studies, particularly through the 
development of the “social model” of disability, to “recast disability as something more 
than inherently traumatic” (Morrison and Casper 3). Historically as this work has been 
done within Disability Studies, non-apparent disabilities, including mental disabilities 
like trauma, have received less attention than physical disabilities. Trauma Studies, on the 
other hand, has remained either tied to psychoanalytic and clinical approaches of PTSD, 
or consumed with thinking through trauma as a metaphor (Berger 564-566). In its most 
abstract, 
Trauma theory describes the carrying-across, the meta-pherein, of subjectivity or 
culture across or through a traumatic crucible into a new linguistic, social, somatic 
world of symptoms, ruins, ideological construct and fantasies – all of which are 
indirect, symbolic, metaphoric figures for what occurred during the missing, 
obliterated, time of trauma. (Berger 566) 
 
Disability scholars and activists are highly critical of turning the embodied 
difference into metaphors, a move which has historically been used to further justify 
ableist ideologies and structural violence (Baynton 33). It is this emphasis on the 
sociopolitical that serves as the final distancing mechanism between Disability Studies 
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and Trauma Studies. Disability Studies arose out of a direct political movement and 
remains tied to that “spirit of advocacy” (Berger 571). With this, scholars in Disability 
Studies routinely employ personal narratives and claim a disabled identity. However, 
theorists of trauma, particularly those concerned with its semiotics, rarely situate their 
work as political or locate themselves within their theorizing (Berger 571). Yet despite 
these current hesitations, the integration of intellectual inquiries must develop more fully, 
because even though not all instances of disability are traumatic, many disabilities are 
produced by experiences of trauma (e.g., war, assaults, accidents). Moreover, disabilities, 
particularly those occurring later in life, do often come with the kind of immense loss, 
grief, and mourning typically attributed to trauma (Berger 571-572). And what’s more, 
people with (other) disabilities are likely to experience violence and trauma because of 
their marginalized position in society. Regardless of our academic trajectories, scholars 
from all fields must remember that embodied experiences of trauma and (other) disability 
can be as mutually constitutive as they can be mutually exclusive. As academics 
accountable to the lives of those we write about, our work must attend to these nuances. 
Furthermore, and as this dissertation argues, disability and trauma are bound conceptually 
through the same pathologizing and stigmatizing narrative forces.  
It is as a bridge between Disability Studies and Trauma Studies, and as a point of 
departure toward a new approach to trauma, that I borrow the methodological and 
theoretical framework from Alison Kafer’s 2013 monograph Feminist Queer Crip. 
Aligning myself with these terms, I too take up the intersectionality and 
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interdisciplinarity that structures Kafer’s work, as that approach illustrates the potential of 
understanding disability not as a research topic or object of study, but as a necessary 
analytic for any critical study of power and culture. Throughout the chapter, I am 
utilizing disability in this manner to examine the ways in which power is operating 
through the narrative constructs of trauma within American popular culture. Thus, my 
project is a “fundamentally coalitional text” wherein these three terms—feminist, queer, 
and crip—signify my interdisciplinary approach to the cultural narratives and discursive 
frameworks surrounding the disabling affect of trauma (Kafer 17).  
As a grounding methodology, feminist theory gives me the tools to question the 
essentialized (and pathologized) understanding of “the” traumatized bodymind. It also 
helps me question the systems of power and oppression surrounding trauma that 
consequently leave some traumatized people and populations with better life chances 
than others. Feminist theory challenges the inequalities in resources and social 
discriminations that can leave people and populations more vulnerable to trauma and 
move vulnerable after trauma. Of course, Black Feminist Theory demands thinking 
intersectionally and pushes my work to question how trauma is always already racialized, 
gendered, classed, and embedded in notions of citizenship. My project takes up feminist 
methods and theories in that it is inherently concerned with unequal distribution of life 
chances based on the intersectional markers of social difference.7 Addressing how 
disability is figured in, through, and alongside other categories of difference such as 
gender, race, class, sexuality, and citizenship, I extend these analyses to consider how 
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trauma works conceptually as a marker of social meaning-making (Kafer 17). Feminist 
approaches to trauma have long questioned the hegemonic underpinnings in its leading 
definitions. As feminist theorist and psychotherapist Laura S. Brown so succinctly notes, 
“trauma is thus that which disrupts these particular lives, but no other” (101). When 
reflecting on the 1987 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
criteria of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as including the person having 
“experienced an event that is outside the range of human experience,” Brown notes that 
“the range of human experience becomes the range of what is normal and usual in the 
lives of men and the dominant class; white, young, able-bodied, educated, middle-class, 
Christian Men” (101).8 While the definition has since been revised to remove the phrase 
“outside the range of human experience,” Brown’s reflection still stands. The trauma that 
is recognized is trauma that disrupts particular lives—lives that should not be disrupted. It 
is when a life that should not have been disrupted becomes so that crisis is named. When 
lives that are disposable are disrupted, no one notices—or, if anyone does, they do not 
likely stop to name it as such. With its attentiveness to intersectional critiques of systemic 
violences, feminism is a necessary analytic for theorizing trauma insofar as it considers 
the nuances of how institutional oppressions become mapped onto certain (read 
racialized, classed, gendered, colonized, disabled) populations and not others.  
My theorization of trauma is equally rooted in queer and crip theories. Through 
queer theory I am given the tools to question the normative, and therein, challenge the 
very structures and systems of power that construct the mainstream understanding both of 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
95 
 
 
trauma, and of the unmarked norm from which it is defined. When we are able to 
deconstruct the binary of “abnormal,” traumatized bodymind / “normal,” untraumatized 
bodymind, we are then able to demarcate the intersecting vectors of power and 
oppression that exist within the discourses of trauma/PTSD. With this, the social 
meanings and political implications—namely, the power—of such discourses in the lives 
of traumatized individuals/populations becomes clearer. It is this attentiveness to the 
potential radical politics of trauma that I draw most heavily from my queer theories and 
methodologies. Again, using queer theory we can reject essentialized and pathologized 
definitions of trauma and come to understand a socially constructed one that intersects 
with race, class, gender, sexuality, and citizenship.  
If queer theory is, at its basis, the study of the social categorization and hierarchy 
of the “normative” and the “deviant” – then a queer theory of trauma would first situate 
trauma within this categorization. Then it would ask: what might happen if deviant 
(traumatized) people rejected this framework? Embraced it? Worked in coalition against 
these forces of traumatization and oppression? Lastly, a queer approach to trauma would 
be wary of and resistant to institutional power. It is at this juncture that my work is 
indebted to Ann Cvetkovich who presents the predominant queer approach to trauma 
theory in her work, An Archive of Feeling. In a queer move that my project follows, 
Cvetkovich’s theorization soundly rejects pathologizing approaches to trauma and aims 
instead to “seize authority over trauma discourses from medical and clinical discourse in 
order to place it back in the hands of those who make cultures, as well as to forge new 
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models for how affective life can serve as the foundation for public culture” (Cvetkovich 
20). With this, Cvetkovich’s project shows us how the everyday artifacts of trauma 
produce an “affective experience that falls outside of institutionalized or stable forms of 
identity or politics” (17). My theorization of trauma is deeply informed by this queer 
approach to trauma as an affective experience that falls outside of institutionalized and 
stabilized forms of identity and politics. With its focus on challenging structures and 
ideologies of normativity, queer theory is a necessarily analytic for the study of trauma 
because it provides the methods needed to disrupt what circulates as “common sense” in 
both popular discourses and trauma theory writ large.  
Lastly, my approach to trauma is fundamentally a crip approach in that it seeks to 
“takes a sledgehammer to—that which has been concretized” about trauma in America’s 
imaginary (McRuer, Crip Theory 35). Like queer theory, crip theory unsettles what we 
assume to be naturalized or known about the bodymind. Crip theory does the similar 
analytic work as queer theory but does so while including—if not centering—(dis)ability 
as a vector of oppression.9 Canonized by Robert McRuer and Carrie Sandall as Crip 
theory, “cripping” as a verb and methodology “exposes the ways in which able-
bodiedness and able-mindedness get naturalized and the ways that bodies, minds, and 
impairments that should be at the absolute center of a space or issue or discussion get 
purged from that space or issue or discussion” (McRuer, Crip Times 23). My crip theory 
of trauma then seeks to center the traumatized bodymind at the absolute center of the 
discussion. It is also through crip theory that I come to question the compulsory able-
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bodymindedness within trauma discourse, what I call “stability trouble” (McRuer, Crip 
Theory X). Crip theory brings with it an embrace of fluidity, instability, and incoherency 
as potentially politically charged phenomena and positionalities. Furthermore, I hold 
space for trauma’s paradoxical locations. Trauma is thought to be held within the 
individual bodymind, yet its so-called “events of origin” happen in the outer world. 
Trauma is said to be psychological, yet its manifestations are so often somatic in nature. 
Trauma is also said to be deeply personal, yet its reverberations are felt collectively. In 
other words, trauma crips our understanding of the relationship between the bodymind 
and society.  
 When taken together a feminist queer crip (FQC) theory of trauma provides an 
intersectional, interdisciplinary approach to trauma that rejects the medicalization and 
pathologization of trauma that currently dominates popular discourse. Here it becomes 
possible to make sense of both the nuanced sociocultural implications of trauma and the 
embodied material realities of traumatization. A FQC theory of trauma provides an 
avenue to challenge the status quo and “common sense” embedded within mainstream 
discourses and theories of trauma/PTSD.  
Thus, in putting critical disability studies and critical trauma studies in 
conversation with one another through feminist, queer, and crip theories, I’ve come to a 
new way to understand trauma outside the bound of both pathology and hegemony. I 
define trauma as an embodied, affective structure that falls outside the hegemonic norms 
that constitute social recognizability, even as it is inscribed into and held deep within our 
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bodyminds. I use the phrase “affective structure” to denote a conglomeration of “visceral 
forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces 
insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought 
and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral)—a barely registering 
accretion of force-relations, or that can leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent 
intractability” (Seigworth and Gregg 1). I see these affective forces as intersecting, in 
such a way that they may at times structure one’s life in ways beyond one’s immediate 
control or consciousness. However, as González’s speech shows, when trauma is situated 
as the source of crip trauma knowledge, it stands as a personal and political force worthy 
of consideration rather than medicalization or pathologization.  
 
Part Two: Emma González’s Feminist Queer Crip (FQC) Trauma Narrative 
 To the everyday listener, González’s speech is about her experience during the 
Parkland shooting. To me, González’s entire speech, what she said and didn’t have to 
say, was clearly a reframing of trauma narrative altogether. In the section that follows I 
detail González’s speech to show what a FQC trauma narrative looks like. I argue that 
González’s speech epitomizes a FQC trauma narrative in four overlapping and nuanced 
ways. More specifically, through González’s speech, we see trauma as an embodied, 
affective structure that falls outside of social recognizability. We also see the ontological, 
epistemological, and spatial-temporal shifts that so often accompany trauma’s affect. 
Lastly, as I outline in part three, González helps us to resituate trauma in what Alison 
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Kafer calls the political/relational model of disability. When trauma is approached 
through FQC theory it becomes possible to forge political alliances and affinities toward 
broader social justice and collective healing—which is precisely what González’s speech 
aims to do.  
The first, and recurring, aspect of González’s speech we can understand as an 
FQC theory of trauma is her treatment of the role of time as it relates to trauma. The 
affective structural embodiment of trauma includes combating time (and space). Within 
the pathology of the DSM, this is characterized as flashbacks, nightmares, and triggers. 
But when González walks to the podium, we see her combating time with the look on her 
face. It says: I don’t have time for your welcoming cheers or chants. She taps the podium 
impatiently. She forces a contrived smile as she shows the audience her combat boots. 
Then, when she begins speaking, she begins with the concept of time: “Six minutes and 
about twenty seconds,” she says. “In a little over six minutes, seventeen of our friends 
were taken from us. Fifteen were injured.” (González). With this introduction she 
emphasizes the significance of time and how much can happen with so little of it. 
Somehow, she speaks with urgency and calmness simultaneously. In doing so, González 
begins to show us that time is fluid, bending and complex. She shows us how much 
normative time haunts traumatized individuals and how we must learn to navigate time in 
new, crip ways—about which Gonzáles says more momentarily.  
Her voice is low at the start but picks up inflection as she continues on. “And 
everyone,” she says, “absolutely everyone in the Douglas community was forever 
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altered.” In this one statement, with these few words, González speaks to the ontological 
instabilities of trauma directly. As brief as this statement is, its significance cannot be 
understated. This is the second way in which González’s speech can be understood as an 
FQC intervention in the understanding trauma. For González, trauma alters everyone in 
the community—not just the people at the school, not just the parents or loved ones, but 
“everyone” and “forever.” Here we see trauma creating a permanent shift, an alteration, 
in the community. The word “forever” is also worthy of note, in that González is 
signifying her belief that this change in the community is not only far-reaching and 
substantial, but that it is indefinite. While some might dismiss this wording as a nice turn 
of phrase or a melodramatic political plea, a FQC analysis of González speech reads her 
words as her subjugated knowledge. As a traumatized, queer bi-racial teenager it’s too 
easy to dismiss her as “too young to understand.” In truth, González is exactly the person 
who would understand.  
In her next statement, González continues to explain that this ontological shift, 
this alteration, is in fact directly related to a kind of knowledge production. This is the 
third way in which the speech can be understood as an FQC intervention in the 
understanding trauma. Here, González is establishing trauma as an epistemology. 
Moreover, I argue that it is what Robert McRuer and Merri Lisa Johnson have termed a 
“cripistemology” in that it is a way of knowing that comes through the disabled 
bodymind. Her statement is a cripistemology of trauma. González explains: “Everyone 
who was there understands.” With more forcefulness in her voice, she broadens the scope 
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of who is included in the traumatized community: “Everyone who has been touched by 
the cold grip of gun violence understands.” She then explains that what they all 
understand is a kind of not understanding: 
For us, long, tearful chaotic hours in the scorching afternoon sun were spent not 
knowing. No one understood the extent of what happened. No one could believe 
there were bodies in that building waiting to be identified for over a day. No one 
knew that the people who were missing had stopped breathing long before anyone 
of us had even known that a code red had been called. No could comprehend the 
devastating aftermath, or how far this would reach, or where this would go. 
(González)  
 
As Jack Halberstam explains, “any cripistemology worth its name should identify modes 
of not knowing, unknowing, and failure to know” (McRuer and Johnson 152). In these 
lines, González does just that. The new knowledge that trauma has brought to the 
community is one of not knowing, unknowing, and failure to know. But this is in itself a 
knowledge, for in the next line González says, “For those who still can’t comprehend, 
because they refuse to, I’ll tell you where it went. Right into the ground. Six feet deep.”  
Throughout this passage we see González doing two things simultaneously. First, 
she is creating a political in-group/out-group binary between those who understand an 
embodied knowledge of trauma’s unknowability through not knowing, and those who 
don’t understand the knowledge of trauma “because they refuse” to know. This refusal to 
know is particular kind of epistemic injustice that feminist philosopher Gaile Pohlhaus 
calls “willful hermeneutical ignorance” (722). As a kind of epistemology of ignorance, 
Pohlhaus frames willful hermeneutical ignorance as a nuanced dismissal and refusal of a 
marginalized person’s situated knowledge (722). González, and the survivor-activists 
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from Parkland, struggle to get mainstream America to (ac)know(ledge) their truths about 
the trauma of gun violence because, as Pohlhaus explains, for those exhibiting willful 
hermeneutic ignorance to do so would be to give up epistemic privilege and “investigate 
parts of the world in light of others’ concern” (721). In other words, when those with 
social privilege are invested in keeping their privilege they can “maintain their ignorance 
by refusing to recognize” and by working to undermine any source of new knowledge 
presented by the marginalized voices (Pohlhaus 728). Thus, this refusal to hear 
marginalized knowledges, such as Gonzàlez’s narrative of trauma, is not an inability but 
“rather a willful act” of injustice (729).  
Secondly, undeterred by these willful acts of refusal, González is detailing a 
cripistemology of trauma as a paradoxical knowledge where “everyone understands” and 
“no one understood” at the same time and place. Trauma is a knowledge that “no one 
could comprehend” and yet “[she’ll] tell you” about it right now. Through this speech act 
González is not just calling on the Parkland community, she is creating a new 
community—interpellating in, hailing in all those who “have been touched by the cold 
grip of gun violence.” What’s more, she is calling in audience members to witness her 
trauma; to be traumatized with her. She is not presuming a given community but rather 
building an expansive one, where anyone who can be with the paradoxical truths of 
trauma that she is narrating is welcome. Some audience members can, and some cannot. 
Some become part of the “knowers” through witnessing her trauma and being with her in 
the unknowability. Others still “refuse to know.” Here we see González refusing to 
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simplify trauma’s crip knowledge. It is about knowing and not knowing and refusing to 
know. It is isolating and community building at the same time. It is something you 
understand and don’t understand all. It is paradoxical. Trauma is something you can talk 
about, but, as her next lines show, it is where words fail us. 
 In what’s becoming a refrain, González returns to her first point regarding time: 
“Six minutes and twenty seconds with an AR-15, and my friend Carmon will never 
complain to me about piano practice…” She begins crying as she names her friend 
Carmon and wipes tears away as she continues to name her classmates. 
Aaron Feis will never call Keira Miss Sunshine. 
Alex Schachter will never walk into school with his brother Ryan.  
Scott Beigel will never joke around with Cameron at camp.  
Helena Ramsey will never hang around after school with Max.  
Gina Montalto would never wave to her friend Liam at lunch.  
Joaquan Oliver would never play basketball with Sam or Dylan.  
 
There is melancholy force behind each word, each name; a force, a particular kind of 
anger that ricochets between heavy-hearted agony and righteous indignation. We can hear 
her gasp for air between her words and tears. Just as Ellen Samuels outlines in her essay 
on crip time, trauma time is also grief time (Samuels). Here we see González living in 
what Margaret Price terms “crip spacetime.” For Price, “the spacetime we move through 
and which constitutes us is composed not only of geometric space and linear time, but 
also of the affective impact and intangible knowledges that manifest these radical 
inequities” (Price, Moving 10). Price argues that even when we are side by side, we are 
not inhabiting the same spacetime, and the differences “are often a matter of violent 
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inequity, even of life or death” (Price, Moving 10). González is forcing her audience to 
recognize her crip spacetime, which represents the violent trauma she has experienced 
and the violent inequities surrounding gun violence in American culture. She continues to 
name her dead classmates, but now with incomplete sentences.  
 
Aliana Petty would never...  
Cara Luggin would never…  
Chris Hixon would never...  
Luke Hoyer would never...  
Martin Duque Anquiano would never...  
Peter Wang would never...  
Alyssa Alhadeff would never...  
Jamie Guttenberg would never...  
Meadow Pollack would never… 
 
Here, González is not just publicly mourning the loss of her classmates, she is suspending 
their lives rhetorically in spacetime with her incomplete sentences. Their lives are 
incomplete. Her memory of them is incomplete. These incomplete lines also allow those 
in the audience to imagine the endings for themselves, in ways that they might need. 
Reading this moment through a FQC analysis we see not only a cripistemology of not 
knowing but also González’s trauma affect.  As she reads each name and word from the 
page she holds her voice gets higher and speed up, almost as if she is overtaken with 
overwhelming fury. It is uncontrolled and visibly comes from her chest; we can hear and 
see her still gasping for breaths between her words. Some might say she looks as though 
she’s on the verge of a panic attack. She isn’t. Or maybe she is. She’s living with trauma 
in her bodymind.   
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But then she stops speaking. After she has named all of her now dead classmates 
González stands in complete silence. She stands staring straight ahead into the audience. 
Her tears are all gone, and her face is stern and stoic. We can hear her breathing once 
more. When González stands in silence for over four minutes, she is demanding that the 
audience recognize the crip spacetime of trauma that she lives in. This is the fourth way 
González’s speech can be understood as a FQC intervention in trauma narrative. Samuels 
writes that crip time “requires us to break in our bodies and minds to new rhythms, new 
patterns of thinking and feeling and moving through the world” (Samuels). Trauma time 
requires the same. I think about these four minutes of silence as González pulls the 
audience into her trauma, into her tension, and metaphorically even into her flashbacks.  
It is at about 30 seconds of silence that some man in the audience first yells, “go 
Emma!” and then others in the audience follow suit with chats and claps. After 20 to 30 
seconds of more silence, the audience continues with their chanting and clapping: “Go 
EMMA!” “You can do it!” After González has been silent for two minutes, the audience 
starts chanting: “Never again! Never again! Never again!” The camera goes back and 
forth between faces in the crowd, and González’s eyes are now closed almost as though 
she is hiding from the crowd’s chants. The crowd seems to realize this, and they stop 
chanting “Never again” after 45 seconds, when González opens her eyes. The crowds is 
silent for a moment, then someone says “We’re all with you Emma. We all love you.” 
The camera continues its frenetic back-and-forth between González’s face, the wide view 
of the crowd, and close-ups of faces in the crowd. I argue here that the crowd does not 
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know how to hold the truths of González’s silence and that in this silence González falls 
outside of social recognizability. The crowd needed González to be a motivational 
speaker. They needed a call and response speech. They needed a particular kind of 
trauma narrative wherein trauma is devastating chaos, but it's one that is overcome. 
González did not give that narrative. She did not give them a beginning, middle, and end. 
She gave them 6 minutes and 20 seconds of horror. She gave the devastation, the chaos, 
the unknowing. González gave her audience her trauma.   
When González’s timer goes off and she finally breaks her silence, she begins 
again with time. “Since the time I came out here, it has been six minutes and 20 seconds” 
she explains—the exact amount of time that the shooter took to kill her classmates. 
Again, rather than giving the audience an inspirational story of overcoming or a 
motivational call to arms, González pulls them into her trauma affect, her broken FQC 
narrative. With a snarky, almost annoyed look, she tells the audience: “fight for your 
lives before it’s someone else’s job.” González does not see this work as her “life’s 
passion” or “meaning of life” but rather as a job. Here the general affect of González’s 
speech can be understood as an intervention as FQC intervention in trauma narrative. 
Outside of showing her combat boots to the audience before she began speaking, 
González makes no effort to “connect” with the crowd. She does not smile, joke, or give 
a heartwarming plea. She never once talks of “overcoming” or “coming together” even 
politically. She is exasperated and heartbroken. She is mournful and indignant. She is 
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sad—we can see her tears—but she does not tell you that. What she tells you is her anger 
at the systems that failed her and her classmates.  
This affect continues, even after she finishes speaking. She immediately turns and 
walks off the stage before any applause can be received. With González gone so quickly 
the camera turns to a young white girl in the crowd, crying, while audience cheers as 
though it were a rock concert. The camera turns back to show González walking sternly 
off the stage. She doesn't have the interest, space, or time for the audience reception. She 
is out of time. We are out of time.  
I’m positing that when we approach trauma through a feminist queer crip 
methodology what comes forth are ways of knowing with and through trauma that can 
lead us to a place not just for personal healing, but more importantly, for collective, 
communal healing that is infused with coalitional political action. In the most simplistic 
terms, to establish a more meaningful and socially just approach to understanding and 
healing from the disabling effects and affects of trauma, we must start with centering crip 
knowledges of trauma. We must learn to listen to the kinds of knowledges and ways of 
knowing that come from within and through trauma itself. This is what I see in 
González’s silence. That is what González’s speech gives us, once we learn to listen to its 
silences and breakages, in ways beyond our rubrics of pathology and pity, overcoming or 
recovery. When this is done, when we can approach trauma through feminist, queer, and 
crip lenses, I believe that two things become possible simultaneously. First, we make 
more room for more kinds of healing that do not include coerced re-assimilation into 
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hegemonic norms of personhood. Second, as I will detail in the next section, we can 
consequently begin to build coalitions and cross-community political action from a place 
of affinity and solidarity. This is the work I see González leading. This is why I could not 
stop crying as I listened to her speech. Finally, someone—a young bi-racial queer 
youth—is speaking the feminist queer crip trauma knowledges I have been searching for 
for decades. 
 
Part Three: Resituating Trauma - A Political / Relational Approach 
González’s speech is so powerful, in part, because it takes trauma out of the 
medical/clinical domain or model of disability. In fact, it resituates trauma in a 
Political/Relational Model of Trauma. In Feminist Queer Crip, Alison Kafer intervenes 
in the longstanding and overwrought debate regarding the Social Model of Disability. For 
decades, the Social Model has been the predominant theoretical approach to disability to 
resist the medical-industrial complex. While the Social Model of Disability has created a 
pathway for significant political and cultural advances, it is not without its limitations. 
Kafer’s Political/Relational Model of Disability offers an alternative, critical approach to 
both the Medical Model and the Social Model of Disability.  
Almost as soon as leading disability scholars and activists began articulating the 
tenets of the Social Model, others in the field begin voicing their concerns. First, in 
emphasizing the social barriers of disability, the hardline Social Model activists declined 
to address the need for medical intervention, nearly to the point of rejecting it. This 
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rejection of medical intervention is not so simple for those of us in this disability 
community living with chronic pain, or those of us who need medical/clinical support to 
survive. Second, The Social Model also creates a strict binary between “impairment” and 
“disability.” Impairments are understood as the physical or mental limitations of the 
bodymind and disability is framed as the social exclusion, oppression, or meanings that 
are mapped on to these limitations (Kafer 7). For Social Modelists, impairments 
themselves are not disabling; society turns them into disabling conditions. Critics of this 
position have been quick to note this binary is not clear and that what counts as an 
impairment is itself socially constructed—determined in great part by culture, time, and 
place. Furthermore, impairments themselves can disable. No amount of barrier and 
ideological shifts will change the disabling realities of chronic pain, fatigue, and illness.   
The “Political/Relational Model of Disability” takes up these critiques and offers 
“an alternative perspective” to the Social Model of Disability (Kafer 6). Kafer does so in 
four main ways. First, expanding on the Social Model, Kafer’s approach locates the so-
called “problem” of disability squarely in the political, where it is the “built environments 
and social patterns that exclude or stigmatize particular kinds of bodies, minds, and ways 
of being” that must be transformed (6). However, unlike the Social Model, Kafer’s 
approach leaves space for medical intervention and even the ideological complexities 
associated with the desire to be cured (Kafer 6). Rather than rejecting or shaming 
individuals who live with pain and seek intervention or cure, the Political/Relational 
Model contextualizes these apparent contradictions within their political and 
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phenomenological realities. Kafer acknowledges that it is quite possible to be allied with 
disabled people and proud to be disabled, and also seek to end chronic pain 
simultaneously (Kafer 6). Moreover, rather than rejecting the medical framing of 
disability, Kafer’s model politicizes it (6). She pushes us to ask about the quality and 
accessibility of health care: Who can afford health care? For how long? At what costs? 
(6). In doing so, Kafer argues not for a rejection of the medical approaches to disability 
but instead for a “renewed interrogation of them” (7).  
Second, in what she calls a “friendly departure” from the Social Model, Kafer’s 
Political/Relational Model does not distinguish between impairment and disability (7). 
This distinction not only fails to recognize that conceptually impairment is just as socially 
constructed as disability, it fails to recognize the “often-disabling effects of our bodies 
(Kafer 7). Those like myself who live with chronic pain and fatigue have been some of 
the loudest critics of this distinction within the Social Model, because no amount of 
policy change or barrier removal will end the intense aching that I feel in my bodymind 
each day. To focus strictly on socio-cultural and political factors of disability without 
attending to the bodymind “renders pain and fatigue irrelevant to the project of disability 
politics” (Kafer 7). This not only marginalizes a great segment of the disability 
community, it also makes it difficult for disability activists and scholars to talk about the 
pain and suffering we live with in ways that do not seem to give “fodder to the enemy, so 
to speak” (8).  
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Third, Kafer’s Political/Relational Model emphasizes the terms within its name. 
Kafer emphasizes disability’s relationality in that cultural notions of disability and ability 
affect everyone—not just people who claim or have been claimed by disability (8). 
Because of our society’s deep-seated ableism, we are all taught to fear embodied 
difference—through aging, through temporary loss of function, or through other 
stigmatized bodily deviances (scars, birthmarks, height, weight, etc). Moreover, 
Disability is not lived in isolation. Disabled people’s families are also affected by ableism 
(Kafer 8). Then conceptually, disability itself experienced in and through relationships; it 
exists in relation to able-bodiedness and able-bodiedness exists in relation to disability 
(Kafer 8). Indeed, they form a constitutive binary. We can only know one because of and 
through the other (Kafer 8).  
Finally, Kafer’s Model is overtly and emphatically political in that it is a “direct 
refusal of the widespread depoliticization of disability” (8). Rather than defining 
disability, Kafer positions disability as “contested and contestable,” analyzing instead the 
creation of the category as it intersects with other markers of social difference (10). It is 
this embeddedness with vectors of power and oppression that concerns Kafer and that she 
aims to explore in her full project (10). In doing so, Kafer’s project seeks to answers 
questions like: “is disability political? How is the category of disability used to justify the 
classification, supervision, segregation, and oppression of certain people, bodies, and 
practices?” “How has disability been depoliticized, removed from the realm of the 
political? Which definitions and assumptions about disability facilitate this removal? 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
112 
 
 
What are the effects of such depoliticization?” and so on (10). With this, Kafer is asking 
us to question the ways in which ableist understandings of disability have come to be 
accepted as common sense.  
I seek to do the same with trauma. Thus, using the principles Kafer’s 
Political/Relational Model of Disability, I present the following tenets of a 
political/relational approach to trauma. Resituating trauma in a political/relational model 
not only takes trauma out of the pathologizing medical model of disability, it allows for 
an expansive understanding of the sociocultural and political aspects of trauma. When 
understood through this approach, trauma becomes a site for what historian Joan W. Scott 
calls “collective affinity.” Scott describes collective affinities as “play[ing] on 
identifications that have been attributed to individuals by their societies, and that have 
served to exclude them or subordinate them” (Scott in Kafer 11). This too is what 
González was drawing upon in her speech - the potentiality of trauma as a site for 
coalition building across difference. In terms of traumas collective affinities could 
include people who have experienced various kinds of gun violences, sexual violences, 
domestic or physical violences; people who live with intergenerational and 
multigenerational traumas; people living with the daily traumas of systemic oppressions; 
people who have experienced accidents or other catastrophic incidents; veterans, 
civilians, and refugees of war; immigrants and asylums seekers; institutionalized and 
incarcerated peoples; people who have lived through “natural” disasters; and so on.  
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A Political/Relational Model of Trauma:  
 
1. Understands that trauma is socially constructed, even as it’s held in our 
bodyminds. Here, I am extending the Critical Trauma Studies critique that trauma is 
not inherent to the catastrophic event but determined by the extent to which society 
agrees that such event was in fact traumatizing (Alexander 15). This collective 
decision-making is of course highly racialized, gendered, classed, and geopolitical. I 
am pushing this critique further to argue that trauma is still socially constructed, even 
after it becomes held in our bodymind. This, of course, is this classic intervention of 
the Social Model of Disability. What counts as trauma, when, by whom, and in what 
ways, are all determined by place, time, and culture. This, too, is highly racialized, 
gendered, classed, and geopolitical. In other words, what is recognized as trauma is 
not some essentialized truth of the bodymind, but rather mediated by deeply political 
and socio-cultural factors.  
 
While the direct content of González’s speech itself does not show this reality, the 
broader political discourse surrounding the Parkland survivor-activists absolutely 
does. First, even as the event of the Parkland shooting was broadcast through various 
media networks, the survivor-activists were denied their trauma. Right-wing pundits 
and conspiracy theorists described the students as “crisis actors” throughout social 
media platforms (Grynbaum). In doing so, they circumvented the question of the 
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trauma by simply removing the students from the event in question. Second, the 
attention that the Parkland survivor-activists received for their organizing around gun 
violence brought up great critique surrounding questions of race and class, in 
particular the organizing efforts of #BlackLivesMatter. The trauma of the young, 
most white, affluent Parkland youth was quickly recognized and rewarded whereas 
the traumas of urban, youth of color are routinely dismissed. 
 
2. Recognizes that the so-called “problem” of trauma cannot be solved through 
medical or clinical intervention, but rather through broad social change. This is 
because the “problem” of trauma is located not in the bodyminds of the individuals 
who live with trauma, but rather in the social structures that unequally distribute life 
chances. Again, while on an individual level trauma can reach any demographic, 
socially and culturally it is more likely to reach those who are marginalized. It is often 
white supremacist, ablest, capitalist, neocolonialist heterocispatriarchy itself that 
traumatizes. Just as disability activists and scholars have argued about disability, I am 
arguing now about trauma: if we want to better the lives of traumatized people, we 
need to work to change social structures and cultural ideologies surrounding trauma 
and its healing processes.   
 
We see this in González’s speech when she ends with the line “Fight for your lives 
before it’s someone else’s job” (González). The conclusion to her silence, to the 
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trauma she has experienced, and the nation has experienced, is not straightforward 
therapy, “recovery,” and/or healing. It is political action that will lead to broader 
social transformation.   
 
I want to pause here to say that medical and clinical intervention, that trauma-
informed care, is not to be shamed or dismissed. Indeed, I have spent the greater part 
of the last decade searching for anything that would ease the physical pain, anguish 
and fatigue that I live with daily and that can limit traditional forms of political 
engagement. Moreover, healing (whatever that means individually and in community) 
and restorative justice must be prioritized.  
 
Just as Kafer “recognizes the possibility of simultaneously desiring to be cured of 
chronic pain and to be identified and allied with disabled people” in her work, I, too, 
recognize the very real possibility of wanting to lessen the chronic anguish of both the 
physical and psychological pain that can come with trauma while simultaneously 
identifying and feeling solidarity with the fight for broader systemic change against 
traumatizing systems of violence. Indeed, there are many powerful political actions 
that can be taken without the physical demands of marching in the streets (Pulrang). 
Furthermore, following a long line of disabled activists—particular queer women of 
color—I contend that care work is political work (Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-
Samarasinha).  
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3. Emphasizes the political. As Kafer does with disability, I’m arguing for both an 
“increased recognition for the political nature of a medical framing” of trauma as well 
as a general repoliticizing of trauma writ large (Kafer 6, 8). Here again, I’m thinking 
specifically about necessary questions regarding the politics of resources and life 
chances. We must, of course, be asking about access to trauma-informed care and 
questioning who has the resources to pay for such care. But even before that, we must 
ask whose trauma will be recognized as such and whose will be dismissed? Whose 
trauma will be considered worthy of care and whose trauma will be criminalized? We 
could go even further to ask which bodyminds will carry intergenerational trauma and 
who will not? Who will have life chances that mean they are less likely to experience 
sociocultural traumas like war, gun violence, sexual assault, domestic violence, hate 
crimes, or police violence? Because trauma has been so deeply tethered to the 
medical/clinical model of disability, its political nature has been obscured. We must 
repoliticize trauma in every facet possible.     
 
In addition to the line about fighting for your lives, González’s speech emphasizes the 
political when she directly states, “For those who still can’t comprehend, because 
they refuse to, I'll tell you where it went. Right into the ground. Six Feet deep.” She 
also names that “everyone who has been touched by the cold grip of gun violence 
understands,” speaking more broadly about gun violence outside of just the Parkland 
shooting itself. Lastly, she implicitly critiques the rescue efforts saying, “no one could 
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believe there were bodies in that building waiting to be identified for over a day” 
(González).  
 
 
4. Conceptualizes trauma in relational terms. Trauma does not happen in isolation. 
Not only do trauma inducing events often happen with others, trauma itself requires 
that we relate, witness, hear, and be with one another. Furthermore, the traumatized 
bodymind can only be known through its co-constitutive relationship to the 
normative, idealized, untraumatized bodymind.  
         
We see this relationality all throughout González’s speech. First, González casts 
trauma as relational when she names all of her classmates and all of the things they 
will never do again with her classmates who are still living (including herself). 
Second, she presents trauma as co-constitutive with the untraumatized, when she talks 
about “everyone who was there” in comparison to “those who still can’t 
comprehend.” She is defining trauma here against the non-traumatized, or those who 
have not experienced gun violence and therefore cannot fully understand. Lastly, in 
her performative speech act of community building, González is situating trauma as 
relational or communal. In doing so, she is resisting the medical model of disability 
that proclaims trauma to be an individual issue for individual concern. This move, of 
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course, helps usher trauma back into the political and allows González to argue for 
broader social transformation.  
 
Concluding Thoughts  
 Mourning. Thoughts and prayers. Acrimonious, obstructed, and ineffectual 
debate. This is the pattern of our national discourse surrounding gun violence and other 
trauma-inducing events. As we’ve seen in this chapter though, Emma González, along 
with her fellow Parkland survivor-activists, have been working tirelessly not only to 
disrupt this discursive pattern but to figuratively and literally change the trauma 
narratives that are available. In doing so, I argue that González resituates trauma back 
into the political by demanding not only accountability but also broader social 
transformation. Moreover, her feminist queer crip narrative of trauma provides both 
alternative knowledge about trauma and more space for knowing trauma than the 
tiresome (and dismissive) “thoughts and prayers” ever could. In the next chapter, I 
explore what it looks like when youth - just a bit older than González - bring similar 
demands for social change around trauma into a specific institution – higher education. 
Unsurprisingly, we see more acrimonious, obstructed, and ineffectual debate. I argue 
however, that this debate is illustrative of how higher education understands trauma and 
mental illness writ large and as such it requires our full attention.  
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Trauma and The Trigger Warning Debate:  
Toward a Feminist Disability Studies Pedagogy  
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College campuses and classrooms have long been a site for socially and 
politically contentious debates. Collectively, college students harness the kind of audacity 
required to challenge the status quo through instigating broader cultural dialogue on “hot-
button” topics where the personal is shown as political. Cultural conversations about 
trauma are of no exception. Amidst heightened national discourses of traumatocracy 
explored in chapter one, American college students began speaking out about how their 
own experiences of trauma, and retraumatization, impact their education. They have done 
so—by and large—through calls for “trigger warnings,” or statements that alert 
participants of class material that may call forward past traumatic experiences. These 
calls have been met with great controversy and have sparked what is known as the 
“trigger warning” debate. 
As noted in chapter one, the most dramatic surge in reporting on trauma and 
PTSD in TIME Magazine appears during the years of 2013-2014. It is of no surprise, 
then, that these years also mark the beginning of the “trigger warning” debate across 
academia. Late in the year, Slate magazine named 2013 “The Year of the Trigger 
Warning” (Marcotte). Not only does this article mention the expansion of trigger 
warnings to cover further distressing issues, it also references the use of trigger warnings 
in places beyond the internet—places such as the feminist classroom (Marcotte). In May 
of 2014, the New York Times published an article reporting on specific efforts from 
students at Santa Barbara, Oberlin, Rutgers, University of Michigan, and George 
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Washington University, among other schools, to initiate the use of trigger warnings in the 
classroom during that spring semester (Medina).  
These initial efforts from students across the nation sparked an immediate dispute 
throughout academia. Articles on trigger warnings appear as opinion journalism pieces in 
venues like The New York Times, The LA Times, The Guardian, Mother Jones, The New 
Republic, Salon, as well as at The Chronical of Higher Education and Inside Higher Ed. 
(Gerdes).  Of course, the intensity of this debate may vary from campus to campus and 
one educational journalist or blogger to the next, but the premise always remains the 
same. Those in favor of trigger warnings argue that they serve as a relatively simple 
accommodation measure that provides a better, safer learning environment for students 
who may have experienced traumatic events in their past (Brown, S.). Those opposed 
argue that such warnings come from overly sensitive students and that the warnings are in 
themselves inherently infantilizing, impossible to implement, an excessive form of 
political correctness, and a violation of academic freedom (Brown, S.).  
However, as articulated thus far, this “debate” about trauma in the classroom has 
been for the able-bodyminded among us. Whether or not we consider the affect10 and 
effects of trauma on pedagogy is an option only for those whose lives are not already 
shaped by trauma. For us, there is no choice; our experiences of trauma shape how we 
move through the world. The consideration of trauma in our classroom is not a question 
of pedagogy or academic labor. It is not about academic freedom, the latest 
administration of neoliberal policy, or even a debate at all. Teaching and learning with 
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trauma is our daily life. We do it every day, because we have to if we want to survive in 
the academy.  
I don’t want anyone to coddle me or feel sorry for me. It’s easy to feel sorry it 
happened. It’s hard to see how your current way of doing things still harms me. I am 
asking you for consideration of the disabling trauma I carry in my bodymind. I was in the 
room because I wanted to have the conversation. Because I believe deeply in the 
political, social, and ethical need to enact change. But when you started reading the 
detailed descriptions of violence without any kind of warning, I couldn’t stay. My palms 
got sweaty. My heart started beating outside of my chest. The room begin to spin and lose 
its color. I couldn’t focus on anything other than trying to remember to breathe. 
Remember. To. Breathe. I couldn’t breathe because my chest was so tight. The people 
sitting beside were starting to stare. I think because I was spinning now in little circles in 
my chair. I had no idea what you were saying anymore. You just kept reading. I was lost 
in my traumas. I was lost in my bodymind. I realized later that it took me over 20 minutes 
to remember that I could leave the room. It took me the rest of the day to find myself 
again.  
Thus, rather than rehashing the overly determined supporting11 and opposing 
sides12 of the debate, this chapter will contextualize the discourse surrounding trigger 
warnings within the intersecting politics of disability and feminist pedagogies. When 
analyzed in this way, it becomes apparent that three fundamental misunderstandings 
routinely impede the debate and limit the possibility of meaningful exchange. First, 
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misuse of the words “trauma” and “trigger” have led to serious misinterpretations of both 
the psychosomatic experience of trauma and the embodiment of its corresponding affect. 
As with other disabilities, the lack of accurate public knowledge and understanding about 
the lived experiences of trauma has led to yet another ill-conceived conversation about 
us, without us. Second, trigger warnings highlight the seemingly conflicted preferences of 
disability and feminist pedagogies. Disability pedagogues call for trigger warnings as a 
practice of accommodation, while feminist pedagogues argue that the possibility of the 
classroom as a “safe space” is always already fraught. However, this perceived conflict 
highlights another misunderstanding: the conflation of access with safety. Finally, 
popular response to these student initiatives have become entrenched in and structured by 
these first two misunderstandings. This reflects a final misunderstanding about what 
students were actually requesting: recognition of their lived experiences and institutional 
support of how those experiences influence their education. 
Through an analysis of these three misunderstandings, I contend that in order to 
fully comprehend the significance of trauma in the classroom, and to ethically respond to 
the question of using trigger warnings as a teaching tool, we must approach this 
conversation through a “feminist disability studies pedagogy” (FDSP). Introduced by 
Kristina Knoll in a 2009 Feminist Teacher article, this pedagogy approaches questions of 
access not merely as means of inclusion, but rather as analyses of systems of power and 
oppression (Knoll 122). When the trigger warning debate is approached this way, the 
conversation shifts from whether we should use them to why trauma itself is an 
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imperative social justice issue within our classrooms. As scholars, activists, and 
pedagogues, this debate presents itself as an opportunity to reconsider and reimagine the 
interrelated experiences of trauma and disability in the classroom. The classroom 
ultimately stands as a site where theory meets practice, and as such a place where our 
material realities meet our theoretical ambitions. Thus, nothing less than a fully integrated 
and collaborative feminist disability approach to trauma in the classroom will be 
sufficient for supporting all our students.  
 
Trauma Culture, Trauma Confusion 
The first misunderstanding that structures the trigger warning debate is the serious 
misuse of ‘trigger,’ ‘trauma,’ and their relationships to disability. These conflations and 
the consequent public response to trigger warnings reflect larger patterns of indifference 
and discrimination toward disability, indeed relying on many of the same arguments used 
in previous debates about disability and education.13 In this section, I first situate trauma 
as a disabling affective structure. Then I argue that the pervasive misconstruction of 
trauma is rooted in ableist logics, and as such the institutionalized responses stemming 
from such reasoning only further perpetuate ableist structures of inequality. To challenge 
or resist these forces, we must incorporate the effects of trauma into our understanding as 
a mental disability, and then work to approach trauma through the Political/Relational 
model discussed in chapter two. When social responses to the affects of trauma are 
appropriately understood as dis-abling, the contours of the debate extend beyond the 
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specifics of trigger warnings toward broader considerations of accessibility in the 
classroom.  
For the purposes of this chapter, I conceptualize trauma as a disabling affective 
structure. In popular, and even clinical discourse, focus is typically given to the event that 
produces the state of psychosomatic distress.14 I am, however, focusing on the affect 
itself rather than the event since not everyone who lives through a traumatic event(s) 
consequently experiences an affective shift. Moreover, while it would be problematic to 
completely collapse the traumatized bodymind and the disabled bodymind, there are 
undeniable overlaps in both subjective embodiments. Leading trauma theorist Cathy 
Caruth defines trauma generally as “the response to an unexpected or overwhelming 
violent event or events that are not fully grasped as they occur, but return later in repeated 
flashbacks, nightmares, and other repetitive phenomena” (91). Similarly, psychoanalyst 
Avgi Saketopoulou describes the experience of “being triggered” through what Freud 
called “single anxiety” or “a paralyzing, overwhelming cascade of emotional and 
physiological responses commensurate not with the anticipation of danger but with the 
experience of the danger itself” (emphasis in original). Lastly, Peter Levine’s work notes 
that while the embodiment of trauma is different from person to person, common 
responses and symptoms include types of hyperarousal such as increased heart rate, 
sweating, difficulty breathing, cold sweats, tingling, muscular tension; constriction of the 
nervous system and digestive system; dissociation and/or dysphoria; feeling numb, 
spacing out, or fully blacking out. Traumatized individuals also often experience hyper 
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vigilance, sensitivity to light and sound, difficulty sleeping, a reduced capacity to manage 
stress and anxiety, amnesia and forgetfulness, chronic fatigue, immune system problems, 
headaches, and diminished ability to bond or connect with other individuals (Levine 14-
19). This is in no way an exhaustive or inclusive list, nor could any such list ever be 
compiled. My attention to trauma as an affect, rather than an experience or disorder, 
necessitates an understanding of the countless immeasurable, nuanced, and deeply 
personal ways in which trauma may manifest in the bodymind. 
However, I offer these widely recognized descriptors for two reasons. First, I aim 
to situate the psychosomatic and affective shifts of trauma in relation to other kinds of 
neurodiversity such as Autism, ADHD, learning disabilities, epilepsy, Down syndrome or 
other mental health issues (Sibley). While this chapter focuses on triggers within context 
of trauma, many neurodivergent people experience triggers in ways that often similarly 
impact their embodied subjectivities. I am using the experience of a trigger then to call 
for solidarity between individuals typically understood as mentally disabled and 
communities who have experienced other kinds of traumas, such as racial and post-
colonial traumas. In doing so, I am purposely troubling the category of neurodivergence 
to include people who may never receive a medical diagnosis, or clinical recognition as 
such. This is an overtly political move toward an intersectional approach to trauma and 
disability. As an embodied, affective structure trauma cannot be located solely in the 
neurological. However, recent advances in neuropsychology have legitimized what 
critical race theorists, women of color feminisms, and post-colonial feminisms have long 
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been arguing. Not only does trauma change the neurology of the traumatized individual, 
evidence suggests, “PTSD can be genetically transmitted to secondary and subsequent 
generations” (Sotero 99). We are fundamentally changed by trauma; and these changes 
bear legacies. 15 By approaching trauma as an affective structure that may, or may not, 
also be recognizable as a kind of neurodivergence, I seek to broaden our understanding of 
disability – not to further marginalize the marginalized, but rather to draw attention to the 
intersecting forces of white supremacy and ableism.  
Second, I reference the above descriptions not to define trauma or delineate the 
specifics of being triggered, but rather to say what trauma and being triggered are not.16 
As becomes clear in the descriptions above, experiences of re-traumatization or being 
triggered are not the same as being challenged outside of one’s comfort zone, being 
reminded of a bad feeling, or having to sit with disturbing truths. I am attempting here to 
distinguish between trauma and injury. While the latter can indeed lead to the former, 
they are not one and the same. An injury is a wound that can be healed17; redress can be 
given. Injuries offend, but they do not ontologically destabilize. Trauma shatters one’s 
ontology. To be triggered is to mentally and physically re-experience a past trauma in 
such an embodied manner that one’s affective response literally takes over the ability to 
be present in one’s bodymind. You are affectively returned to that moment of ontological 
instability. When this occurs, the triggered individuals often feel a complete loss of 
control and disassociation from the bodymind. This is not a state of injury, but rather a 
state of disability. Because others understand this loss of control and the other related 
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affects as emotionally disproportionate, the traumatized individual is no longer seen as 
reliable, or as having the ability to “make sense.” Margaret Price argues in Mad at School 
that individuals with mental disabilities are “rhetorically disabled” in instances where 
they are stripped of their “rhetoricity” or “the ability to be received as a valid human 
subject” (Price, Mad 26). This is precisely what happens in instances of re-
traumatization. Alongside other people with mental disabilities, when those of us who 
live with the affects of trauma become triggered, “we speak from positions that are 
assumed subhuman, even nonhuman, and therefore, when we speak, our words go 
unheeded” (Price, Mad 26). In these moments we may struggle to make sense of our 
bodyminds, but what is most disheartening is that we do this in a world that has so often 
already dismissed us.  
The depths of this misunderstanding, and dismissal, are no more apparent than in 
the August 2014 report entitled “On Trigger Warnings,” by the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP).  In this report the AAUP argues unwaveringly against the 
use of trigger warnings. What is most thought-provoking about this report are not its 
various assertions—most of which had already been debated online for months 
beforehand—but rather the level of unfamiliarity with the psychosomatic effects of 
trauma. The AAUP’s misunderstandings of the concepts of “trauma” and “triggers” are 
far-reaching. Throughout their report, the AAUP repeatedly equates trauma with being 
offended, made to feel uncomfortable, or responding negatively with a claim of injury. In 
the first line of the report the AAUP proclaims that a “current threat to academic freedom 
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comes in the demand that teachers provide warnings in advance if assigned material 
contains anything that might trigger difficult emotional responses for students” (emphasis 
added, 1). Here trauma is being vastly oversimplified. As noted above, being triggered or 
re-experiencing trauma entails a fully embodied shift in affect wherein any number of 
psychosomatic responses may occur without one’s cognitive control. This is not the same 
thing as, for example, the discomfort, or difficult emotional responses, that come with 
confronting one’s white privilege, or the feeling of personal injury that may come when 
someone challenges your belief system. With this fundamental misunderstanding 
grounding their response, it is no wonder the AAUP continues in their report to argue 
against trigger warnings.  
A few paragraphs later the AAUP claims that trigger warnings are powerful 
enough to reduce the complex “literary, historical, sociological, and political insights” of 
a text “into a few negative characterizations” (2). They continue to argue that “by calling 
attention to certain content in a given work,” trigger warnings “signal an expected 
response to the content (e.g, dismay, distress, disapproval) and eliminate the element of 
surprise and spontaneity that can enrich the reading experience and provide critical 
insight” (2). Two things become clear in this one passage. First, the AAUP has no 
conceptualization of what the “element of surprise” often does for someone who lives 
with trauma in their bodymind – it retraumatizes. Second, the AAUP again over 
simplistically equates feelings of “dismay, distress, disapproval” to life with trauma, 
while simultaneously expressing more concern with taking away the “surprise and 
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spontaneity” from untraumatized students than considering the impacts of the material on 
students who live with trauma.  
The report goes on to explain that “some discomfort is inevitable in classrooms” 
and that “trigger warnings suggest that classrooms should offer protection and comfort 
rather than an intellectually challenging education” (2-3).  Indeed, in their original 
petition, Oberlin students did suggest trigger warnings when “issues of privilege and 
oppression” arise in the classroom (AAUP). Such suggestions conflate potential 
discomfort, or personal injury, with the disabling affects of trauma and being triggered. 
However, an opportunity arises when students make these conflations. As educators, 
rather than dismissing trigger warnings outright, as the AAUP has done, we could engage 
students about how systems of oppression work and explain the difference between 
pedagogically productive discomfort and trigger-induced re-traumatization. As educators, 
we could use this conversation as an opportunity to discuss the use of trigger warnings 
before the Internet. Historically, trigger warnings, Andrea Smith reminds us, began as “a 
part of a complex of practices” within the anti-violence movement working to recognize 
“that we are not unaffected by the political and intellectual work that we do” and that “the 
labor of healing has to be shared by all” (Smith). Indeed, this conversation could have 
been one about the intersections of ability with race, class, gender, sexuality and 
citizenship. Instead, the mainstream rendering of this “debate” has accomplished very 
little outside of perpetuating the conflation of trauma with discomfort and the ableist 
logics of oppression that tell the marginalized to “get over it.”   
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The extent to which both sides of the debate operate with a limited perception of 
trauma is telling, though not unsurprising, given the extent to which we live in a culture 
that’s is at once ableist and problematically trauma-centered culture. I argue, as Anne 
Rothe has, that this is precisely because we live in a culture oversaturated with “mass 
media employments of the pain of others” that our understanding of trauma is so diluted 
(5). The narrative structure of these traumatic experiences is quite familiar, especially to 
disabled people, as they rearticulate the quintessential American anecdote of “pulling 
yourself up by your bootstraps” (Rothe 8). Just as other “supercrip” stories focus on 
disabled people “overcoming” their disabilities, popular trauma discourse reinforces “the 
superiority of the nondisabled body and mind” by focusing on overcoming traumatization 
(Clare 2). People who have experienced trauma are culturally expected to turn their pain 
into a narrative of inspiration for others.18 These trauma-and-recovery narratives position 
the individual as one who “eventually overcomes victimization and undergoes a 
metamorphosis from the pariah figure of weak and helpless victim into a heroic 
survivor,” with little to no contextualization of the historical and socio-political forces 
that underpin their experience (Rothe 2). As with other disabilities, dominant 
understandings of trauma are framed by the individual or medical model of disability. 
Like other neurodivergent people, those who have experienced trauma are considered 
“deviant, pathological and defective” until they have undergone the “proper” treatments 
needed to adhere as closely as possible to the norms of able-bodymindedness (Kafer 5). 
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I in no way wish to dismiss the intense physical and emotional pain that comes 
with traumatic experiences. Nor do I want to downplay the very real need to address this 
pain in order to make life more livable. However, I am aiming here to follow Margaret 
Price in thinking through trauma outside of the medical model of disability, in order to 
emphasis the normalizing and oppressive forces at play when we discuss trauma and 
trigger warnings in the classroom. Since its inclusion in the DSM, feminist trauma 
theorists,19 and more recently queer trauma theorists, have critiqued approaches to trauma 
that reinscribe normative ways of being, through either the terms of diagnosis or the 
approaches to healing. More recently, Ann Cvetkovich’s work on queer and lesbian 
responses to trauma shows “ways of thinking about trauma that do not pathologize it, that 
seize control over it from the medical experts, and that forge creative responses to it that 
far outstrip even the most utopian therapeutic and political solutions” (3). Cvetkovich 
does not incorporate disability theory in her approach to trauma directly; however, her 
efforts clearly align with the work of many disability theorists, most notably Alison 
Kafer. Kafer outlines a political/relational model of disability as one that recognizes the 
imperative of working to eliminate “disabling barriers” while also acknowledging the 
ways in which pain and fatigue within the disabled bodymind constrain daily life (Kafer 
7).  
Taken together, Kafer and Cvetkovich present a guide toward reimaging trauma 
in a way that adequately responds to the far-reaching misunderstandings and ableism 
present in the dominant conception of trauma, such as the underlying tensions in the 
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trigger warnings debate. Building from Cvetkovich’s definitions of trauma as an 
“affective experience that falls outside of institutionalized or stable forms of identity or 
politics,” I further define trauma as an embodied, affective structure that relegates an 
individual (or population) outside of hegemonic notions of normative subjectivity (17). 
As such, traumatized individuals are dis-abled by a society that cannot comprehend or 
make room for such affective or psychosomatic responses that do not adhere to the 
assumed stability of able-bodymindedness. Following Kafer then, “the problem of 
[trauma] no longer resides in the minds or bodies of individuals but in the built 
environments and social patterns that exclude or stigmatize particular kinds of bodies, 
minds and ways of being” (6).  
Those in opposition to trigger warnings in classroom reinforce the individual 
model of disability, suggesting that the traumatized or triggered individual seek help on 
their own from the proper medical establishments. It is the responsibility of the 
traumatized to deal with their excessive bodymind, not the society that produces and then 
pathologizes it as such. Those in support of trigger warnings attempt to locate the 
problem within the climate of higher education and its ableist infrastructure. However, 
while recognizing the numerous social barriers for traumatized individuals is certainly 
important, the experiences and embodiments of trauma must also be reconceptualized 
culturally as both relational and political. Just as all disability is constituted through the 
(false and oversimplified) binary of disabled or abled, embodiments of trauma are also 
constituted through the unmarked binary of traumatized or un-traumatized. We know 
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whose affects and responses are “inappropriate” or “dysregulated” because we have 
socially determined what a proper and regulated affective response looks like. Thus, 
individuals who live with the affect of trauma are socially constructed as an Other, and 
like other disabilities, trauma is “experienced in and through relationships” with the un-
traumatized norm (Kafer 8).  
Furthermore, trauma must also be understood as unequivocally political. As with 
all disabilities, living with trauma means negotiating life in a world established by and for 
bodyminds that do not experience the affect of trauma. The sociopolitical inequalities 
surrounding race, class, gender, and citizenship undoubtedly shape the unequal access to 
healthcare and other resources needed to live with and/or through trauma. In fact, the 
ability to be recognized as a person living with trauma is in many ways a political 
privilege.20 Furthermore, while traumatic experiences can certainly be accidental, the vast 
majority of potentially traumatizing experiences are rooted in systems of power and 
oppression. The forces of racism/white supremacy, colonization, and global capitalism 
continuously instigate innumerable violences worldwide. As legal scholar Dean Spade 
argues, it is often the administrative systems themselves that traumatize and disable us 
the most by “distributing life chances and promoting certain ways of life at the expense 
of others, all while operating under legal regimes that declare universal equality” (103). 
Indeed, it is not by accident that the organizing that originated trigger warnings arose 
alongside a feminism proclaiming, “the personal is political” (Smith). By depathologizing 
trauma, and approaching it through a Political/Relational model, trauma stands along 
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with other disabilities “as a potential site for a collective reimagining” (9). In this debate 
on trigger warnings in the classroom, situating trauma within this framework of disability 
allows educators and students to collectively reimagine what education can look like.  
 
“Safety” for Whom? Accommodations for What? 
The second misconception fueling this debate is the relationship between “safety” 
and disability accommodation. Those in opposition to trigger warnings argue that the 
classroom cannot, and should not, be a “safe space” where comfort and protection are “a 
higher priority than intellectual engagement” (AAUP). Indeed, feminist scholars have 
long argued that the concept of safety is always already fraught. Those in favor of trigger 
warnings argue that a student’s ability to learn is highly compromised if they are re-
traumatized, and therefore this is simply a matter of accommodation (Johnson). However, 
many of these same supporters also list issues of power and oppression as possible 
triggers, replicating the conflation of accommodation with comfort. When both 
opponents and supporters of trigger warnings routinely conflate access with safety, they 
illustrate a prevailing and fundamental lack of awareness about disability, access, and 
accommodation in higher education.  
Feminist educators have written extensively about safety in the classroom and the 
necessity of discomfort as part of learning. Most notably, in Teaching to Transgress bell 
hooks describes how “safety” was used by people with privilege to silence the voices of 
“those of us on the margins” who spoke about social justice and changing the academy:  
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Indeed, exposing certain truths and biases in the classroom often created chaos 
and confusion. The idea that the classroom should always be a “safe,” harmonious 
place was challenged. It was hard for individuals to fully grasp the idea that 
recognition of difference might also require of us a willingness to see the 
classroom change, to allow for shifts in relations between students (30).  
 
Following hooks, Berenice Malka Fisher describes how attempts to ensure safety 
in a feminist classroom also risk denying difference and suppressing pedagogically 
valuable conflict (139). For both hooks and Fisher, calls for “safety” in the classroom 
must be critically evaluated and resisted as a means of maintaining the status quo and 
further marginalizing and silencing students who are presenting knowledges that 
challenge the norm. Fisher’s work provides further specific ways to address the multiple 
and intertwining notions of safety in the classroom that also recognize “the asymmetries 
of privilege and the differential vulnerabilities that flow from them” (emphasis in 
original, 150). In other words, one’s social privilege determines the kind of relative safety 
that might be felt at any given place and time, as well as the kinds of risks and 
vulnerabilities one might feel “safe” enough to endure.  
Opponents of trigger warnings are quick to employ this feminist reasoning and 
argue that such warnings censor difficult topics and even create an atmosphere where 
dissidence will be silenced from fear of institutional reprimand (AAUP 3). However, the 
swift retreat to this argument illustrates inattentiveness to disability as a vector of 
oppression and the ways in which ableism, power, and privilege are being denied. 
Students who carry traumas in their bodyminds are attempting to speak truth to 
institutional power in their call for trigger warnings. They are claiming their trauma and 
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asking for support in the classroom surrounding it. What they get instead is a reminder 
from the AAUP that “the onus” for their experience in the classroom should not fall on 
the teacher, and that “cases of serious trauma should be referred” out of the classroom 
and to “student health services” (AAUP 3). In the ableist perspective of the AAUP’s 
report, the “problem” of the traumatized student is a medical one to be dealt with outside 
of the classroom. If such students stay in the classroom, “reasonable accommodations” 
should be “made on an individual basis,” However, “this should be done without 
affecting other students’ exposure to materials that has educational value” (AAUP 3). 
Again, we see here the AAUP privileging the experiences of the able-bodied students 
over those who live with disabling trauma in their bodyminds.  
In her reflection above, hooks notes that it was the individuals with privilege and 
social capital who clung to a sense of safety as a way to resist change when voices from 
the margins began speaking their truths in the classroom. In this instance, those with 
power turned to “safety” as an attempt to uphold the status quo. Now, with trigger 
warnings, those with power are again turning to “safety” as an attempt to uphold the 
status quo. However, rather than turning to “safety” as a means to their own comfort, 
those with power and the social privilege of an able-bodymind are using a critique of 
safety as a means of upholding the status quote and resisting the change being called for 
by marginalized voices. Put another way, this time it is the students from the margins—
those living with the affects of trauma or mental disabilities, rather than those with social 
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privilege—that are accused of clinging to safety as a means of avoiding the rigors of an 
“intellectually challenging education” (AAUP).  
While great strides have been made in regard to inclusion and accommodation in 
higher education, students with mental disabilities continue to face serious barriers. 
Margaret Price argues there is a “popular conception that unsound minds have no place in 
the classroom” and that the academy is driven “to protect academic discourse as a 
‘rational’ realm, a place where emotion does not intrude (except within carefully 
prescribed boundaries), where ‘crazy’ students are quickly referred out of the classroom 
to the school counseling center” (33). Unfortunately, once pushed out of the classroom, 
students with mental disabilities rarely find their way back. The National Center for 
Education Statistics reports that students with mental disabilities are more likely to drop 
out of college than any of their peers, with dropout rates at 56.1% for those with “mental 
illness” and at 23.6% for those with “serious emotional disturbance” (NCES). In their 
study on higher education and psychiatric disabilities, Collins and Mowbray report an 
even more disheartening number, noting 86% of students with psychiatric disabilities 
leave before they complete their degree. They show that the leading issue facing students 
with mental disabilities is the struggle to receive institutional accommodation and 
support: respondents reported a number of barriers keeping them from accessing 
disability services, including fear of disclosing (24%), lack of knowledge about the 
services available (19%), fear of stigmatization (19%), and the unavailability of the 
needed accommodations/support (16%) (Collins and Mowbray 308).  
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Given these findings, it is imperative that the debate on trigger warnings focus on 
the inherent questions of access. However, because of the misuse of “triggered” to refer 
to anything that makes someone uncomfortable, disagreements about the classroom as a 
“safe space” often divert the conversation away from any real discussion of pedagogy 
and access in higher education. In his 2012 research, Mark Salzer found that students 
with mental illness were more likely to withdraw because of the impact of “perceived 
stigma and discrimination” than because of personal struggles with the symptoms or 
stresses related to their disability (Salzer 1). Because such students are “often viewed as 
disruptive, lacking academic skill, prone to violence” they are often socially isolated and 
left alone to question “how welcome they are on campus” (2). These findings suggest that 
simply providing information about mental illness and “chiding the audience” to treat 
individuals with mental illness kindly by noting the available resources, is not an 
effective approach to decreasing the rate of withdraw for disabled students (6). The false 
conflations of access with “safety,” which allow accommodations to be dismissed only 
serve to further marginalize mentally disabled students, telling them they are in fact not 
welcome because their needs disrupt the processes of learning their peers deserve.  
In the most basic sense, accommodations are not about “safety,” but about access 
to opportunity for a more livable life. When disability is denied because it is not 
understood or seen, or when access is denied because it is inconvenient or complicated, 
humanity is denied. While it is certainly possible to recognize trauma as a mental 
disability and still be hesitant toward trigger warnings as an accommodation practice,21 
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the content and tenor of that conversation would be far removed from the outright 
hostility and rejection that have reverberated most widely. When presented as an access 
measure, it becomes evident that trigger warnings do not provide a way to “opt out” or 
avoid anything, nor do they offer protection from the realities of the world. Trigger 
warnings provide a way to “opt in” by lessening the power of the shock and the 
unexpectedness, and by granting the traumatized individual agency to manage the affect 
and effects of their trauma. Traumatized individuals know that trigger warnings will not 
save us. Nor do they allow us to avoid the traumas we carry with us. Such warnings 
simply allow us to do the work we need to do so that we can participate in the 
conversation or activity at that moment. They allow us to enter the conversation, just like 
automatic doors allow people who use wheelchairs to more easily enter a building.  
 
A Feminist Disability Studies Praxis 
While the recent consideration of trauma in higher education has remained 
practically fixated on trigger warnings, it is important to note that such precautions are 
certainly not the only tool available for addressing trauma in the classroom.22 Along with 
the aforementioned misconceptions structuring the debate, this preoccupation with trigger 
warnings works more to highlight the ablest structures of the academy than to address the 
needs of students. A college classroom, or campus, that adequately accounts for the 
material realities of diverse bodyminds is almost inconceivable within an institution built 
on awarding individual merit over acknowledging structural privileges and inequalities.23 
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Thus, the engagement in this “debate” has remained on a literal level, often overlooking 
the deeper needs and desires behind the appeals.  If educators acknowledge that students 
are doing the best they can, with what they have been taught, to ask for what they need, 
then the focus of this debate would shift beyond the literal request for trigger warnings, 
toward understanding the underlying experiences producing those requests. When this is 
done, it becomes apparent that these students are essentially asking for three reasonable 
things (discussed below), and that the issues at hand are bigger than the specifics of this 
debate. I argue that what this debate calls for is not another institutionalized measure of 
disability management, but rather a collaborative, integrated approach to teaching about 
disability and ableism all together: a feminist disability studies pedagogy.  
First, students are asking to be recognized as whole persons. They are asking that 
educators recognize their full humanity in the classroom, including recognition of 
emotions, struggles, and lived experiences. Students are reminding educators that the 
material being taught has real affects and effects on bodyminds. Second, they are asking 
for a language that recognizes their full humanity and helps attend to the very real 
embodied affect of pain and suffering. Moreover, by petitioning institutions, students are 
attempting to enact systemic change. They are asking that educators model and instruct 
how to critically engage with difficult, and potentially harmful, conversation without 
enacting harm on another. If instructors are not able to do this, students are simply asking 
that the instructor acknowledge their own limitations and not put the bodyminds of the 
vulnerable among them at risk. In her book Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a 
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Self, Susan Brison notes that our society lacks a vocabulary and the interpersonal skills 
necessary to truly comprehend and respond to trauma: “It is a symptom of our society’s 
widespread emotional illiteracy that prevents most people from conveying any feeling 
that can’t be expressed in a Hallmark card” (12). Appeals for trigger warnings are, in 
essence, appeals to include instruction and language on emotional literacy within the 
curriculum.  
Finally, in these petitions for trigger warning students are telling educators that a 
key component of their educational experience is being ignored. Following bell hooks 
and other feminist pedagogues, I see the call for trigger warnings as students demanding 
what hooks terms an “Engaged Pedagogy,” one “that does not offer them information 
without addressing the connection between what they are learning and their overall life 
experience” (hooks 19). While the stance that educators are not therapists is certainly 
valid, Price reminds us that it is the ethical responsibility of educators to respond to the 
emotional experiences that happen in the classroom (52). Instructors are not trained in 
counseling or crisis management; to pretend otherwise would be to do a disservice to 
students in need. However, it takes very little to acknowledge that learning is not isolated 
to cognitive processing, but also includes the often-unconscious assessment of new 
information through emotional, sociocultural, and psychosomatic ways of knowing. 
Indeed, teaching too is not isolated in cognitive processing, and routinely includes ways 
of knowledge that extend beyond the intellectual.  
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Pedagogically speaking, this recognition can manifest in any number of ways. It 
asks that instructors teach with the embodiment of affect, rather than against it.  For 
example, if during a classroom activity or discussion it becomes apparent that students 
are struggling with feelings of anger or frustration, the instructor could pause the 
conversation and ask students to write for five minutes about the emotions they are 
feeling in that moment. Then, when the discussion resumes, the instructor can guide 
students through analyzing how emotions influence the ability to consider new ideas and 
engage with one another in informative and/or mindful ways. If in another instance, 
students seem sluggish and unresponsive, the instructor could pause the class discussion 
or lecture and instruct the students to get up and stretch, shake, dance, or move around 
the room for a set amount of time. Through relatively simple pedagogical practices such 
as these, educators not only acknowledge the full humanity of the students in class, but 
also help students come to recognize learning as a process that involves all aspects of the 
bodymind. To this end, I seek a pedagogical paradigm shift – an interweaving of feminist 
and disability praxis located in what Knoll terms a “feminist disability studies pedagogy” 
(FDSP) (131) and what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson described in her call to integrate 
disability and feminist theory:  
One way to think about feminist theory is to say that it investigates how culture 
saturates the particularities of bodies with meanings and probes the consequences 
of those meanings. Feminist theory is a collaborative, interdisciplinary inquiry 
and self-conscious cultural critique that interrogates how subjects are multiply 
interpellated: in other words, how the representational systems of gender, race, 
ethnicity, ability, sexuality, and class mutually produce, inflect, and contradict 
one another. These systems intersect to produce and sustain ascribed, achieved, 
and acquired identities, both those that claim us and those that we claim for 
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ourselves. A feminist disability theory introduces the ability/disability system as a 
category of analysis into this diverse and diffuse enterprise. It aims to extend 
current notions of cultural diversity and to more fully integrate the academy and 
the larger world it helps shape. (3, emphasis added) 
 
Feminist disability studies pedagogy puts the work of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and 
other feminist disability theorists into practice by blending the ways dis/ability intersects 
with other vectors of power and oppression to inform how we teach and learn. 24 Within 
disability pedagogy, the principles of Universal Design provide important guidelines 
toward creating an accessible classroom and encouraging educators to see our students in 
their full bodymind. 25 However, as Knoll rightfully asserts, working exclusively toward 
the implementation of universal design or accommodations would “leave gaping holes in 
access to academia and courses, by not seeing and addressing the intersecting dilemmas 
of privilege and oppression within the disability experience” (124). Critical disability 
pedagogy incorporates feminist principles that reach beyond inclusion and toward 
shifting the pervasive and intersecting forces of inequality. When the debate on trigger 
warnings is situated within FDSP, the question shifts from should instructors provide 
trigger warnings to how educators might provide adequate acknowledgement of trauma in 
the classroom. Providing trigger warnings is one way to do this, but is not the only way, 
or even the most effective.26  
First, an instructor utilizing FDSP would situate the affective structure of trauma 
and the potential of being triggered within the political/relational model of disability. 
This means understanding that like other neurodivergent people, those affected by trauma 
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or other trigging experiences are dis-abled by social barriers and ideologies that 
marginalize them. These experiences and subjectivities are not individual issues in need 
of cure, but rather the consequences of systemic forces of inequality and oppression. 
Ableism intersects here with race, class, gender, sexuality and citizenship in ways that 
leave the most marginal even more vulnerable to policing measures that dismiss them as 
“excessive,” “improper” and “inappropriate” for the classroom and, though unspoken, 
society at-large. A FDSP would resist the ideologies of exclusion that push traumatized 
and/or triggered individuals out of the classroom. Instead, instructors would incorporate 
consideration of such bodyminds into their teaching. A FDSP would understand 
psychosomatic and affective responses, like the experience of being triggered, as 
appropriate responses to the horrors of structural inequality. Rather than attempting to 
relegate trauma outside of the bounds of academia, instructors would imagine what it 
might look like to honestly teach with the trauma that may be present in their student’s 
bodyminds, and perhaps even in their own.27   
There is a kind of vulnerability here that can be hard to embody—especially for 
instructors and students coming from marginalized populations. Still, profound teaching 
and learning can come from places of vulnerability. In my first semester as the instructor 
of record a student made comments in an online discussion forum that blamed sexual 
violence on what the victim was wearing during the attack. The next day in class, I wore 
a sweatshirt and sweat pants. I explained to the class that this is what I was wearing 
when I was sexually assaulted. We then talked through the rhetoric of victim blaming and 
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how it works to shame the victim into silence, while perpetuating rape culture. This is 
one, perhaps extreme, example of teaching with the trauma that is present in our 
bodyminds.  
While students should undoubtedly receive guidance to all available physical and 
mental health resources on campus,28 students and teachers alike need to understand that 
nothing is “wrong” with a person who is experiencing a moment of re-traumatiziation, or 
any other kind of disability-related affective experience.  In a FDSP classroom, students 
know that the best learning and unlearning often comes with great discomfort, and this 
discomfort is not equivalent to trauma. With this, students should also be given 
guidelines and taught how to engage with difficult and, at times, potentially triggering 
material, and how to know within their own bodymind the difference between 
discomfort/injury and trauma/triggering. This work may be done by including general 
statements in the class syllabus, opening a conversation, brainstorming potential 
responses or self-care skills one might utilize in the event of an overwhelming affective 
experience, or perhaps engaging activities that model how to speak with one another 
when the connections between systemic injustices and deeply personal experiences are 
felt and known in the bodymind. For example, the instructor might initiate a discussion 
on the necessity of discomfort in learning about difficult material and guide students 
through thinking about the differences between personal discomfort and institutionally 
sanctioned, epistemic violence. Statements on the syllabus, or in other handouts, might 
include instructions on how to talk about difficult topics and disagree without demeaning 
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or disrespecting one another. While this may seem unnecessarily, or overly laborious for 
instructors such measures are actually methodological in nature – instructing students on 
how to learn with one another not just what to learn.  
Similarly, various kinds of acknowledgements could be given before in-class 
readings, videos, discussions, or activities. These could take the form of a trigger 
warning, a content note, or brief descriptions. Instructors might make note of the most 
common kinds of triggering material (rape/sexual assault, extreme violence, 
suicide/murder, police violence, and self-harm). Or, at the beginning of the term, 
instructors may ask that students anonymously submit any potentially triggering topics 
they may have.  As educators, there is no way to predict what may trigger one student or 
another, but we can provide the space needed for the bodyminds in the room to share 
their truths.29 Rather than place the responsibility of students’ affective responses on the 
instructor, these measures would serve to remind students of their own power, and 
agency over their bodyminds. Instructors would make note of potentially triggering 
material, not to “protect” their students, but to allow their students to prepare in whatever 
way is necessary for participation.  
Lastly, instructors using FDSP would not require a letter of accommodation, as 
registration with disability services often requires reliance on the medical model of 
disability. This often precludes our most marginalized students from gaining the access 
they need, as people of color, poor people, and queer people are less likely to have the 
financial resources necessary to obtain the required diagnosis and documentation. 
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Moreover, educators and students who desire a community of learners would not seek 
institutionalized policies that require trigger warnings. Educators invested in access 
would take heed from the limitations of the ADA, and know that legislation and 
mandates cannot force anyone, especially those in power, into consciousness.30 Instead, 
work would be done to increase awareness and education about disabilities and emotional 
literacy. Structural changes would be made with regard to the importance of pedagogy 
and student evaluations in faculty development, training, and retention. Rather than 
giving the university resources to reprimand, work would be done to give faculty and 
students the resources to make change together.  
Faculty, students, and administrators should indeed debate the merits and 
limitations of trigger warnings as a pedagogical practice, and seriously consider the 
potential positive and negative effects of institutionalizing such a policy. This work is 
part of what it means to be an educator, and one way students can take ownership of their 
own educational experience. With this, it is also the job of educators to teach students 
how to understand, respond, and engage with the full complexity of the world and our 
humanity. This work must include ways of attending to the affects and effects of trauma 
and violence, the politics of emotions, and the embodied manifestations of power and 
oppression. It is telling that critiques of trigger warnings accuse the supporters of 
enacting neoliberal ideologies of individualizing harm (e.g., Halberstam), yet when 
faculty position themselves against trigger warnings because of justifiable fears of 
increased work load, expanded emotional labor, or risks of retribution, they create a false 
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binary between one group experiencing institutional exploitation and another. The needs 
of faculty and staff need not be positioned against the needs of students. Imagine if, 
instead of refusing student initiatives, faculty and students stood in solidarity to demand 
and create the kind of community it takes to truly provide education as a practice of 
freedom.  
When approached through FDSP, the significance of the trigger warning debate 
shifts. An accurate understanding of trauma and triggers situates trauma in the context of 
disability, not discomfort, and it illustrates the persistent misconceptions surrounding 
disability and mental illness. Similarly, examining the seeming conflict between feminist 
and disability pedagogy over trigger warnings demonstrates the still present 
misconstruction of access and accommodation, neither of which are about “safety.” 
Finally, these new perspectives allow educators to finally see the underlying needs 
students identify when they make such requests. When guided by FDSP, this debate 
ceases to be one. The conversation shifts from whether educators should incorporate 
trigger warnings into pedagogical practices to why trauma itself must be understood as an 
imperative social justice issue within the classroom. 
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Chapter Four:  
 
The Cripistemologies of Trauma: 
A Feminist Queer Crip Interpretation of Hanya Yanagihara’s A Little Life 
(Content Note: This writing discusses self-injury, sexual violence, and suicide. Take care.) 
 
 
The point of reading, especially fiction, is not to have confirmed what you already think 
or feel, but to make you think anew about what you already think or feel.  
 - Hanya Yanagihara.  
 
 
 
 
  
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
151 
 
 
The quote above, taken from a 2015 Electric Lit interview, 31 was part of Hanya 
Yanagihara’s response to two questions about trigger warnings. In particular, the 
interviewer asked whether or not Yanagihara thought students who had been victims of 
trauma themselves, should be able to “exercise their right to opt out” should her book, A 
Little Life, be assigned in a class (Kavanagh). While her initial answer illustrates the 
common misunderstandings regarding trigger warnings that the interview question itself 
prompts32, Yanagihara’s extended response actually provides a succinct counter-
argument in support of trauma-informed pedagogical practices and curriculum. 
Moreover, her insight centers the potential of literature to present alternative ways of 
thinking, knowing, and feeling about trauma. Yanagihara asserts: 
  
I’d say we never really know how we’re going to react until we start reacting. To 
try to preemptively shield yourself from an experience—to say, in essence, this 
book is about something that I fear is going to really upset me, so I’d better 
protect myself by not exposing myself to it at all—is not only limiting, but also 
meaning you might be preventing yourself from experiencing something else, 
something you thought you never would, or never have. It also reduces art to a 
single topic, and to a single reaction: I would hate it if this book were dismissed 
as a book about abuse. Abuse is part of it. But I hope it’s also about other things 
as well. All books are. This is an obvious point, but no one book is about one 
thing (unless it’s a very boring book). The point of reading, especially fiction, is 
not to have confirmed what you already think or feel, but to make you think anew 
about what you already think or feel. (Kavanagh) 
  
It is precisely for these reasons that feminist disability pedagogues call not for “opting-
out,” but rather for collective classroom and university approaches that provide 
individuals living with trauma many avenues toward “opting-in” (see chapter 3). 
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It took me close to a year to begin reading A Little Life after I bought it, on 
recommendation from perhaps the one person who has walked beside me through my 
traumas the longest. I wasn’t avoiding the book; it sat on my nightstand the entire time. 
What I was doing was preparing myself for its truths, preparing to opt in. As I read I used 
many, if not all, of the strategies to process the impending triggers I routinely discuss 
with my students: I took breaks; I cuddled with my dog; I journaled; I stopped reading 
for days at a time; I cried to friends; I talked about how I was feeling with friends; I took 
walks; I stretched; I reminded myself of the present date and time; I even took the book 
with me to therapy and read passages to my therapist; I wrote expletives in the margins; 
and I threw the book across the room. And yet, I could not stop reading - I could not turn 
away. 
         Winner of the Kirkus Prize in Fiction and earning a spot on the short list for the 
Man Booker Prize, The National Book Award and the Andrew Carnegie Medal for 
Excellence, A Little Life begins by chronicling the first decade or so of friendship 
between four men who met in college: Jude St. Francis, Willem Ragnarsson, Jean-
Baptiste (JB) Marion and Malcolm Irvine. As the novel, and the next two decades unfold, 
the narrative situates firmly on Jude, and in particular, his lifelong struggle with the 
physical and affective aftermath of disabling traumas. 
While the narrative arcs within A Little Life unquestionably hinge around themes 
of abuse, suffering, disability, trauma—despite the overwhelming lack of attention the 
last two received in popular reviews—Yanagihara’s work is not about these topics in the 
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traditional sense. Rather, as this chapter will argue, what Yanagihara presents in A Little 
Life is an alternative way of thinking and knowing about trauma and disability. Through 
the novel’s main character Jude St. Francis, I contend that what Yanagihara offers is a 
crip-epistemology, or a cripistemology of trauma (Johnson and McRuer, Crip 128) Not 
only does A Little Life present a subversive narrative that centers the kinds of embodied, 
affective knowledges of disabling trauma, it does so unapologetically and without 
reprieve. Indeed, one reviewer even notes that “there are truths here that are almost too 
much to bear” (Cha). To paraphrase the quote from Yanagihara above, this is the 
“something else,” the something I thought I never would, and never have, experienced 
until reading this book (in Kavanagh). Jude’s narrative of trauma and disability is 
precisely what I have been searching for and not finding. Indeed, Yanagihara’s A Little 
Life fulfills trauma theorist Cathy Caruth’s call to “listen to trauma beyond its pathology 
for the truth that it tells us” (vii-viii). In doing so, Yanagihara’s reader is guided through 
“different ways of thinking about what it means to understand” trauma and disability—
and even more importantly, “what kinds of truth we are looking for” (Caruth vii-viii).     
  
Crip Knowledges of Trauma 
         As articulated in Chapter Two, in order to reconceptualize a more meaningful and 
socially just approach to understanding the disabling effects and affects of trauma, I 
contend that we must start with centering crip knowledges of trauma. We must learn to 
listen to the kinds of knowledges and ways of knowing that come from within and 
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through trauma itself. Disability theorist Merri Lisa Johnson coined the term 
“cripistemology” to draw attention to the politics of knowledge production by centering 
what we—as disabled people—know, how we know it, and why it matters (McRuer and 
Johnson 161). Further developed in a two-part journal series co-edited with Robert 
McRuer, cripistemology is a neologism merging the reclaimed word “crip” with 
epistemology, serving as a philosophical endeavor that challenges the prominence of non-
disabled knowledges about disability though a reconceptualization of what disability 
theorists have termed “sitpoint theory.”33 Johnson and McRuer push theorists not to 
resolve the assumed crisis between “identity-based or embodiment-based knowledge” 
and “poststructuralism, pleasure, or the slipperiness of meanings, texts, and bodies” 
(Johnson McRuer Crip 132). Rather, they invoke cripistemology as a purposefully 
conflicting theoretical trajectory—one that aligns with the instability of (dis)ability 
itself—and ask theorists to “proceed without fearing conceptual instability” (Johnson 
McRuer, Crip 132). Johnson, McRuer, and all the authors in the two-part journal series 
they edit show that “beneath these caricatured encampments lie meaningful conceptual 
differences” toward new understandings of (dis)ability and disabled bodyminds (Johnson 
and McRuer, Crip 133).  
In the introduction to the second journal volume on cripistemology, Johnson and 
McRuer speak directly to these concerns as they expand on their mobilization of the term. 
While they do not use the language of trauma directly, it is indirectly woven throughout 
their invocation. “As we bound cripistemology to crisis...” Johnson and McRuer exclaim, 
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“... it was in the interest of touching upon ways of being together that might be sustaining 
through crises” (Johnson and McRuer Intro 254 emphasis added). They go on to specify 
that in tethering crip ways of knowing to crisis it becomes evident that “the differences 
between us guarantee that we will not and cannot all identify with or around various ways 
of speaking, even if—at moments of personal or collective crisis—those ways of 
speaking (crip! queer! lesbian! crazy!) are hurled at us and leave us freshly wounded” 
(Johnson and McRuer, Intro 254, emphasis added). Within these few sentences, found 
within their concluding paragraph, Johnson and McRuer put forth the theoretical 
implications of a cripistemology of trauma. Crip ways of knowing are bound to crises, 
they tell us, and the ways that we have found to sustain ourselves in perpetual states 
thereof. What's more, Johnson and McRuer point directly to the paradox of trauma 
theory: the ways of narrating (speaking) about trauma fail us all, in fact they often hurt us 
more, and no one way of knowing from, within, or about trauma will ever work for 
everyone because of our various embodied experiences and socialized differences. 
With this much nuance, it is unclear why Johnson and McRuer veered away from 
using the word trauma itself in this conclusion and defining passage. Just like disability 
has what Simi Linton has called its “nice words” (physically challenged, differently-
abled, special, etc), trauma too has its share of well-meaning euphemisms (14-15). While 
such words can certainly have independent meaning in various other contexts, these 
words—crisis, wounded, among others—are colloquially and commonly used to 
downplay traumatic experiences, typically to ease the social anxiety of those near, but not 
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experiencing, the trauma.34 Nevertheless, Johnson, McRuer, and the theorists that follow 
in the journal volumes outline a foundational theoretical framework for an initial 
cripistemology of trauma. This general framework provides the scaffolding for a more 
nuanced understanding of the crip trauma knowledge presented in Yanagihara’s A Little 
Life.  
In fact, Yanagihara and the cripistemologists with the journal volumes write with 
similar modalities. Jude St Francis, the main character in A Little Life, is written with 
unrecognizable demographics. Throughout the book his race is seen as indeterminable. 
While there one mention late in the book that he “must be part Mohican,” it is more 
generally repeated that “Jude is not white” (615; 7). Similarly, his sexual orientation is 
unclear as he never speaks of his past. His physical disabilities are also hard to pinpoint. 
His friends joke that he is “post-sexual, post-racial, post-identity, post-past…[t]he post 
man. Jude the Postman.” (Yanagihara 107). Of course, readers come to find out that he is 
also living post-trauma (whatever that means). Like Yanagihara seems to intend with 
writing Jude in this way, Johnson and McRuer write that they, too, “intend to gesture 
away from definitely knowable identities,” and explain that instead they “gesture toward 
ways of knowing in relation, knowing-with, knowing-alongside, knowing-across 
difference, and unknowing” (Johnson and McRuer, Intro 253-254). When Jude’s 
character is understood through the crip knowledges of trauma he puts forward 
throughout the novel, it seems as through Yanagihara shares these inclinations as well. 
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
157 
 
 
While only three or four mainstream book reviews briefly discuss the trauma 
within the book as trauma, and not a single review uses the word disability, let alone 
deeply considers its role in the novel,35 this chapter will show that Yanagihara’s narrative 
in A Little Life presents an innovative, contentious, and formidable cripistemology of 
trauma. More specifically, through a close feminist queer crip reading of the novel, 
alternative ways of knowing trauma become possible through depiction of the main 
character, Jude. What’s more, subjugated knowledges about living with embodied, 
disabling traumas become apparent when readers learn to listen to Jude’s words as well 
as his silences. In particular, the chapter will argue that three unmistakable yet 
overlapping crip trauma knowledges emerge through such a close reading practice: the 
narratives of trauma; the instabilities of trauma; and the affects of trauma. The crip 
knowledges of trauma depicted in A Little Life offer the discerning reader an entry point 
into modes of knowing (and not knowing) about disabling trauma that push beyond the 
bounds of compulsory identitarian and rights-based discourses that so often erase the 
complex, embodied crip experiences of the traumatized that such discourse aims to 
liberate in the first place.   
  
Cripistemology One: Crip Narratives of Trauma  
The first elements of a cripistemology of trauma presented in A Little Life are the 
various components of Jude St. Francis’s crip trauma narrative. Through Jude, 
Yanagihara presents a story of trauma where no one gets better; mainstream pathways 
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toward “recovery” are questioned; and narrative itself is positioned as retraumatizing. In 
doing so, I argue that Yanagihara’s writing offers a cripistemology of trauma that 
centralizes ways of knowing and unknowing that arise from the embodiment of disabling 
trauma itself. More specifically, Jude’s silence throughout the novel can be understood 
then, not as a sorrowful consequence of trauma’s debilitation, but rather as an agential 
move toward what Robert Zussman theorizes as “narrative freedom” (142).  
Conventionally, narratives are understood as the way in which people map 
meaning onto their lived experiences by putting them into sequences, known as stories 
(Irvine et al, 3). Trauma, as leading trauma theorist Cathy Caruth understands it, is more 
than responding to an unexpected, violent event, or even an encounter with death; it is 
“the ongoing experience of having survived it” (Caruth 7). Consequently, for Caruth, 
trauma narratives are “thus a kind of double telling, the oscillation between a crisis of 
death and the correlative crisis of life: between the story of the unbearable nature of an 
event and the story of the unbearable nature of its survival” (Caruth 7).   
In its totality, A Little Life focuses on Jude’s life story—his narrative of disabling 
trauma. However, only a small part of the narrative comes from Jude himself. Instead, the 
narration of Jude’s story alternates randomly from chapter to chapter and subchapter to 
subchapter. Some sections are narrated omnisciently, while others are narrated from the 
point of view of one of his loved ones, either in third or first person. So while the novel 
appears to center Jude’s trauma narrative, what it actually centers is the meaning that his 
loved ones—and the reader—make of Jude’s disabling and traumatizing life experiences. 
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As argued in previous chapters, this is a common occurrence in the lives of disabled and 
traumatized people and populations. Meaning is mapped onto our bodyminds by those 
around us who are attempting to make sense of us, often in epistemically violent ways.  
Throughout the novel, the reader and various characters have differential access to 
knowledge about Jude’s past and disabling trauma. This is done through the structure of 
the trauma narrative itself. Temporal shifts within the narrative, or some version of a 
literary “flashback” to Jude’s past, begin only after the reader has gained familiarity with 
Jude as a character (Yanagihara 113). These narrative “flashbacks” tell the stories that 
introduce Jude’s past and his disabling trauma to the reader. Although many novels play 
with temporal structure, the use of a non-linear trajectory with only Jude’s story is 
particularly tied to and evidenced by his traumatic experiences and disabled embodiment 
within the narrative. Most importantly, it is never Jude directly telling his own trauma 
stories to the reader, but rather an omniscient narrator telling the reader about Jude’s 
disabling trauma.   
In time and in pieces, readers come to learn that Jude was abandoned near a trash 
can at birth. He was found and raised by monks who abused him both physically and 
sexually. When he is a teenager, one of the monks convinces Jude to run away with him. 
That monk then sexually traffics Jude for a handful of years out of hotels across the 
country. Eventually, Jude is “rescued” and put into a group home where his sexual 
exploitation continues. In time, he runs away, running across the country living truck stop 
to truck stop by engaging in sex work for survival. Eventually, he is picked up by an 
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older man who keeps him locked up in his basement. When he tries to escape, the man 
runs Jude over with his car leaving him with permanent physical disabilities. At this point 
Jude is taken in by a caring social worker who helps him finish high school and apply to 
college. (Although abusive, the monks taught him a great deal academically.) In college, 
he meets his three lifelong friends: Willem, Malcolm, and JB. He also develops a strong 
caring relationship with his mentor, who eventually adopts him as an adult. While Jude 
achieves career success in adulthood, he falls into an abusive relationship with a man 
who rapes and almost kills him during one episode of domestic violence. Throughout his 
life, Jude struggles with internalized ableism, suicide ideation, and a coping mechanism 
of self-injuring behavior.  
Jude desperately attempts to hide these details of his past, his disabilities, and his 
traumas from his friends and mentor. Throughout his life, Jude finds ways to dodge 
questions from those who love him. In one passage from when Jude was in college, the 
reader learns that:  
His silence was both a necessity and a protection, and had the added benefit of 
making him appear more mysterious and more interesting than he knew he was. 
“What about you, Jude.” a few people had asked him, early in the term, and he 
knew enough by then—he was a fast learner—to simply shrug and say, with a 
smile, “It’s too boring to get into.” He was astonished but relieved by how easily 
they accepted that, grateful too for their self-absorption. None of them really 
wanted to listen to someone else’s story anyway; they wanted to tell their own.  
(Yanagihara 107)    
 
In other instances, Jude replies with very little detail, answering only the question that is 
asked, or providing very nuanced answers. For example, after he grew closer to Willem, 
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JB, and Malcolm in college they wanted to know more. “Well” said JB, pausing and 
taking another inhalation, “we’ve all known each other a while now ...And all of us want 
to know why you’ve never told us what happened to your legs. …It really hurts our 
feelings, Jude. Do you not trust us?”  
At that moment he hated all of them, but of course he was in no position to hate 
them. They were his friends, his first friends, and he understood that friendship 
was a series of exchanges: of affection, of time, sometimes of money, always of 
information. And he had no money. He had nothing to give them, he had nothing 
to offer. He couldn’t loan Willem a sweater, the way Willem let him borrow his, 
or repay Malcolm the hundred dollars he’d pressed upon him once, or even help 
JB on move-out day, as JB helped him.  
“Well” he began, and was aware of all of their perked silences, even 
Willem’s. “It’s not very interesting.” He kept his eyes closed, both because it 
made it easier to tell the story when he didn’t have to look at them and also 
because he simply didn't think he could stand it at the moment. “It was a car 
injury. I was fifteen. It was the year before I came here.” (Yanagihara 111)  
 
In this exchange the reader learns a few things about Jude. First, we learn that he 
understands friendship and relationality not as a sociality based in love or connection, but 
rather a series of exchanges, sometimes forced or out of obligation. Second, we see here 
how Jude narrates his life experiences. He does not go into detail about the man who hid 
him in his basement and sexually abused him. He does not go into detail about the nature 
of his injuries or the nature of the incident that caused the injuries. Even with his “first 
friends” Jude keeps the details, and emotions, related to his disabling traumas to himself.  
“Oh,” said JB… “I’m sorry, bro. That sucks.”  
“You could walk before” asked Malcolm, as if he could not walk now. And this 
made him sad and embarrassed: what he considered walking, they apparently did not.  
 “Yes,” he said, and, because it was true, even if not the way they’d interpret it, he 
added, “I used to run cross-country.” (Yanagihara 112)  
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Here we see the kind of “well-meaning” ableism that often comes from loved 
ones. Malcolm centralizes able-bodied norms by seeing Jude’s disability as a lack, or 
inability, while Jude understands himself to be capable of walking, regardless of his 
impairment. Here we also see Jude offering a piece of his trauma narrative without the 
trauma. The cross-country running Jude is referring to is the times when he ran away 
from sexual violence, running alongside the highways from truck stop to truck stop where 
he engaged in sex work to survive (Yanagihara). However, from Jude’s narration, his 
friends would never suspect any of those details; rather they would imagine him to be a 
part of a high school sports team. In this half-truth, Jude is both saving his friends from 
his traumatic past and also saving himself from its retelling.  
Jude’s distance from his own trauma narrative throughout the novel signifies crip 
ways of knowing and unknowing about trauma, in that narrative for traumatized people is 
a particularly complicated and ambivalent endeavor. In traditional trauma theory, it is 
thought that narratives of trauma can never fully be told because trauma is understood as 
an “experience that is not fully assimilated as it occurs” and therefore it is spoken in a 
“language that defies, even as it claims, our understanding” (Caruth 5). I argue here, 
through the depiction of Jude’s trauma narrative within A Little Life, that it is not a 
question of trauma’s assimilation into the psyche of the traumatized, but rather a question 
of the traumatized person’s narrative freedom. In his forthcoming work, entitled 
“Narrative Freedom,” Robert Zussman explores the possibilities and limitations of this 
very concept. Zussman defines this freedom as “the ability to tell stories about ourselves 
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in the ways we want, not simply to muster particular facts and events but to draw 
meanings and morals about our own lives” (142). Furthermore, Zussman specifies that 
narrative freedom “involves selecting among the categories and actions we identify with 
but also selecting and transforming the meanings we ascribe to those identities and 
actions” (143).  
As we see throughout A Little Life, narrative freedom is highly limited for 
traumatized individuals. The meanings and morals about our lives are routinely mapped 
onto our bodyminds or narrated for us by others, as is Jude’s narrative throughout the 
novel. Moreover, when we do try to tell our narrative to those around us they often 
struggle to hear it. For instance, after years of Willem begging Jude to tell him about his 
past, Jude finally relents.  
...Jude had sighed. “Willem, I’m not going to tell you these stories if you’re going 
to react like this,” he said, finally. “It’s okay, it really is. It was a long time ago. I 
never think about it.” He paused. “I don’t want you to look at me differently if I 
tell you these things.” He’d taken a deep breath. “No,” he said. “You’re right. 
You’re right.’ And so now when he listened to these stories of Jude’s, he was 
careful not to say anything, to make small, non-judgmental noises, as if all his 
friends had been whipped with a belt soaked in vinegar until they had passed out 
or been made to eat their vomit off the floor, as if those were normal rites of 
childhood. But despite these stories, he still knew nothing...if Jude was just 
beginning with the easier stories, he now knew enough to know that those stories, 
if he ever heard them, would be horrific. He almost didn't want to know. 
(Yanagihara 490-491) 
  
In this passage we see that Jude’s understanding of his stories and Willem’s 
understanding differ greatly. Jude expresses distance from his trauma and Willem has to 
consciously alter his emotional responses because of how deeply it touches him. The 
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differential meanings experienced by the two men are indicative of the conflict regarding 
narrative that lasts the entire novel.  
Throughout their adult years together (later in life Willem and Jude’s friendship 
develops into a life partnership), Willem consistently tries to get Jude to tell him more 
about his past. This is because Willem—like many others—understands narrative to be 
empowering and therapeutic. For many traumatized individuals, however, our 
relationship to narrative is more complex. In his work, Zussman utilizes both Foucault 
and Goffman to propose four types of autobiographical narratives. This approach is 
useful when thinking through trauma narrative because many trauma narratives—like 
Jude’s—so often fall outside of all four types. The first set of narrative occasions arise 
from the top down, when authority figure insists on a story, often in a particular form and 
content (Zussman 145). As Zussman proposes them, these narratives are either positioned 
socially as “transformative” for the individual (e.g therapy) or “restorative” for society at 
large (e.g confession). The second set of narrative occasions arise, according to Zussman, 
from the bottom up, when individuals or collectives generate their own narratives or 
shared history (Zussman 145). These too can be “transformative” through narratives of 
self-invention (e.g., slave narrative or other identitarian storytelling) or “restorative” 
through reunions or collective memory (e.g. high school reunions). Of course, Zussman 
notes that narratives can be a combination of these categories (148).  
Using Zussman’s framework, what we see throughout A Little Life are the ways in 
which both top-down and bottom-up transformative narratives are imposed onto 
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traumatized individuals, limiting their narrative freedom. The cripistemologies of trauma 
arise within the book through Yanagihara’s approach to Jude’s character and through his 
relentless rejection of these transformative narratives. Again, according to Zussman, 
transformative narratives are those that transform the storyteller into “something or 
someone new” (146). Throughout Jude’s life he is pressured by those who love him to 
tell his story presumably as a means of healing. Jude’s loved ones assume that narrating 
his story will transform Jude into someone who is less tormented. What A Little Life 
shows, however, is that narrating trauma is not always a healing or transformative 
endeavor. Jude does not get better, nothing is transcended, and he is never transformed 
through narrating his trauma. In fact, narrating his trauma is retraumatizing for Jude. 
When Willem finally gets Jude to tell him the depths of his life story, the reader is told 
that:  
It will take hours, because Jude is sometimes unable to continue, and Willem will 
wait and hold him so tightly that Jude won’t be able to breathe. Twice he will try 
to wrench himself way, and Willem will pin him to the ground and hold him there 
until he calms himself. Because they are in the closet, they won’t know what time 
it is, only that there has been a day that has arrived and departed…He will listen 
to stories that are unimaginable, that are abominable; he will excuse himself, three 
times, to go to the bathroom and study his face in the mirror and remind himself 
that he has only to find the courage to listen, although he will want to cover his 
ears and cover Jude’s mouth to make the stories cease...on and on and on the 
stories will go, and in their path will lie squalor; blood and bones and dirt and 
disease and misery… (Yanagihara 607)  
 
Indeed, in his review for The New Yorker, Jon Michaud writes that “what makes 
the book’s treatment of abuse and suffering subversive is that it does not offer any 
possibility of redemption and deliverance beyond these tender moments. It gives us a 
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moral universe in which spiritual salvation of this sort does not exist… what’s most 
obviously lost here is the promise of spiritual absolution or even psychological healing” 
(citation). Other reviewers noticed this as well, some praising and some condemning 
Yanagihara for such choices (Kavanagh). There is no resolution, no transformation, no 
healing for anyone in A Little Life. So much so that before publication Yanagihara’s 
editor worried the book would be too much for readers to bear (Yanagihara and Howard). 
However, Yanagihara prevailed and the novel was published as written, without the 
traditional arch of redemption. 
In her own essay, “How I Wrote My Novel: Hanya Yanagihara’s A Little Life,” 
the author explains that the book was inspired by numerous pieces of art, including Chip 
Kidd’s 1996 cover for The New York Times Magazine article by Andrew Sullivan about 
the AIDS epidemic (see figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1: Chip Kidd’s 1996 NYT Magazine Cover 
 
  
Yanagihara writes:  
One of the things I knew I wanted to do with this book was create a protagonist 
who never gets better...I remember being fascinated by the [Sullivan] article, of 
course, but also by the cover, which remains one of my all-time-favorite pieces of 
editorial art: In it, the type starts out as “sick”—blurry, clotty, barely 
decipherable—and then, as it moves down the page, gets healthier, crisper 
brighter, more legible. I wanted A Little Life to do the reverse: to begin healthy (or 
appear so) and end sick both the main character, Jude, and the plot itself 
(Yanagihara, How 4). 
  
Here we see clearly here both the queer and crip theoretical and methodological forces 
within the novel. In this instance queerness, chronic illness, disability, alongside cultural 
and community trauma blur together in resistance to the social pressure to heal and 
overcome. By grounding her refusal to write into the narrative of “getting better” in the 
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history of HIV/AIDS activism, Yanagihara’s writings shows that although she is likely 
not “well versed in contemporary disability theory and queer theory” she is “intimately 
acquainted with negativity, failure, hopelessness, and passivity” (Johnson and McRuer, 
Crip 127). She too knows that “it does not always get better and when it does, there is a 
cost attached” (Johnson and McRuer, Crip 127). Although the mainstream review press 
finds this particular act of redemptive refusal subversive, I understand it as simply one of 
many stylistic choices Yanagihara made in writing a pivotal crip trauma narrative 
(Michaud). 
 Relatedly, despite the many attempts of his loved ones to coerce him into therapy, 
Jude resists going, or when he does relent, he refuses to narrate his trauma for the 
therapist (Yanagihara). Here we see the ways in which traumatized individuals may have 
to navigate top-down transformative narratives that again limit their own narrative 
freedom. On one occasion he admits to Willem that he has been “going, but not going” to 
his appointments. “Well, I go,” Jude said, “but then—then I sit outside in the car and read 
through the session, then when the session’s over, I drive back to the office” (646). The 
reader soon learns that “Willem gave him permission to terminate his mostly silent 
relationship with Dr. Loehmann...He had felt guilty about his eighteen months with Dr. 
Loehmann, in which he had revealed almost nothing, had spent most of this time 
childishly protecting his privacy, trying not to say anything, wasting both his and the 
doctor’s time (662-663).  
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Jude’s resistance to talk based therapy, as a healing modality, is reasonable on 
many accounts, particularly given his early life history with institutional violence. Those 
who were supposed to protect and help him only further pathologized and harmed him. 
Furthermore, while we know nothing of Jude’s parents or ancestors, the book is clear that 
Jude is “not white” and suggests that he may be of direct Native American descent 
(Yanagihara 7; 615). We cannot rule out the potential then for intergenerational trauma. 
Regardless, as a disabled possibly indigenous person with queer desire and a history of 
sexual trauma, his likelihood for being highly pathologized, even institutionalized, is 
extremely high. In fact, throughout the book we see Jude’s fear of this outcome (156). In 
an interview with Electric Lit Magazine, Yanagihara speaks specifically to on this topic, 
in that she:  
…didn’t use psychological language, and didn’t want to—nor encourage the 
reader to—diagnose Jude in clinical terms. As far for limits of therapy: I can’t 
speak to them, only that therapy, like any medical treatment, is finite in its ability 
to save and correct. I think of psychology the way I think of religion: a school of 
belief or thought that offers many people solace and answers... but I don’t believe 
in it—talk therapy, I should specify—myself. One of the things that makes me 
most suspicious about the field is its insistence that life is always the answer... 
psychology, and psychiatry, insists that life is the meaning of life, so to speak; 
that if one can’t be repaired, one can at least find a way to stay alive to keep 
growing older.” (Kavanagh) 
  
Though her full statement is certainly controversial, what Yanagihara is questioning here 
is the power of therapeutic narrative, or what Zussman theorizes as top-down 
transformative narrative. Yanagihara’s work challenges both the demand for narrative 
and the assumption that narrative will be transformative for all. Zussman too 
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acknowledges that narrative freedom is limited by therapists who, “even with the best of 
intentions, insist on particular forms of speech” (156). Furthermore, Zussman argues that 
narrative freedom, while not impossible, is quite difficult to achieve, most notably 
because it “requires resources, possessed by few, such that a story may not simply be told 
but also heard” (156). As we’ve seen, Willem struggles to hear Jude’s trauma narratives 
on more than one occasion. The inability to be heard, even when we speak our trauma, is 
something traumatized individuals often come to expect. Indeed, this is why, like Jude, 
many traumatized individuals choose to remain silent or speak little about our traumas.  
 Through her presentation of Jude’s crip trauma narrative, Yanagihara brings forth 
a cripistemology of trauma in that she presents a story where “getting better” is 
questioned; narratives of transformation are rejected; and narrative itself is positioned as 
potentially harmful. Furthermore, A Little Life illustrates what Zussman’s work 
concludes: that “the closest approximation of narrative freedom may, then, reside not in 
any particular form of narrative but in the right not to narrate” (157).  Zussman and 
Yanagihara alike ultimately suggest in their work that true narrative freedom “may not 
involve liberating narrative, but to liberate ourselves from narrative” (Zussman 157). 
Throughout A Little Life, Jude’s negotiation of his own trauma narrative illustrates a 
cripistemology that arises when one is attempting to find that liberation.  
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Cripistemology Two: The Instabilities of Trauma 
 The second cripistemology of trauma that arises from A Little Life involves the 
instabilities trauma brings to the traumatized person. It comes in three primary 
modalities: an instability of selfhood, an instability of the physical bodymind, and an 
instability of both in time and space, or what Margaret Price has termed “crip spacetime” 
(Price, Moving 3). It is imperative to approach these instabilities as alternative ways of 
knowing and being in the world for two reasons. First, historically these instabilities have 
been the markers of trauma that have led to pathologization and further marginalization 
for traumatized people through the medical industrial complex. In order to move trauma 
out of the Medical Model of Disability and into a Political/Relational Model, as I outlined 
in Chapter Two, we must begin by disrupting the pathways of this pathologization. 
Rather than situating these instabilities as individualized markers of damaged personhood 
in need of correction, I am positioning them as merely another part of the embodied 
affect of trauma. Indeed, these ontological, phenomenological, and temporal-spatial 
instabilities are often the embodiments of trauma that cause traumatized individuals to 
fall outside of social recognition (even momentarily).  
Second, I am therefore arguing that we center an understanding of these 
instabilities as a central part of the embodied experience of trauma so that we might 
imagine other ways of responding to trauma beyond the ideologies of pathologization, 
pity, lack, and damaged personhood. More specifically, by approaching the instabilities 
of trauma as a cripistemology, rather than a pathology that needs to be corrected, I am 
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positioning traumatized people as valid, agential, knowing subjects. For many people, 
both the embodied, affective experience of trauma and the common social responses to 
their experiences of trauma negate their feelings of control, validity, and agency, as well 
as their claims to knowledge. In approaching the instabilities of trauma as a 
cripistemology that offers alternative ways of knowing and being in the world, I seek to 
reestablish the traumatized person as the expert in their own experience in order to move 
toward broader social justice and transformation.   
 
Yanagihara wrote A Little Life with theses instabilities of trauma in mind. She notes that: 
 I wanted the experience of reading it to feel immersive by being slightly 
otherworldly, to not give the reader many contextual tethers to steady them. Jared 
once called it an ‘emotional thriller,’ and I think that’s right: the readers should, in 
part, experience the same terrifying unpredictability and uncontrollability of life, 
the helplessness of life, as Jude does.” (Yanagihara and Howard)   
  
These “slightly otherworldly,” “terrifying,” unpredictable, uncontrollable, and so-called 
“helpless” experiences that Jude lives with are common experiences for disabled and 
traumatized people. As the popular albeit problematic saying36 goes, these experiences 
are what all of us will live through if we live long enough. Still, while it might seem as 
though Yanagihara is deliberately pulling her reader though the book as a kind of 
“miserabilist epic,” as some have proposed, I contend that she is doing so in order to 
depict the deeper complexities of crip trauma knowledge than her quote here allows 
(Yanagihara and Howard). A closer reading of Jude’s character development throughout 
the novel shows his consistent struggles with the intertwining of ontological instability, 
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phenomenological instability, and tempo-spatial instability. While these instabilities are 
often markers of pathology, Yanagihara presents them here—through Jude—as 
components of a cripistemology that deserve to be taken seriously as an alternative way 
of being and knowing in the world. Throughout the novel, Jude’s instabilities are 
presented in order to show the reader, and other characters, certain “truths” about 
disabling trauma. While this is certainly just one representation of trauma (as no single 
depiction could ever encapsulate all experiences), Yanagihara’s characterization of Jude 
throughout A Little Life offers readers an entry into knowledges about trauma’s 
instabilities that are often overlooked, ignored, or pathologized in mainstream U.S. 
culture. In doing so, I argue that A Little Life provides readers with a pathway to begin 
imagining trauma otherwise.    
 The often-canonized trauma theorist Cathy Caruth connects her work 
genealogically to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as a rethinking of Freud’s 
analysis. For Caruth, trauma theory is ultimately asking “the urgent and unsettling 
question: what does it mean to survive?” (60). For philosopher Susan Brison, disabling 
trauma is that which “introduces a ‘surd’—a nonsensical entry—into the series of events 
in one’s life, making it seem impossible to carry on with the series” of life as it was 
previously understood (103).  After trauma, daily life as it was previously known ends; 
“not only is it now impossible to carry on with the series” of life, Brison explains, “but 
whatever sense had been made of it in the past has been destroyed” (104). The present 
instantly disconnects from the past, and it becomes nearly impossible to envision what 
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could be called a future (Brison 68).  It is this moment of debilitation where “all that is 
left is the present, but one that has no meaning, or has, at most, only the shifting sense of 
a floating indexical, the dot of a ‘now’ that would go for a walk, if only it knew where to 
go” (Brison 104).  
Throughout A Little Life, I argue that readers see the merging of both approaches 
to trauma in the various instabilities arising from, within, and surrounding Jude. For 
many of us, like Jude, who grew up living from traumatic moment to traumatic moment 
there is no before or after trauma, as Brison describes it. Rather, we live chasing that 
floating indexical trying to figure out where it is has taken us and where we are going to 
end up next. This is what disabling trauma looks like for us. Caruth and Brison’s 
approach to trauma, as the unbearable nature of survival, supplements my approach to 
trauma—not as an event, but as an embodied, affective structure that falls outside the 
hegemonic norms that constitute social recognizability.  
   In a chapter entitled “Outliving Oneself,” Brison discusses the ways in which 
trauma ultimately reshapes the sense of self held by the person who “survives” the 
trauma. Of course, it is how we understand “the self” in the first place that shapes how 
we come to understand its undoing via trauma (Brison 38). Drawing on the work of 
numerous philosophers, Brison contends that the self is a narrative of personal identity 
that is deeply relational, intrinsically social, embodied, and autonomous (41). In her 
work, Brison argues that the study of trauma reveals each of these aspects of the self 
through its very disruption. Trauma changes us—it changes the story of who we are. Our 
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relation to the people and world around us changes. The socially determined meanings 
we put onto our bodyminds and all of our experiences shift. Our understanding of our 
own autonomy, strength, power, and fortitude is altered. Often, as Brison reports, our 
entire identity has changed. We do not see ourselves as the person we were before.  
However, for many of us—like Jude—who have no memory of life before 
trauma, no narrative of self, or no sense of personal identity that was constructed pre-
trauma, this so-called “disrupted” self is our only self. The trauma that is the “undoing” 
of others, is our foundation. It is our only personal narrative, our only starting point, our 
first sense of self. We do not have a “before” and “after,” a “pre” or a “post,” but rather 
our entire way of being, our only selfhood, our relationality, our sociality, and our 
understandings of ideas like autonomy and control, are traumatized from the very 
beginning. We see this clearly in Yanagihara’s portrayal of Jude, from his time as a 
young adult all the way into the end of his life. 
As a character, Jude is consistent throughout the novel in that his sense of self is 
deeply rooted in his disabling trauma. He provides little to no identity or life narrative for 
those around him (with the exception of the coerced and retraumatizing trauma narrative 
he told to Willem late in the novel). His understandings of himself, his own agency or his 
capabilities in the world are deeply formed by the disabling traumas he’s endured, not by 
the evidence of his many successes. On the outside, Jude’s adult life would seem stable 
and quite wonderful. He graduates college; goes to graduate school and law school; 
clerks for a renowned judge; becomes a highly successful lawyer; is adopted as an adult 
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by two wonderful older mentors who love him deeply; lives in a nice apartment; and is 
surrounded by friends and a partner who care for and support him (Yanagihara). Yet, on 
the inside, Jude is in perpetual turmoil. For many, this is what disabling trauma looks 
like. For example, after returning home from a long walk that causes him great physical 
pain, the reader learns that:  
He will turn off the shower and lower himself into the tub and lean his cheek 
against the tile and wait to feel better. He will be reminded of how trapped he is, 
trapped in a body he hates, with a past he hates, and how he will never be able to 
change either. He will want to cry, from frustration and hatred and pain, but he 
hasn’t cried since what happened with Brother Luke, after which he told himself 
he would never cry again. He will be reminded that he is a nothing, a scooped-out 
husk in which the fruit has long since mummified and shrunk, and now rattles 
uselessly. He will experience that prickle, that shiver of disgust that afflicts him in 
both his happiest and his most wretched moments, the one that asks him who he 
thinks he is to inconvenience so many people, to think he has the right to keep 
going when even his body tells him he should stop. (Yanagihara 176)  
 
The depths of Jude’s internalized ableism, psychic and physical pain, and emotional 
sorrow are undoubtedly hard to read. Still, they are also reflective of the internalized 
struggles many traumatized people face. In this passage, readers learn that Jude sees 
himself with disgust, as “a nothing,” and an “inconvenience.” Moreover, we see many 
instances within the book where Jude is described as self-conscious (Yanagihara); in an 
earlier moment the reader learns Jude was so self-conscious that he would “turn his head 
or block his face whenever anyone tried to take his picture” as well as cover his mouth 
whenever he’d laugh or even smile, as though he were ashamed of his own happiness 
(Yanagihara 41). This self-consciousness is paired with repeated references to Jude 
(mostly by JB) as “self-loathing,” particularly when Jude himself would question if he 
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was worthy of something, because how could “someone like him” ever be the beneficiary 
of something kind (Yanagihara 43). 
Jude’s understanding of himself is contradicted throughout the novel by 
statements from other characters like Harold (his adopted father), who says to Jude, 
“You’re a great-looking kid; I hope someone’s told you that before.” And then, before he 
could protest: “acceptance Jude” (Yanagihara 129). Or, from a person who hears Jude 
sing and says, “you have one of the most beautiful tenors I’ve heard in a long time” 
(126). Or, after a long dinner conversation with his mentors and his mentor’s friend, the 
friend says, “Jude, I think that was the first truly revelatory conversation I’ve had in 
Harold’s home in probably the last decade or more: thank you” (144). Or even, Jude’s 
first and only social worker, Ana, tells him, “You’re destined for greatness kid,” which 
we are told Jude had “wanted to believe... even though he couldn’t” (123). 
The inconsistencies between how Jude sees himself and how those around him 
see him point toward Jude’s instability of selfhood. In fact, it is through this portrayal of 
Jude’s knowledge of himself and the knowledge others hold of him that Yanagihara 
presents a cripistemology of the instabilities of selfhood. As a part of his embodied 
experience of trauma, there are two Judes in existence at the same time. There is the 
private, traumatized Jude who lives in deep turmoil, anguish, and shame. Then there is 
the outward facing Jude who is, among other things, good-looking, a wonderful 
conversationalist, and destined for greatness. Jude’s life consists of struggling to keep 
both Judes separate but afloat. This work takes great effort, and in reality, the two Judes 
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cannot be separated from each other. Despite his attempts to hide his traumatized self, the 
two Judes often blur into one another. As a cripistemology, Jude’s character shows the 
reader the ways in which trauma shatters the idea of a single, solid, coherent sense of self, 
as Jude spends the novel both juggling and embodying this reality.  
Take, for instance, a single twenty-four-hour span of time in Jude’s young 
adulthood. It’s the night before Jude and Willem host a New Year’s Eve party, and Jude 
has an accident that deeply cuts his arm requiring immediate medical attention 
(Yanagihara 78). From the evening before the late-night accident until the next evening 
when the party is happening, Jude goes from baking pastries and gingersnaps; to 
engaging in self injury practices that lead to the accident; to “making more gougeres”; to 
saying to Willem, “I’m sorry. Don’t be mad at me”; to worrying and asking Willem, “are 
you mad at me?”; and then to planning the continuation of the party despite Willem’s 
protest (77,155, 86-87). Then, right before the party arrives, the four friends get locked 
outside on the roof and Jude decides to be the one to make the daredevil-like climb down 
the side of the building and into the bedroom window, as he is the only one who can 
break into his personally concocted, elaborate, homemade security system (Yanagihara 
90). After he and Willem have landed safely alone in the bedroom, “Jude laughed a little, 
although he winced as he did so” and urges Willem to go get JB and Malcolm, as he 
closes his eyes in debilitating pain. 
In these scenes, we see the convergence of the instabilities of Jude’s selfhood 
through his traumatized affect and the shattering of his physical bodymind. In those 
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twenty-four hours, Jude quickly and disjointedly shifts through numerous states of being 
and their correlating emotions and physicalities. He begins in a pleasant domestic space 
of baking and cleaning; then he is engaging in intense self-injuring practices; next he 
wakes Willem up with sorrowful apologies. He then rushes to and fights with this doctor. 
This is followed by stoic silence between him and Willem on the way home, where he 
goes to sleep. After waking, he returns to intense cleaning and baking, as though nothing 
has occurred. That evening he hosts a party with his closest friends in laugher and 
community.  When they get locked on the roof, he volunteers for the daredevil-like stunt 
down the side of the building. Lastly, after a moment of intense emotional connection 
with Willem, he sits with Willem in more silence and sorrow. Then the evening 
concludes with Jude in deep pain alone in his room. This twenty-four-hour set of scenes 
illustrates the ways in which Jude ricochets through the instabilities of his own 
emotionality, physicality, and psychology.  
Furthermore, these moments also depict what disability scholar Margaret Price 
has termed “a bodymind event” (Price, Moving 16). For Price, a bodymind event is an 
unpredictable, “sudden emergence of a debilitating breakdown or loss of capacity” that 
are not found in the bodymind, but rather arise “from the particular conditions of space 
and time that contribute to the emergent meaning of a situation” (Price, Moving 16). 
Bodymind events, like Jude’s accident when engaging in self injury or his climbing down 
the wall, are for Jude “a sudden debilitating shift” in his “mental/corporeal experience” 
(Price, Moving 16). What events like these show us, however, is that instabilities of 
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trauma rupture not just our psyche but our physical self as well. Indeed, trauma shows us 
that the two are in fact inseparable.   
Throughout the book, the reader is taken through Jude’s struggles with the 
intertwined instabilities of his selfhood and his embodiment. After an episode of deep 
pain in his legs and back, we learn that: 
 He sometimes wondered whether Andy thought of him as only a collection of 
viruses and malfunctions: if you removed them, who was he? If Andy didn’t have 
to take care of him, would he still be interested in him? If he appeared one day 
magically whole, with a stride as easy as Willem’s and JB’s complete lack of self-
consciousness, the way he could lean back in his chair and let his shirt hoist itself 
from his hips without any fear, or with Malcolm's long arms, the skin on their 
insides as smooth as frosting, what would he? be to Andy? What would he be to 
any of them? Would they like him less? More? Or would he discover—as he often 
feared—that what he understood as friendship was really motivated by their pity 
of him? How much of who he was inextricable from what he was unable to do? 
Who would he have been, who would he be, without the scars, the cuts, the hurts, 
the scores, the fractures, the infections, the splints, the discharges? (Yanagihara 
163) 
  
The reader knows that there has been no moment where a single friend of Jude’s has 
shown pity toward him. On the contrary, the novel shows many instances where Jude’s 
loved ones—particularly Willem—show what disability activist Mia Mingus has termed 
“access intimacy.” For Mingus, access intimacy describes “that elusive, hard to describe 
feeling when someone else ‘gets’ your access needs” (Mingus). For instance, on a 
particular rainy day while they were walking down the streets of New York Malcolm and 
Willem moved slower than usual in deference to Jude and also stood close enough to him 
that if he happened to slip they could support him, but not close enough that he would 
suspect that they were anticipating his fall (Yanagihara 38). Still, despite the love and 
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care he is shown, Jude consistently worries, and this cannot be removed from the internal 
process he is in regarding his physical disabilities. A few pages before this passage 
above, the reader is told that Jude “felt in those minutes his body’s treason, how 
sometimes the central tedious struggle in his life was his unwillingness to accept that he 
would be betrayed by it again and again. That he could expect nothing from it and yet had 
to keep maintaining it” (Yanagihara 161-162).  
These reflections from Jude present a cripistemology of the bodymind’s 
instabilities. While ableist ideologies present the ideal bodymind as solid, stable, and 
coherent, disabled activists and scholars have long argued that the bodymind is shaky, 
unstable, leaky, and fluid.37 Throughout the novel we see Jude transition from a walking 
person to a wheelchair user (Yanagihara). In this transition, the reader is taken through 
Jude’s processing of his own internalized ableism which is deeply intertwined with his 
trauma processing. As evidenced in the quotes above, Jude comes to terms with his own 
disabilities by coming to terms with the instability of the bodymind. The years in the 
novel where Jude most accepts his disability and trauma are in the section of the novel 
entitled “The Happy Years” (Yanagihara 321-481). This is when the reader sees Jude 
really coming to understand that his biggest struggle in life is his own “unwillingness” to 
accept his bodymind’s limitations. Here the reader sees Jude’s work to accept these 
limitations, whether they be the use of a mobility device or his inability to feel intimacy 
during sex with a partner (Yanagihara). As a cripistemology, Yanagihara presents 
through Jude’s bodymind instabilities the unrelenting truth that all of our bodyminds will 
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eventually fail us. Rather than avoid our own mortality, this cripistemology challenges us 
to face our own internalized ableism just as Jude must throughout the novel.  
         Furthermore, in a scene where Andy, Jude’s doctor, is caring for Jude’s leg sores 
and his pain is unbearable, the reader sees with even more depth how disabling trauma 
becomes a bodymind event that—because of pain—extends the self through space and 
time. As Andy pulls the blood-soaked gauze away from Jude’s raw skin, Jude sits with 
his eyes closed:  
My life, he will think, my life. But he won’t be able to think beyond this, and he 
will keep repeating the words to himself—part chant, part curse, part 
reassurance—as he slips into that other world that he visits when he is in such 
pain, that world he knows is never far from his own but that he can never 
remember after: my life. (Yanagihara 177) 
  
Pain here is otherworldly. It is behind time and place. Jude is moving in what Price calls 
“crip spacetime,” a term that signifies the “affective impact and intangible knowledges 
that manifest” within the “entangled matrix of space and time” in radically unequal ways 
(Price, paper 10). The experience of space and time differs greatly between one person 
and the next. This moment, and others like it, show the reader how deeply trauma is 
rooted in the bodymind, and how deeply the traumatized bodymind is rooted in crip 
spacetime. As a cripistemology, Yanagihara presents Jude’s embodied experiences as 
“otherworldly” in order to show how trauma creates alternative ways of knowing, 
remembering and understanding through spacetime.  
 This is shown most notably through the descriptions of Jude’s flashbacks 
throughout the novel, as they illustrate the ways in which traumatized individuals 
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navigate the instabilities of selfhood and the bodymind through crip spacetime. The 
reader learns that it was during his first year of law school that “his life began appearing 
to him as memories” (569): 
...suddenly, a scene would appear before him, a dumb show meant only for him. 
In those years memories were tableaux, not narratives, and he would see a single 
one repeatedly for days: a diorama of Brother Luke on top of him, or one of the 
counselors from the home, who used to grab him as he walked by, or a client 
emptying his change from his pants pockets...And sometimes the memories were 
briefer and vaguer still...when these memories announced themselves, he would 
find himself disoriented; it always took him a moment to remember that these 
scenes were not only from his life, but his life…It was then that he began 
comprehending how much of his life he had learned to simply erase, even days 
after it had happened, and also that somehow, somewhere, he had lost that 
ability…  
He thought of it as a slight parting of worlds, in which something buried 
wisped up from the loamy, turned earth and hovered before him, waiting for him 
to recognize it and claim it as his own. Their very reappearance was deviant: Here 
we are, they seemed to say to him. Did you really think we would let you abandon 
us? Did you really think we wouldn't come back? (Yanagihara 570)  
 
Here we see ways of knowing and remembering that are disconnected from the knower. 
As a “show meant only for him,” Jude’s memories exist outside of himself even as he 
feels them so deeply that they disorient him. If he is watching a show, then he is a viewer 
of his own life story, not an actor within it. These memories are not stories or narratives, 
the way memories we control often are, but scenes and tableaux that would repeat for 
days. This repetition is important because again it signifies not only a loss of control but a 
feeling of being trapped. Jude’s struggle to remember that these scenes were “not only 
from his life, but his life” signifies the way that trauma shatters any sense of a coherent 
self. This quote further suggests that Jude struggles to recognize himself in his own 
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memories. Perhaps lack of self-recognition is a part of his traumatic affect or perhaps it is 
a coping mechanism, as we learn that at one point Jude had manages to cope by learning 
to erase certain parts of his own life “even days after it had happened” (Yanagihara 570). 
Taken together all of these phrases show the reader the ways in which Jude comes to 
know and remember through crip spacetime.  
Moreover, traumatic memories become personified throughout the novel—they 
are not merely memories for Jude, but threatening entities that promise never to leave 
him. Throughout the book these memories often appear as “hyenas” or other creatures 
that chase him “vigilant in their hunt” (441). In one passage, the reader learns that, “he 
was tired, he was so tired. It was taking so much energy to hold the beasts off. He 
sometimes had an image of himself surrendering to them, and they would cover him with 
their claws and beaks and talons and peck and pinch and pluck away at him until he was 
nothing, and he would let them” (Yanagihara 442). Similarly, Jude’s traumatized self is 
also depicted as a creature that lives inside him— “which he pictured as slight and 
raggedy and lemur-like, quick-reflexed and ready to sprint, its dark wet eyes forever 
scanning the landscape for future dangers” (113). In another instance, where his adopted 
mother asks him where he grew up, Jude responds, “‘South Dakota and Montana, mostly’ 
he said, and he could feel the creature inside of him sit up, aware of danger but unable to 
escape it” (128).  
 In depicting both Jude’s traumatic memories and his traumatized self as wild 
animals, Yanagihara is again showing the way that trauma leaves the traumatized person 
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feeling disconnected from themselves and without a sense of control. For most of his life, 
Jude lives in constant fear of his traumatic memories just as a person might live in fear of 
a wild animal attacking them. He similarly sees himself as a small but nimble creature 
who could at any moment re-experience predatorial danger. With these depictions, Jude’s 
traumatic memories—as well as his traumatized self—are positioned in the novel as 
unpredictable, uncontrollable, and barely understandable by both Jude and his loved ones. 
By characterizing trauma here animalistically, I contend that Yanagihara is speaking 
metaphorically to the ways in which trauma’s embodiment pushes people beyond social 
recognizability.   
It’s no wonder, then, that Jude contends with the instabilities of his disabling 
trauma by engaging in self injury practices. There are kinds of pain, pain that Price calls 
“unbearable pain—that is, the sort of pain that impels one to self-injure or to consider or 
attempting suicide” that disability studies has yet to fully theorize (Price, Hypatia 276). 
Jude’s bodymind events throughout his life demonstrate this very kind of pain. In her 
article, “The Bodymind Problem and the Possibilities of Pain,” Price considers 
experiences just like Jude’s, where mental (and perhaps corresponding physical) pain “ is 
so severe that self-injury appears to be the best possible response” (277). As a queer, crip, 
and feminist materialist response to pain, Price argues that there are times—like during a 
bodymind event—when it is worth withholding judgement of someone's desire for pain 
and instead respond to them with an ethics of care (Price Hypatia 273, 278). In such 
moments, the desire for a different kind of pain is a valid emotional response (Price 278).   
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Throughout the novel Jude engages in self-injuring practices in order to feel 
something other than the overwhelming pain or the overwhelming instabilities that he 
feels constantly. At one point in the novel the reader learns that Jude doesn’t know how 
he’d make it through his life without self-injury as a coping mechanism (555). For Jude: 
“...it was a form of punishment and also of cleansing, how it allowed him to drain 
everything toxic and spoiled from himself, how it kept him from being irrationally angry 
at others, at everyone, how it kept him from shouting, from violence, how it made him 
feel like his body, his life, was truly his and no one else’s” (555). Here we see that while 
self-injury may not be the socially prescribed, or ideal, coping mechanism, what it gives 
Jude is a much-needed momentary sense of control over his life and his bodymind.  
In presenting Jude’s character as someone struggling with the instabilities of 
selfhood, bodymind, and crip spacetime that trauma brings forth, Yanagihara presents a 
cripistemology of trauma that is not always easy to read. However, in doing so, A Little 
Life offers a representation of trauma that centers traumatized ways of knowing and being 
in the world. While Yanagihara’s work certainly does not imagine restorative or healing 
justice for Jude (or anyone else in the novel), as a whole it is attempting to think through 
disabling trauma outside the bounds of pathology. I contend that this is the first step in 
imagining trauma otherwise. As the second cripistemology of the novel, the instabilities 
of trauma that Jude experiences present readers with an entry into ways of knowing and 
being in the world that are often overlooked, subjugated, or dismissed in contemporary 
mainstream U.S. culture.  
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 Cripistemology Three - Crip Affects of Trauma 
  The third and last cripistemology of trauma presented in A Little Life is Jude’s 
crip affect of trauma. In a long, but noteworthy passage during a visit to Andy’s office, 
Jude recounts to himself that,   
what Andy never understood about him was that he was an optimist. Every 
month, every week, he chose to open his eyes, to live another day in the world. He 
did it when he was feeling so awful that sometimes the pain seemed to transport 
him to another state, one in which everything, even the past he worked so hard to 
forget, seemed to fade into a gray watercolor wash. He did it when his memories 
crowded out all other thoughts, when it took real effort, real concentration, to 
teether himself to his current life, to keep himself from raging with despair and 
shame. He did it when he was so exhausted of trying, when being awake and alive 
demanded such energy that he had to lie in bed thinking of reasons to get up and 
try again, when it would be much easier to go to the bathroom and untape the 
plastic zipped bag containing his cotton pads and loose razors and alcohol wipes 
and bandages from its hiding place beneath the sink and simply surrender. Those 
were the very bad days. (Yanagihara 164). 
 
Grounded in both queer and disabled affects, I position crip affects of trauma—like 
Jude’s—as slanted or peculiar affective states arising from embodied experience of 
trauma. While most of the medical- and clinical-industrial complex works to “correct” 
this affective experience through pathologizing and rehabilitation, I’m interested in 
understanding the affect of trauma in its own right. As we can see in this passage, in A 
Little Life, Jude’s crip affect of trauma is made up of a web of feelings and modalities 
that include shame, silence, despair, melancholia, and lastly, what queer theorist Heather 
Love has termed, “feeling backward.”  
In proposing this crip affect of trauma, I am certainly not recuperating trauma’s 
affect into a redemption or positive identity or experience. I cannot deny the often 
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horrifying nature of these moments or ways of feeling through the world. As someone 
who lives with this affect, the “dysregulation” of trauma’s affective structure can be as 
terrifying as it is disabling. Nevertheless, something powerful happened in my own 
healing when I began to shift my understanding of trauma in this way. Instead of trying to 
overcome or recover from my shattering life experiences in an attempt return to the  
coherent sense of self I had been taught to believe in, I allowed feminist queer and crip 
theory to remind me that this world is far from stable and our bodyminds are perhaps the 
most impermanent things we have. Instead of constraining myself to regulate my 
excessive emotional responses, I began to let myself feel excessively when my bodymind 
needed me to do so. Instead of clinging to the promises of happiness, I begin to let myself 
actually feel my desperation and anger when those feeling arose. And instead of rejecting 
the shifting spatial temporality of my bodymind experiences when I am triggered and 
having a flashback, I now allow myself to embody the non-linear complexities of memory, 
time, and place. As soon as I began letting myself experience my bodymind and affect as 
a queer and crip embodiment, I began to experience a kind of happiness that has worked 
for me. 
While Jude does not speak in terms such as these, we ironically see a great deal of 
this affect during chapters of the book entitled, “The Happy Years” (Yanagihara 481-
712). Jude “feels backwards” often when he and his partner are having sex. The first 
night that Jude tries to come to bed naked with Willem he has a break down: 
 As soon as Willem came to bed, he undressed quickly under the covers, then 
flung the blankets away and rolled onto his side, so his back was facing Willem. 
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He kept his eyes shut the entire time, but when he felt Willem place his palms on 
his back, just between his shoulder blades, he began to cry, savagely, the kind of 
bitter, angry weeping he hadn’t done in years, tucking into himself with shame. 
He kept remembering the night with Caleb, the last time he had been so exposed, 
the last time he had cried this hard and he knew that Willem would only 
understand part of the reason he was so upset, that he didn’t know that the shame 
of this very moment—of being naked, of being at another’s mercy—was almost 
as great as his shame for what he had revealed. (Yanagihara 516)        
    
Here we learn that Willem’s touch transports Jude into a state of shame accompanied 
with a kind of “bitter, angry weeping” that Jude hadn’t expressed in years. He is also 
transported back to memories of his abusive ex-boyfriend and of feeling exposed (i.e., 
uncomfortable and unsafe). The reader also learns that Jude’s shame is twofold—shame 
of his physical body (what he had revealed) and shame of his sexuality. In this one 
moment, trauma affect unfolds to show that his ability to be in the present moment with 
his partner is overwhelmed by his disabling trauma. In other words, the present moment 
becomes consumed with an affect that is structured by disabling trauma from the past—
making the distinction of the present and the past for Jude an irrelevant one.  
Despite Jude’s sexual triggers, we learn as the chapter goes on that Jude and 
Willem continue to have sex and Jude works to “make himself stop counting” the months 
in which they’ve been intimate “as if his sexual life is a prison term” (Yanagihara 544). 
As they continue, Jude tells himself that perhaps it will get better each time. He tells 
himself that the more he tries the more comfortable he’ll become and the easier being 
sexual will be for him with Willem. Then at one point he acknowledges, “the sorrow he 
felt when he realized that even Willem couldn’t save him, that he was irredeemable, that 
this experience was forever ruined for him” (Yanagihara 546). From there on, in his grief 
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and dismay, Jude struggles through the process of dealing with the years of trauma from 
his experiences of sexual abuse. Affectively, this process is structured by shame, guilt, 
sorrow, and silence.  
The reader goes along with Jude as he invents “rules” of engagement for how to 
have sex with Willem, despite his trauma, because “Willem had sacrificed so much to be 
with him, and had brought him such peace, that he was determined to try to thank him 
however he could” (Yanagihara 547). For example, we see Jude telling Willem he is 
enjoying their sex when the reader knows that he is lying, because, to Jude, “the 
alternative meant losing him, meant being alone forever” (Yanagihara 548). There is 
what we might call “trauma logic” at play here where Jude’s trauma affect is informing 
his way of thinking about himself and his relationships to those who love him. Because of 
his disabling trauma, he understands all relationships to exist through exchange values 
where he must provide something of value for Willem (sex) in exchange for the life value 
Willem has provided for him (peace). Ideas like companionship, love, and mutual care 
are not enough for Jude.  
At another point Jude is kinder to himself, showing that he recognizes “how much 
his mind had protected his body, how it had shut down his sexual drive in order to shelter 
him, how it had calcified every part of him that had caused him such pain” (Yanagihara 
548). There are moments of acceptance like this throughout the book, though most the 
time, we see that Jude thinks of sex as “something to be gotten through as quickly as 
possible” and that, for Jude, it always came with hearing Brother Luke or Caleb’s voices 
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in his head (Yanagihara 548-549). All of this, and “still, he didn’t give up” (Yanagihara 
549). Jude bought self-help books, read women’s magazines, and even bought a book on 
victims of sexual abuse, a term we learn “he hated and didn’t apply to himself” 
(Yanagihara 549). Jude then decides to “alter his ambition” and focus on making their 
sex life as enjoyable for Willem as he can. If he can never enjoy sex, the least he can do 
is make it enjoyable for Willem, Jude rationalizes (549).  
Taken together, all of these details indicate that Jude is in deep process with his 
embodied trauma, its affect, and its effects on his life. What’s telling in this process is it 
does not help Jude find relief or further peace. The self-help books, the women’s 
magazines, the books on sexual abuse—none of these mainstream approaches to trauma 
help Jude in any way. Sharing his story with Willem does not change the nature of their 
relationship in any meaningful way for Jude. Going to therapy, as his loved ones force 
him to do at various times throughout the novel, does not make a difference in Jude’s life 
or affect either. In this way Yanagihara is offering a critique of mainstream approaches to 
disabling trauma. Jude is presented as someone in deep turmoil and strife because of the 
embodied trauma he lives with and nothing contemporary culture has to offer makes a 
difference.   
And yet, we’re told that these are Jude’s “happy years.” While his affect is 
structured by trauma, he is in love with Willem and he loves the life they live together.  
...every time he hears Willem walk into the apartment, calling his name—he must 
remind himself that this is his life, and that in this life Willem is coming home to 
him. In those moments, he feels that his dislike of sex is miserly, that he must be 
misremembering how bad it is, and that even if he isn’t, he has simply to try 
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harder, that he has to pity himself less. Toughen up, he scolds himself as he kisses 
Willem goodbye... Don’t you dare ruin this. Don’t you dare complain about what 
you don’t even deserve. (Emphasis original, Yanagihara 568-569) 
  
In moments like this we can see how deeply the shame and despair around sexual 
intimacy permeates Jude’s being. As I have been arguing his shame and despair are more 
than situational feelings. Because of the trauma Jude has lived through, the examples 
above show how they have become his affective structure. Jude’s shame and despair both 
consciously and unconsciously permeate his way of moving through the world, relating 
to himself and relating to those he loves. These affects of shame and despair inform his 
feelings of deservedness, insecurity, the need to “toughen up,” self-pity, his dislike of 
sex, and the belief that he owes sexual intimacy to Willem. Jude’s trauma affect is so 
deeply internalized that when he finds out that his violent and abusive ex-boyfriend Caleb 
had passed away due to colon cancer, the reader sees Jude process through a common 
narrative of self-blame:  
That had been one of Harold’s arguments when he was trying to get him to report 
the attack; that Caleb was dangerous, and that by reporting him, by having him 
arrested, he would be protecting other people from him. But he had known that 
wasn’t true: Caleb wouldn't do to other people what he did to him. He hadn’t hit 
and hated him because he hit and hated other people; he had hit and hated him 
because of who he was, not because of who Caleb was. (Yanagihara 508-509) 
  
As heartbreaking as this is, it is also unfortunately rational to a person who has 
been through such an abusive experience. Brison writes, “those who haven’t been 
sexually violated may have difficulty understanding why [people] who survive assault 
often blame themselves and may wrongly attribute it to a sex-linked trait of masochism or 
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lack of self-esteem. They don’t know that it can be less painful to believe that you did 
something blameworthy than it is to think that you live in a world where you can be 
attacked at any time, in any place” (Brison 13). Every moment of what appears to be self-
loathing, low self-esteem, self-hatred, and even self- injury is a way in which Jude is 
asserting some form of control over his life, his bodymind, and his world. Going back to 
Price’s rejoinder, we do not need to understand someone as rational in order to accept 
their pain and perspective as valuable (Price, Bodymind 279). For Jude, it is easier to 
understand these things as about himself and feel a sense of control than it is to 
understand them as about the world or other people, and feel the same traumatizing sense 
of loss of control he has felt in the past. This is the piecing together of the shattering 
affects of trauma. 
         With this affect, the shame is almost always paired with silence. The reader is 
reminded throughout the book of Jude’s reluctance to speak about his past. When Willem 
asks him directly about the sexual violence, Jude freezes:  
What could he say, he thought, as he held himself still. Why was Willem asking 
about this now? He thought he had been doing such a good job being normal—but 
maybe he hadn’t. He would have to try harder. He had never told Willem about 
what had happened with Brother Luke, but along with being unable to speak of it, 
part of him knew he didn’t need to: in the past two years, Willem had tried to 
approach the subject through various directions—through stories of friends and 
acquaintances...through stories about pedophilia he read in magazines, through 
various discourses on the nature of shame, and how it was often unearned...Each 
time, he would remain silent, or change the subject, or simply pretend Willem had 
never spoken at all…(Yanagihara 551-552) 
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But this time, after two exchanges of silence ending with Willem saying, “I wish you’d 
tell me, I wish you’d let me help you,” Jude says “It’s over, Willem...It was a long time 
ago. I don’t need help” (552). Then after more silence, Willem asks directly if Brother 
Luke was the person who hurt Jude, and after yet another silence, “Do you like having 
sex, Jude?”  “If he spoke” the reader learns, “he would cry, and so he didn’t speak” 
(Yanagihara 552). Jude’s silence in this moment is a different silence than the agential 
silence of crip narrative. Here, silence is speaking a kind of pain and a kind of knowledge 
that comes from pain. Earlier in the book, readers are told that Jude “knew things he 
wished he didn’t, things he hoped never to have to use again, things that, when he 
thought of them or dreamed of them at night, made him curl into himself with hatred and 
shame” (Yanagihara 105). He is silent now with this self-hatred, shame, and 
psychological pain because he cannot bring himself to tell Willem the things that he 
cannot even live with himself.  
Jude is silent now because Willem is asking to know about the sexual things Jude 
knows and the things their sex life has brought up for Jude that Jude had hoped never to 
know again. Shame, silence, pain, bodymind memories, and traumatic past events are all 
twisted together here into an affect of trauma. In her work, Alyson Patsavas pushes back 
against recent work in pain studies that challenges representations of pain as unshareable. 
Whereas it is typically understood that pain—like trauma—becomes so all-consuming 
that use of language is destroyed, contemporary theorists have compiled a rich “history of 
representations of pain” (Patsavas 214). Escaping this binary, Patsavas asks instead, “is it 
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not ableism that makes pain feel unshareable?” Here I argue, is it not our culture’s 
inability to hear trauma that makes it feel so unshareable? Is it not still compulsory able-
bodiedness that makes holding another’s psychic pain and instability so often untenable? 
This second kind of silence through which Jude is speaking now is a painful silence 
because he cannot live with the internalized shame and despair of his own trauma, let 
alone imagine sharing it with another.  
Things are hard for Jude when Willem is home, but it is when Willem is gone on 
a work trip that Jude has a massive flashback and the reader learns more about how his 
past experiences interrupt his present life:   
A small memory he could contain, but as the days go by and he waits for Willem, 
he recognizes that this is a long eel of a memory, slippery and uncatchable, and it 
whipsaws its way through him, its tail slapping against his organs so that he feels 
the memory as something alive and wounding, feels its meaty, powerful smack 
against his intestines, his heart, his lungs. Sometimes they were like this, and 
these were the hardest to lasso and corral, and with every day it seems to grow 
inside him, until he feels himself stuffed not with blood and muscles and water 
and bone but with the memory itself, expanding balloon-life to inflate his very 
fingertips. After Caleb, he had realized that there were some memories he was 
simply not going to be able to control, and so his only recourse was to wait until 
they had tired themselves out, until they swam back into the dark of his 
subconscious and left him alone again. (Yanagihara 571) 
  
We learn here of Jude’s coping mechanisms, and that rather than fighting the memories 
he has learned to let them tire themselves out. In an earlier passage, the reader also learns 
that Jude has trained his mind to manipulate the memories so he could move on with 
living. He comes to understand his memories like “the film he had seen his junior year of 
two detectives coming to tell a student at a college that the man who had hurt him had 
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died in prison,” except that it “hadn’t been a film at all—it had been his life” (Yanagihara 
570). And in time, Jude learns “how to manage the memories” (571):  
He couldn’t stop them—after they had begun, they had never ended—but he had 
grown more adept at anticipating their arrival. He became able to diagnose it, that 
moment or day in which he could tell that something was going to visit him, and 
he would have to figure out how it wanted to be addressed: Did it want 
confrontation, or soothing, or simply attention? He would determine what sort of 
hospitality it wanted, and then he would determine how to make it leave, to retreat 
back to that other place. (Yanagihara 571)  
  
As previously described, Jude’s memories, feelings, and flashbacks are described in 
detail as various, fictitious animals—eels, lemurs, hyenas, creatures—coming from inside 
of him or chasing him. Other times, when Jude has more control over his bodymind and 
affect, they are lemurs just sitting in the empty field across from him and staring at him.  
In all cases, Jude’s feelings metaphorically symbolize what queer theorist Heather 
Love theorizes as “feeling backward.” In what makes for a nice theoretical circle, Love 
draws on queer trauma scholar Ann Cvetkovich’s work, looking to feelings like 
“nostalgia, regret, shame despair, resentment, passivity, escapism, self-hatred, 
withdrawal, bitterness, defeatism and loneliness” in what she sees as “the experiences of 
social exclusion” and “the historical impossibility of same-sex desire” (Love 4). For 
Love, this archive of “backward” feeling is “an account of the corporeal and psychic cost 
of homophobia.” The cost that Love is naming is the interlocking, systemic and 
embodied trauma of homophobia (Love 4). Indeed, this is one of the roots of Jude’s pain 
that now leaves his desire for Willem an impossibility. The sexual trauma of Jude’s early 
life was structured by homophobia. The pedophilia, the experiences in the monastery, 
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followed by the years of what may be best described as sex-trafficking as a tween and 
then teen in motels across the county where his body was sold to older men, and then the 
sex he was coerced into having at group homes, with truck drivers, and with other men 
for various kinds of protections, all exist as underground sexual economies, in part, 
because of homophobia. These years of sexual traumas built up for Jude in ways that 
meant his own desires as an adult are now impossible for him to know or understand. 
Jude can’t make sense of his sexuality. He only knows that he doesn’t want to have It. 
Ever. With anyone. But he also knows he has always had sex with men. And he knows he 
loves Willem and wants to be close to him. He feels comfort in his arms and when he 
comes home. “They were in a relationship. People in relationships had sex. If he wanted 
to keep Willem, he had to fulfil his side of the bargain, and his dislike for his duties 
didn’t change this,” Jude thought (Yanagihara 549). In these ways, in addition to his 
flashbacks and haunting memories, Jude’s general affect is a backward feeling. Both his 
present and his future are always already interrupted by his past. He is not only looking 
backward but feeling it despite himself and all his efforts otherwise. 
Love notes that “despite complaints about their toxicity, such tragic, tear-soaked 
accounts of same-sex desire compel readers in a way that brighter stories of liberation do 
not” (3). A Little Life is no exception. In a review for The Atlantic subtitled “The Great 
Gay Novel Might Be Here,” critic Garth Greenwell writes, “In this astonishing novel, 
Yanagihara achieves what great gay art from Proust to Almodovar has so often sought: a 
grandeur of feeling adequate to ‘the terrifying largeness, the impossibility of the world’” 
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(Greenwell).  Greenwell situates Yanagihara’s success primarily in her devotion to queer 
kinship networks and relationalities that fall outside our era’s norm of “embracing gay 
marriage and homonormativity” (Greenwell). While Greenwell is certainly correct in his 
queer reading of A Little Life’s rejection of homonormativity through kinship structures, I 
situate its queerness in it broader queer and crip affect of unhappiness. 
Even in the chapter, “The Happy Years,” Jude’s affect is not happy. Because of 
his queerness, his cripness, his otherness, and most importantly, his crip affect of trauma, 
Jude does not have access to what Lauren Berlant has termed “The Good Life” or what 
Sara Ahmed calls “The Promise of Happiness.” There are paradoxes here because this is 
in spite of his and Willems loving relationship and great material wealth, his loving 
adopted parents and broader queer kinship network, and his professional successes. In 
many ways, he has a good life. Still, he is a melancholy queer and disabled person—not 
because he is queer or disabled, but because happiness is not made for “people like him.” 
In a section of her book The Promise of Happiness entitled “Causing Unhappiness,” 
Ahmed writes:  
A bearable life is a life that can hold up, which can keep its shape or direction, in 
the face of what it is asked to endure, to bear can also be a capacity; a bearable 
life is a life that we can bear. A bearable life suggests that the conditions of 
livability involve a relationship to suffering, to ‘what’ a life must endure...the 
unbearable life is a life which cannot be tolerated or endured, help up, held onto. 
The unbearable life ‘breaks’ up or ‘shatters’ under the ‘too much’ of what is being 
borne...when ‘it’ is too much, things break, you reach a breaking point. (Ahmed 
97) 
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There are two breaking points for Jude within A Little Life. The first comes after his 
physically and sexually abusive relationship in adulthood with Caleb. After all his 
childhood trauma, this adult trauma is too much for Jude to bear and he attempts suicide 
(Yanagihara 445-446). His attempt fails and goes on to live a bearable live with Willem 
and others who love him for many years. It is only after Willem dies in a car crash that 
Jude starts to have an unbearable life again. The reader never learns what brings Jude to 
his last breaking point exactly, only that he reaches it (Yanagihara 811). He dies by 
suicide at the age of fifty-three (Yanagihara 811). However, Harold, Jude’s adopted 
father, believes that it’s only because Willem has died that Jude is now gone as well 
(Yanagihara 812).  
What the cripistemology of Jude’s affect of trauma shows us throughout A Little 
Life is that disabling trauma impacts the person in ways far beyond some initial event or 
series of events. While this is not a new argument, I am proposing that we consider the 
affect of trauma as a cripistemology in its own right. Rather than pathologizing Jude with 
“disordered thinking” or “dysregulation,” Yanagihara presents Jude’s trauma affect 
throughout the novel as a valid way of being and moving through the world. Validity here 
certainly does not mean capital-T true, helpful, or effective, but rather based on 
experience and embodied knowledge. When Jude’s loved ones respond to his shame and 
despair by dismissing his ways of (un)knowing and being in the world, they inadvertently 
reinscribe his feelings of loss of control and agency. When we approach trauma as a 
pathological disruption, we further justify the feeling that so many traumatized people, 
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like Jude, hold already—the idea that something is “wrong” with them. However, when 
we approach trauma as an affect, the traumatized person is centered as an agential 
(un)knowing subject who can move through the intensity of their current feelings toward 
the potentiality for feeling otherwise.   
 
Conclusion: A Little Life Worth Living  
As this chapter shows, a close reading of A Little Life reveals three overlapping 
cripistemologies regarding the narratives of trauma, the instabilities of trauma, and the 
affects of trauma. While the book is not an emotionally easy read, I contend that is an 
important one because of the ways in which it centers these knowledges of trauma 
throughout. If we are to begin the work of imagining trauma otherwise, in order to 
imagine a more socially just and responsive society, we must begin by thinking through 
our ways of knowing trauma.  
Like other standpoint and sitpoint theories, Jude’s cripistemologies of trauma—
like all cripistemologies of trauma—arise from his own embodied experiences. As such, 
they challenge hegemonic notions of who gets to know and what counts as knowledge. In 
doing so, they disrupt the traumatocracy outlined in Chapter One and further situate 
trauma in the Political/Relational Model that is detailed in Chapter Two. 
 Cripistemologies change how we come to know and understand the meaning of 
trauma. Taking cripistemologies into account shifts our focus away from fixing the 
trauma or traumatized person toward being with and learning to listen to the traumatized 
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person. Understanding cripistemologies helps us to understand that trauma isn't 
something you recover from or overcome or talk your way through. When we center 
cripistemologies, we pull trauma out of the medical model of disability and move toward 
a restorative justice approach. Cripistemologies of trauma reestablish the traumatized 
person as an agential, valid knowing subject, even if their knowledge is that which is 
unknowable. When we take cripistemologies into account in our theorizing of trauma we 
are enacting a disability justice politics (Berne). When we take cripistemologies into 
account in our approach to traumatized people’s healing, we are enacting a disability 
justice politics (Berne).  This is the beginning of changing how mainstream U.S. culture 
responds to trauma. This is the beginning of imagining personal and collective healing 
otherwise.  
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Conclusion  
(Content Note: Suicide) 
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Dear	Jesús,			 		 There	is	a	dedication	page	that’s	meant	for	this	kind	of	writing.	Or	some	version	of	it.	That’s	the	proper	place	for	me	to	explain	that	I	wrote	this	dissertation	for	you.	And	perhaps	I	will.	But	as	I	am	sitting	down	to	write	the	conclusion	to	this	work	all	I	can	think	of	is	you.	We	were	going	to	do	this	together—not	just	the	dissertation	(you	were	always	going	to	finish	before	me)	but	life	afterward.	Everyone	else	was	going	to	move	on.	But	you	and	I	were	going	to	stay	in	Minneapolis	and	fight	the	fight	here.	Do	the	work	here.	Make	the	change	here.	I	miss	you,	Jesús.	Especially	now,	as	I	am	so	close	to	finishing	and	you’re	not	here	with	me.	Except	you	are	here	with	me.	You	have	been	with	me	through	every	word	and	idea.	This	dissertation	is	as	much	yours	as	it	is	mine.	And	so,	I	will	not	be	confined	to	the	dedication	page.	I	am	concluding	this	dissertation	by	invoking	you	into	it.	Since	when	did	we	ever	do	anything	in	the	proper	way	anyway?	I	will	not	be	confined.	You	never	were.	Not	even	in	your	death.		I	think	we	talked	about	our	traumas	once.	Maybe	twice.	And	yet	we	were	always	talking	about	them,	weren’t	we?	How	we	felt	different	than	everyone	else	in	our	queerworld—different	together.	The	way	we	fought	to	survive	without	a	safety	net,	how	we	got	here	in	families	that	didn’t	fully	understand	and	needed	us	in	ways	other	people	couldn’t	understand.	How	it	felt	like	we	couldn’t	sit	still,	or	the	world	might	come	crumbling	in	on	us.	We’d	laugh	about	the	way	we	always	looked	over	
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our	shoulders,	sat	with	our	backs	against	the	wall,	kept	our	guards	up,	didn’t	know	how	to	trust	(sometimes	even	ourselves),	and	hated	asking	for	help.	You	would	use	humor	to	deflect	where	I	would	use	overly	harsh	honesty.	You’d	keep	your	emotional	self	hidden	where	I	would	overshare	my	feelings.	We’d	experience	moments	of	happiness,	of	course—especially	in	all	those	amazing	moments	of	queer	kinship—but	there	was	a	certain	affect	we	could	not	shake.	An	intensity	that	existed	before	the	potentiality	of	our	feelings.	When	people	got	to	know	us	they’d	see	it	more.	Queerworld	saw	it.	It	would	come	out	when	we	were	alone	at	night	most	of	the	time.	Sometimes	we’d	text	about	it.	Most	the	time	we’d	just	say,	“yeah.”	We	knew.		Throughout	this	dissertation,	I’ve	argued	that	trauma	is	an	embodied,	affective	structure	that	falls	outside	of	hegemonic	norms	of	recognizability.	I	am	interested	in	shifting	our	understanding	of	trauma	away	from	a	focus	on	the	event	or	events	that	“cause”	trauma	toward	this	embodied,	affective	structure	for	many	reasons.	All	of	them	come	back	to	you	and	me,	Jesús.	First,	we	can’t	get	distracted	by	debates	about	whether	or	not	an	event	is	ordinary	or	extraordinary—what	matters	is	the	impact	it	has	on	the	person	that	experiences	it.	It	had	impacts	on	us	and	those	impacts	exist	in	our	bodyminds.	Second,	we	need	to	expand	our	thinking	about	trauma	beyond	the	idea	of	an	interruption	in	the	“good	life.”	When	we	think	of	trauma	as	an	event	or	series	of	events	that	interrupts	a	life,	it	presumes	a	sense	of	stability—both	materially	and	existentially—that	many	people	do	not	have	access	to	
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under	white	supremacy,	heterocispatriarchy,	settler	colonialism,	and	late	capitalism.	For	different	reasons,	and	in	different	ways,	neither	of	us	had	access	to	that	“good	life”	growing	up,	even	though	our	parents	were	working	so	hard	to	give	us	that	dream.	We	became	poster	children	for	it	in	lots	of	ways,	but	the	closer	we	got	to	it,	the	farther	away	it	was	(again,	the	affect).	Third,	and	most	importantly,	I	am	arguing	that	understanding	trauma	as	an	embodied,	affective	structure	that	falls	outside	of	hegemonic	recognizability	allows	for	a	nuanced	critique	of	the	systems	of	power	and	oppression	that	circulate	within	trauma	discourses.	In	bringing	trauma	and	disability	together	in	this	way,	we	can	push	back	against	the	pathologization	of	trauma	and	instead	work	to	imagine	it	otherwise,	center	ways	of	knowing	and	being	that	come	with	trauma,	and	prioritize	ways	of	responding	to	trauma	that	do	not	further	perpetuate	violence.				We	saw	each	other,	Jesús,	but	because	of	the	ways	in	which	trauma	is	and	is	not	recognized,	society	interpellated	us	differently.	This	is	why	I	am	alive	finishing	my	dissertation	and	you’re	dead.	We	both	lived	with	the	embodied,	affective	structure	of	trauma	deep	within	our	bodyminds	and	it	connected	us	immediately—even	across	our	differences.	For	a	long	time	we	both	found	ways	to	“pass”	in	society	as	not	traumatized.	Then,	at	different	times,	we	couldn’t	pass	anymore.	Because	of	my	white	privilege	and	all	the	resources	it	affords	me,	when	I	experienced	bodymind	events	that	left	me	unrecognizable	to	those	around	me,	I	ended	up	in	an	18	month	outpatient	therapy	program.	Because	you	were	a	queer	Chicano,	when	
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you	experienced	a	bodymind	event	that	left	you	unrecognizable	to	those	around	you,	you	ended	up	alone	in	jail	and	then	dead.	I	am	arguing	for	a	new	approach	to	trauma,	a	new	understanding	of	trauma,	and	a	new	way	of	responding	to	trauma,	because	there	are	dire	consequences—matters	of	life	and	death—to	continuing	with	the	mainstream	approach	to	trauma	that	dominates	right	now.		This	dissertation	had	four	goals,	Jesús,	and	they	all	come	back	to	you	too.	First,	I	wanted	to	understand—no,	I	needed	desperately	to	understand—what	the	discourses	of	trauma	do	in	contemporary	U.S.	society.	Why	is	it	that	my	trauma	was	recognized,	but	yours	wasn’t?	Why	is	it	that	I	can	claim	my	trauma,	but	you	couldn’t?	Or,	that	you	could	claim	some	of	your	trauma,	in	some	places,	but	only	using	some	words?	None	of	which	included	the	word	trauma.	And	when	I	say	I	can	claim	my	trauma,	I	mean	only	parts	of	it,	sometimes,	in	some	ways,	like	you—but	different.	Why	is	it	that	when	I	claim	my	trauma	I	am	turned	into	either	inspirational	survivor	or	another	whining	white	girl,	attached	to	her	woundedness?	Why	wouldn’t	anyone	allow	you	your	woundedness,	your	full	humanity?	If	your	trauma	had	been	recognized,	like	mine	sometimes	is,	would	you	still	be	alive?	That	question	haunts	me.			 In	Chapter	One	I	dug	into	these	questions	because	the	discourse	of	trauma	wields	considerable	power	in	contemporary	U.S.	culture.	Trauma	is	everywhere.	In	the	news,	on	our	T.V.	screens,	all	over	our	social	media	pages.	It	bombards	us,	and	in	doing	so,	it	also	teaches	us.	These	dominant	narratives	of	trauma	teach	us	what	
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counts	as	trauma,	who	gets	to	be	traumatized,	and	what	narratives	get	to	be	told	as	trauma	narratives.	These	dominant	discourses	both	produce	and	foreclose	our	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	be	traumatized.	It	won’t	surprise	you,	Jesús,	that	all	of	this	is	determined	by	ideologies	and	systems	of	power.	It	didn’t	surprise	me	either.	In	fact,	through	my	analysis	of	TIME	magazine	(as	indicative	of	mainstream	U.S.	discourse),	I	argued	that	we	live	in	a	traumatocracy—a	sociocultural	discursive	regime	where	the	narratives	of	Trauma/PTSD	are	utilized	to	mobilize	certain	figures	and	forms	of	U.S.	citizenship.	Here,	I	drew	on	Amy	Brandzel’s	theorization	of	normative	citizenship,	where	citizenship	is	a	set	of	practices	that	differentially	sorts,	distributes,	and	assigns	rights,	resources,	and	social	value	to	people	and	populations	in	ways	that	reify	the	norms	of	whiteness,	heterosexuality,	consumerism,	and	settler	colonialism	within	the	United	States”	(4).	In	other	words,	under	our	traumatocracy,	the	likelihood	of	your	trauma	being	recognized	as	Trauma	depends	upon	your	proximity	to	normative	citizenship.	What	this	recognition	may	get	you	is	a	question	for	another	dissertation	or	book	project.	Still,	this	is	why	my	trauma	was	recognized	and	yours	was	not.		I	know	you,	Jesús,	and	I	know	that	you’re	like,	“grrl	duh,”	but	I	needed	to	show	this,	both	quantitatively	and	qualitatively,	because	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	no	one	has	done	so	yet.	I	analyzed	36	years	of	TIME	magazine	to	see	how	these	discourses	have	changed	over	time,	and	what	I	found	was	that	it	was	only	
after	9/11	that	Trauma/PTSD	became	synonymous	with	veterans	and	the	military.	
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Prior	to	9/11,	the	dominant	discourses	of	Trauma/PTSD	focused	on	children	and	the	family.	Of	course,	it	was,	though,	right?	Because	it	was	the	late	80s	and	90s	and	U.S.	society	was	falling	apart	because	of	the	queers	and	the	welfare	queens.	But	that,	too,	is	for	another	dissertation	or	book	project.	I	also	argue	in	Chapter	One	that	within	the	mainstream	discourses	of	trauma	there	is	no	room	to	consider,	let	alone	critique,	any	of	the	systemic	or	institutionalized	forms	of	trauma.	This	is	another	reason	my	traumas	are	more	recognizable	than	your	traumas.	U.S.	culture	is	more	comfortable	with	the	idea	of	individual	“perpetrators”	doing	individualized	harms.	As	a	society,	we	cannot	make	space	for	the	idea	that	trauma	is	perpetuated	through	systems	and	institutions	and	experienced	collectively.	(I	know,	grrl	duh.)	Lastly,	there	is	a	wide	dismissal	of	cultural	differences	or	preferences	in	understanding	and	processing	trauma	and	living	life	afterward.	I	went	to	more	therapy	than	God.	You	watched	Bob’s	Burgers,	smoked	a	lot	of	pot,	and	gardened.	Both	of	our	processes	were	valid,	but	mainstream	U.S.	culture	validates	one	more	than	the	other.		All	of	this	matters	because	trauma	is	so	commonly	understood	as	an	individual	medical	problem,	but	by	bringing	trauma	and	disability	together	I	am	arguing	that	it	is	a	social	justice	issue.	Moreover,	through	my	analysis	in	this	chapter	I	showed	that	the	discourses	of	trauma	are	deeply	entrenched	in	systems	of	power	and	oppression.	This	gets	to	the	second	goal	of	my	dissertation,	which	is	to	bring	together	Critical	Trauma	Studies,	Feminist	Studies,	and	Critical	Disability	Studies	toward	an	interdisciplinary	theory	of	trauma.	I	contend	that	we	need	all	three	
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approaches	in	order	to	fully	attend	to	the	nuances	of	trauma.	Our	lived	experiences	demand	that	we	address	the	socio-political,	material,	discursive,	and	embodied	realities	of	traumatization.	We	have	to	think	through	trauma	and	disability	together	because	they	exist	in	our	bodyminds	together,	and	there	is	just	more	work	to	be	done	here.	I	know	you	understand	this,	Jesús,	because	you	were	an	interdisciplinary	and	intersectional	thinker	too.	I	utilize	methods	and	theories	from	all	three	fields	of	study	throughout	the	project,	but	it’s	really	in	Chapter	Two	where	I	bring	all	three	fields	together	in	my	feminist,	queer,	crip	theory	of	trauma.		Chapter	Two	is	also	the	first	place	in	the	dissertation	where	I	began	imagining	trauma	otherwise.	That	is	the	third	goal	of	the	dissertation.	We	did	a	lot	of	imagining	otherwise	together,	didn’t	we	Jesús?	That’s	where	we	had	all	of	our	fun—all	of	us	in	queerworld	together.	It’s	a	queer	practice,	to	imagine	the	world	otherwise.	To	imagine	the	otherwise	into	the	world.	When	I	say	I	want	to	imagine	trauma	otherwise,	I	don’t	mean	I	want	to	imagine	a	world	without	trauma.	Although	that	is	an	important	project,	that	also	is	a	project	for	another	dissertation	or	book.	What	I	mean	is:	what	would	it	look	like	to	imagine	our	responses	to	trauma	differently?	To	imagine	our	understanding	of	trauma	differently?	I	wonder,	what	would	it	look	like	to	reject	the	pathologies	of	Trauma	and	center	the	knowledge	of	trauma.	I	wonder,	what	would	it	look	like	to	reject	the	individualization	of	trauma	and	rethink	it	collectively?	I	wonder,	what	would	trauma	narratives	look	like	if	they	didn’t	overemphasize	overcoming,	recovery,	surviving,	forgiving,	or	inspiring?	What	
	 
 
 
 
 
 	
210 
 
 
would	it	look	like	to	hold	space	for	pain,	suffering,	sorrow,	tragedy,	guilt,	regret,	anguish,	shame,	and	despair—without	turning	people	into	objects	of	pity	or	narratives	of	failed	personhood?	What	about	narratives	of	trauma	with	no	easily	determinable	victim	or	perpetrator?	What	about	all	the	silences	that	come	with	trauma?	What	would	it	look	like	if	we	were	to	actually	acknowledge	the	systemic	traumatization	of	peoples	across	the	globe—both	historically	and	presently?	What	if	we	questioned	the	very	system	that	is	in	place	to	help	us	“recover”	from	trauma,	as	often	just	another	part	of	the	traumatization?	Lastly,	what	might	healing,	real	deep	personal	and	collective	healing,	look	like	if	we	could	approach	trauma	differently?		As	I	said,	this	is	some	of	the	work	I	began	in	Chapter	Two.	I	think	I’m	repeating	myself	a	lot,	Jesús,	but	you	know	I’m	a	repeater.	It’s	part	of	how	my	trauma	narrative	shows	up	for	me.	In	repetition.	I	don’t	know	how	to	start	to	tell	you	about	Chapter	Two...There	was	another	school	shooting.	Another	white	kid	with	a	gun.	Except	this	time	the	students	in	the	high	school	that	experienced	the	shooting	got	real	political	afterward.	You’d	be	proud.	They	called	out	the	politicians	and	launched	a	social	media	campaign.	It	was	not	without	its	critics—people	wrote	about	it	and	it	was	all	legit—why	was	it	that	these	kids	were	getting	so	much	attention	for	their	activism	while	the	#blacklivesmatter	youth	continue	to	be	ignored	(see	my	analysis	in	Chapter	One)?	Still,	their	activism	was/is	powerful.		In	Chapter	Two,	I	analyzed	a	speech	by	one	of	the	leading	voices	from	this	movement,	Emma	González.	You’d	LOVE	Emma,	Jesús.	She’s	a	badass	(she’s	a	
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Scorpio	like	me	so	I	claim	her,	but	she’s	a	queer	Cuban	American,	so	I	know	you’d	claim	her,	too).	Anyway,	I	argue	that	Emma’s	speech	offers	an	alternative	way	to	understand	and	respond	to	trauma,	outside	the	strongholds	of	hegemony.	By	utilizing	feminist,	queer,	crip	methodologies	I	contend	that	new	frameworks	emerge	for	understanding	trauma	itself;	for	recognizing	its	knowledges;	and	for	situating	its	political	and	coalitional	potentiality.	It’s	the	last	part	that	I	know	you’d	be	most	excited	about,	Jesús.	You	believed	deeply	in	the	power	of	coalition	and	political	change.	Even	though	you	pretended	to	be	jaded.	Even	though	you	got	burned	more	than	once.			I	came	to	this	point	by	reading	Emma’s	speech	through	what	I	am	calling	a	political/relational	model	of	trauma.	Guided	by	the	work	of	a	Critical	Disability	Studies	mentor	of	mine,	Alison	Kafer,	I	enumerate	four	tenets	of	a	political/relational	model	of	trauma.	You	know	I	like	my	lists.	First,	under	a	political/relational	approach	to	trauma,	we’d	understand	that	trauma	is	socially	constructed	even	as	it’s	held	deep	within	our	bodyminds.	Second,	we’d	recognize	that	the	“so-called”	problem	of	trauma	cannot	be	solved	through	individual	medical	or	clinical	intervention	alone,	but	must	be	addressed	through	broader	social	change.	Third,	we’d	re-emphasize	the	political	nature	of	trauma.	And,	fourth,	we’d	conceptualize	trauma	as	relational	because	trauma	does	not	happen	in	isolation.	By	bringing	trauma	and	disability	together	in	this	way,	I	argue	that	trauma	becomes	a	site	for	building	coalitions	across	difference.	This	is	yet	another	place	in	my	project	
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where	a	future	project	might	arise.	What	would	political	coalitions	across	differences	based	on	trauma	look	like?	Where	could	that	work	begin?	Where	has	it	already	begun?	I	know	what	you	would	say	-	Chicana	Feminism.	I’m	sure	you’re	right.		 The	fourth	and	final	goal	of	my	dissertation	was	to	create	more	breathing	room	for	all	of	us	who	live	(or	who	have	lived)	with	trauma	in	our	bodyminds.	Chapter	Three	does	this	work	by	addressing	trauma	in	the	classroom,	with	the	hope	of	making	more	space	for	traumatized	students	and	instructors	alike.	We	talked	a	lot	about	teaching	and	how	we	wanted	to	teach.	All	the	things	Edén	had	taught	us	and	all	the	ways	we	wanted	to	show	up	in	the	classroom.	I	wonder	now	how	your	trauma	showed	up,	or	didn’t	show	up,	for	you	when	you	taught.	We	wanted	to	give	our	students	so	much,	didn’t	we?	You	were	such	a	good	teacher,	even	when	your	students	called	you	José.	I	began	writing	Chapter	Three	before	you	died.	Did	you	read	it	in	its	early	stages?	Did	we	talk	about	it?	I	can’t	remember	now.	I	wish	I	remembered	all	the	things.	In	the	chapter,	I	analyzed	the	arguments	in	higher	education	surrounding	the	trigger	warnings	as	a	practice	toward	addressing	trauma	in	the	classroom.	Rather	than	weighing	in	on	the	“pros”	or	the	“cons”	of	the	debate,	I	argued	that	the	debate	itself	shows	us	how	higher	education	understands	and	responds	to	mental	illness	and	trauma	on	campus.	The	answer	is:	not	well	at	all.	But	you	know	that,	don’t	you,	Jesús?	More	than	most.		
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We	talked	a	lot	about	how	higher	education	traumatizes	and	retraumatizes	and	that	is	something	I	didn’t	spend	enough	time	on	with	this	project.	That	is	for	a	future	project	too.	They	arrested	you	once	for	pointing	out	this	truth,	for	protesting	this	reality.	Protest	was	your	trauma	narrative.	And	they	pressed	charges	against	you	for	speaking	it.	In	Chapter	Three,	I	analyzed	the	ways	in	which	the	common	negative	responses	to	trigger	warnings	similarly	show	a	refusal	to	recognize	what	students	are	asking	for—a	recognition	of	their	full	humanity	and	institutional	support	for	how	their	experiences	impact	their	education.	I	then	present	a	feminist	disability	studies	pedagogy	that	outlines	some	beginning	ideas	of	what	an	approach	to	trauma	in	the	classroom	might	look	like.	I	do	this	for	you,	Jesús,	and	for	myself,	and	for	the	teachers	we	imagined	we’d	become	but	might	never,	and	for	all	our	students	who’ve	needed	it.	Here	I	am	bringing	trauma	and	disability	together	in	order	to	imagine	teaching	with	trauma	otherwise	in	a	way	that	makes	more	space	in	the	university	for	those	of	us	who	weren’t	supposed	to	be	here	but	are	anyway.		My	last	chapter,	Jesús,	is	where	it	got	hard.	It’s	also	where	I	came	to	understand	why	you’re	gone.	In	Chapter	Four	I	did	an	analysis	of	this	novel	called	A	
LIttle	Life	by	Hanya	Yanagihara.	It’s	about	four	friends	who	move	through	the	world	together,	but	really	it’s	about	this	man	named	Jude.	Jude	lived	through	a	lot	of	disabling	trauma.	By	disabling	trauma,	I	mean	both	trauma	that	comes	along	with	other	kinds	of	disabilities	and	trauma	that	disables	in	its	own	right.	In	my	analysis,	I	argue	that	the	novel	presents	three	overlapping	cripistemologies—or	crip	trauma	
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knowledges—through	its	portrayal	of	Jude.	I	presented	these	cripistemologies	because,	in	my	estimation,	the	only	way	we’re	going	to	find	a	more	socially	just	approach	to	understanding	and	responding	to	trauma	is	by	centering	the	knowledges	of	traumatized	people.	Literature,	like	A	Little	Life,	helps	us	imagine	otherwise	because	it	helps	us	think	beyond	the	quagmire	of	the	here	and	the	now,	right?	Only,	I	think	what	Yanagihara	is	doing	is	actually	helping	us	see	the	here	and	the	now	for	how	limiting	it	is.	The	entire	book	shows	us	how	the	dominant,	mainstream	approach	to	understanding	and	responding	to	trauma	so	often	doesn't	work	for	traumatized	people.		The	first	cripistemology	of	trauma	within	A	Little	Life	is	the	narrative	of	trauma	that	is	presented	throughout	the	book.	Here	I	engage	with	a	theorist	named	Robert	Zussman	who	thinks	about	narrative	freedom—who	gets	to	have	it,	what	it	might	look	like,	and	how	its	limited	by	socially	determined	narrative	conventions.	He	proposes	silence	as	a	form	of	narrative	freedom.	In	the	book,	Jude	refuses	to	narrate	his	trauma	throughout	his	life	in	multiple	ways.	Jesús,	silence	was	often	your	answer	as	well.	The	second	cripistemology	I	discuss	in	Chapter	Four	is	the	instability	of	trauma,	or	rather	the	three	modalities	that	trauma	often	destabilizes:	our	sense	of	self,	our	bodymind,	and	our	understanding	of	spacetime.	Through	a	close	reading	of	Jude’s	character,	I	showed	how	the	book	illustrates	these	crip	trauma	knowledges,	not	as	pathologies	but	as	valid	ways	of	knowing	and	being	in	the	world.	I	wonder	a	lot,	Jesús,	about	your	experiences	of	these	instabilities,	
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especially	on	the	day	you	died.	I	wonder	what	it	would	have	meant	to	you	to	have	someone	tell	you	that	your	experience	was	not	wrong,	but	just	another	way	of	being	in	the	world.	Would	it	have	made	any	difference?	Or	would	it	have	still	been	so	terrifying	that	you	wouldn’t	be	with	us	any	longer?				Lastly,	the	third	cripistemology	I	discuss	is	Jude’s	affect.	He	was	like	us,	Jesús.	He	didn’t	trust	people.	He	didn’t	know	how	to	let	people	in.	He	had	a	lot	of	internalized	shame	and	guilt	and	thought	it	was	all	his	fault.	Even	during	his	happiest	times,	he	had	this	generalized	affect	of,	well,	trauma.	This	shows	up	for	him	in	his	relationships,	mostly	his	intimate	relationship	with	his	best-friend-turned-life-partner	Willem.	Again,	this	is	where	the	dominant,	mainstream	approach	to	trauma	would	pathologize	Jude,	but	I	don’t	think	the	book	does	that.	I	think	it	presents	Jude’s	affect	as	an	alternative	way	of	being,	knowing,	and	feeling	in	the	world.	When	thinking	about	trauma	and	disability	together,	these	cripistemologies	of	trauma	matter	because	they	give	us	another	way	of	knowing	trauma	outside	of	the	medical	model	of	disability.	Most	importantly,	they’re	a	way	of	knowing	trauma	that	centers	the	traumatized	person’s	embodied	knowledge,	even	if	that	knowledge	is	a	kind	of	unknowing.					 Jude	died	by	suicide	too,	Jesús.	Just	like	you	did.	And	just	like	with	you,	the	reader	doesn’t	get	to	know	why.	We	didn’t	get	to	know	why.	All	we	got	was	silence.	Well,	silence,	and	all	the	trauma	narratives	from	everyone	else	trying	to	make	sense	
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of	your	life	and	death	for	you—just	like	A	Little	Life	is	narrated	by	all	of	Jude’s	loved	ones	trying	to	make	sense	of	his	life	and	death.	I’ve	spent	the	last	four	years	thinking	about	it.	We	all	have.	There	are	so	many	questions	and	there	aren't	any	answers.	Or,	maybe	there	are	too	many	answers,	I	don’t	know	anymore.	But	when	I	was	reading	and	writing	and	analyzing	Jude’s	death	I	had	to	stop	because	it	became	your	death.	Elizabeth	hates	the	book.	That’s	okay.	I	loved	it.	I	loved	it	because	it	was	about	a	queerworld	of	friends	that	loved	their	friend	and	did	everything	they	could	to	love	him	and	still	he	couldn’t	keep	living.	Just	like	you	couldn’t	keep	living.					Jesús,	I	wrote	this	dissertation	because	I	needed	a	better	way	to	understand	the	world	that	meant	you	were	dead,	and	I	am	alive.	And	that	it	is	not	our	fault.	I	wrote	this	dissertation	because	I	needed	to	begin	imagining	a	world	where	you	could	still	be	alive.	The	Jesúses	of	the	world	need	to	be	alive.	The	Judes	of	the	world	need	to	be	alive.	The	Emmas	of	the	world	need	to	be	listened	to.	More	importantly,	though,	they	need	to	have	a	world	in	which	their	lives	are	worth	living.	A	world	in	which	personal	and	collective	healing,	restorative	justice,	transformative	justice	are	possible.	I	don’t	know	what	that	world	looks	like,	but	I	know	a	lot	of	amazingly	brilliant	people	are	doing	great	work	to	imagine	and	build	those	worlds.	I	felt	trapped	in	the	narrative	frameworks	of	trauma	that	surrounded	me	because	of	my	own	trauma,	then	you	died,	and	the	walls	closed	in	even	more.	So	I	had	to	start	somewhere.		
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I	don’t	have	grand	illusions	about	this	work.	You	and	I	never	did.	But	ideas	change	beliefs	and	beliefs	change	actions	and	actions	change	practices	and	practices	change	policies	and	policies	impact	lives.	Or	so	they	say,	right?	What	I	am	getting	at	is	that	I	think	this	work	does	matter	beyond	you	and	me.	Because	there	are	a	whole	lot	of	traumatized	people	out	there	and	the	way	things	are	going	now	isn’t	working	so	well	for	the	vast	majority	of	us.	The	ideas	I’ve	proposed	here	can	help	because	they	can	disrupt	the	ideologies	and	narrative	binds	we’re	trapped	under	and	make	more	space	for	alternative	ways	of	knowing,	being,	and	narrating	our	lived	experiences	(including	not	narrating	them	at	all).	I	am	asking	people	to	think	about	trauma	differently,	to	respond	to	trauma	differently—to	pull	it	out	of	the	medical	model	of	disability	and	see	it	as	political	and	relational.	I	am	asking	people	to	see	trauma	as	a	social	justice	issue	imbedded	in	systems	of	power	and	oppression.	I’m	asking	people	to	question	the	narratives	of	trauma	that	surround	them.	After	we	shift	how	we	understand	trauma,	we	have	a	lot	of	work	to	do	to	change	the	systems	that	traumatize	and	change	our	responses	to	traumatization,	but	our	first	step	is	changing	our	understanding	of	trauma	itself.	I	see	this	as	the	beginning	of	a	path	toward	personal	and	collective	healing,	a	path	toward	restorative	justice.		Still,	I	wish	I	could	have	written	a	better	dissertation	for	you,	Jesús—one	that	said	all	the	things	I	really	needed	to	say	about	systemic	trauma	and	its	erasure.	There	are	other	things,	too,	that	remain	undiscussed,	or	only	touched	upon;	things	that	deserve	further	exploration.	For	example,	in	Chapter	One	I	outlined	the	details	
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of	a	traumatocracy	in	order	to	explicate	how	discursive	power	operates,	but	in	doing	so	I	only	hinted	toward	the	impacts	on	those	who	are	relegated	to	its	margins	or	worse	erased	entirely.	I	need	to	talk	more	about	the	impacts	of	this	discursive	regime.	In	Chapter	Two,	I	outlined	the	political/relational	approach	to	trauma	as	a	pathway	toward	coalition	building,	systemic	change	making,	and	personal/collective	healing,	but	I	have	yet	to	discern	any	actionable	steps	that	could	be	taken	to	beginning	this	work	on	the	ground.	What	does	restorative	justice	look	like	for	traumatized	people?	What	does	healing	look	like	for	us	personally	and	collectively?	I	don’t	know	the	answers	to	these	questions	yet.	In	Chapter	Three,	I	discuss	approaches	to	trauma	in	the	classroom	when	the	students	are	traumatized,	but	I	don’t	fully	consider	the	instructor	as	a	potentially	traumatized	person	as	well.	More	importantly,	I	didn’t	get	into	the	nuances	of	education	as	traumatizing	itself	(something	you	know	so	much	about,	Jesús).	Lastly,	in	Chapter	Four	I	didn’t	deal	with	Jude’s	death	very	well—just	like	I	didn’t	deal	with	your	death	very	well.	It’s	written	out	of	the	book.	It’s	left	unknowable	to	the	reader.	So,	I	leave	it	unknowable	in	my	analysis.	I	am	still	trying	to	figure	what	that	means	in	terms	of	trauma	and	disability	that	Jude	dies	by	suicide.	Just	like	I	am	still	trying	to	figure	out	what	your	death	means,	Jesús.	Perhaps	I’ll	never	know.	Perhaps	it's	my	next	project.	Or,	maybe	I’m	done	trying	to	talk	about	trauma	and	disability,	I	don’t	know.		Maybe	Zussman	is	right	and	silence	is	the	best	approach	to	narrative	freedom.	Was	your	suicide	your	attempt	at	narrative	freedom?	Was	it	your	escape	
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from	the	narrative	binds	of	trauma,	oppression,	and	mental	illness	that	trapped	you	so	intensely?	I	am	going	to	believe	that	it	is,	because	I	am	going	to	believe	that	you’ve	found	freedom,	Jesús.			This	writing	is	my	attempt	at	imagining	more	freedom—in	life—for	us	all.		I	love	and	miss	you,	Jesús,	more	than	you	could	know.			Yours,		a		
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Notes 
1 I’m drawing here from Foucault’s theorization of a “regime of truth” wherein a  
“formation of a corpus of knowledge, techniques, [and] ‘scientific’ discourses” become 
“entangled with the practices of power to punish” (Lorenzini). 
 
2 The first article to use trauma as a metaphor referred to the 1991 financial recession as 
putting the banks “through their worst trauma since the 1930s” (Greenwald). The second 
article from 2014 was titled “Obama’s Trauma Team” and discussed the group of “high-
tech wizards” that were revived HealthCare.Gov (Brill).  
 
3 2001 appears twice in this graph because I split the year in two. The articles published 
before 9/11 are included with the pre-9/11 data and charted under the first 2001. The 
articles published after 9/11 are included with the post-9/11 data and charted under the 
second 2001.  
 
4 Theorized by disability studies scholars, like Eli Clare, the term “supercrip” is used to 
signify narratives or representations of disabled people “overcoming” their disabilities by 
either 1) glorifying us for doing an everyday task as though it were an extraordinary feat 
or 2) turning us into ableist symbols of inspiration as we achieve extraordinary feats (e.g. 
the paraplegic person who climbed Mount Everest).  
 
5 Take for instance the Iowa Republican Representative, Steve King, who criticized 
González for wearing a patch of the Cuban flag. See, Vazquez. 
 
6 These expected narratives shift depending on the proximity to the event. The media 
expects and even thrives on fetishizing “chaos” in personal narrative immediately after a 
catastrophic event. However, with time, these narratives are expected to shift into the 
conventional standard with a coherent beginning, middle, end; expected or debatable 
“plot” resolution; character/personal development; and social justice or political 
implications. See, Frank.  
 
7 I borrow the phrase “uneven distribution of life chances” from queer legal scholar and 
theorist Dean Spade. 
 
8 Feminist activist-scholars quickly rejected this definition in that it “the range of human 
experience” was so narrowly, and hegemonically, defined. Furthermore, it positioned 
anyone who experienced trauma as outside of the human.  
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9 With this, I would argue that crip theory is always queer, but queer theory is not always 
crip (In the same way that a square is always a rectangle, but a rectangle is not always a 
square).    
 
10 Again, along the “affective turn” in the humanities, I use “affect” here in reference to 
Clough’s definition of “affectivity as a substrate of potentially bodily responses, often 
automatic responses, in excess of consciousness” (2).  
 
11 For two brief pieces in support of trigger warnings see Angus Johnston’s essay “Why 
I’ll Add a Trigger Warning” posted on Inside Higher Ed in May of 2014, and Kat 
Stoeffel’s  work “Why I Stopped Rolling my Eyes at Trigger Warnings” posted on the 
NY Magazine’s Blog The Cut on May 21, 2014.  
 
12 For a general overview of arguments in opposition to trigger warnings, see the “Essay 
by faculty members about why they will not use trigger warnings” posted on Inside 
Higher Ed in May of 2014.  
 
13 See: Yergeau, Melanie. “Disable All the Things: On Affect, Metadata, & Audience.” 
Computers and Writing Conference. Washington State University. June 2014. Address. 
 
14 Under the medical model, this affective shift is often diagnosed as “PTSD.” However, 
because I wish to understand the affects of trauma outside of the forces of pathology, I 
am not using PTSD as a marker of this experience. Moreover, I wish to recognize that 
many people live with this kind affective structure who have not or would not be 
diagnosed with PTSD - such as the large numbers of people who have inherited what is 
now being termed intergenerational trauma.  
 
15 For more see: DeGruy, Joy. Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome: America’s Legacy of 
Enduring Injury and Healing. Portland: Joy DeGruy Publications, 2005.  
 
16 Although I have provided various descriptions of trauma, including my own working 
definition, I want to hold space for the fluidity of the experiences of trauma and being 
triggered. I do so in recognition of important critiques within disability scholarship on 
establishing “standards” of any disability or disabling experience in ways that might then 
be used to further police disabled bodies. See for more detail, Zahiri Richter’s blog on the 
topic cited above.  
 
17 There is a broader debate among neuroscientists, clinical psychologists, therapists, and 
individuals who have experienced trauma as to whether or not one can heal or overcome 
trauma. While I think efforts can be made to attend to the affects of trauma and make life 
more livable, I believe that the epistemological shifts alone negate any kind of “return” to 
a pre or non-traumatized bodymind. Furthermore, because I understand the effect of 
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trauma to be non-linear, I believe that one may learn skills to help “manage” trauma in 
the bodymind, it is always possible for the affect of trauma to reappear in the future.  
 
18 In his now foundation text The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics, Arthur 
W. Frank terms these stories “quest narrative.” In quest narratives “the ill person 
gradually realizes a sense of purpose, the idea that illness has been a journey” and 
through this journey three ethics emerge to guide the storytelling: recollection, solidarity, 
and inspiration (177, 133). While Frank argues that the quest narrative is the ideal ending 
point for all who experience a wounded body, an analysis of these narratives through the 
social model of disability would situate the quest narrative as a product of ableist 
ideologies (particularly the supercrip).   
 
19 See Brown, Laura S. “One Feminist Perspective on Psychic Trauma.” Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory. Cathy Caruth, Ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995. 100-112. Print.  
 
20 See for instance, McRuer’s discussion of Stone’s The Disabled State in “Disabling 
Sex: Notes for a Crip Theory of Sexuality.” GLQ. 17.1 (2010): 107-117.  
 
21 See Duggan, Lisa. “On Trauma and Trigger Warnings, in Three Parts. Bully Bloggers. 
23Nov 2014. Web. 26 Nov 2014.  
 
22 K-12 educators have been working to shift pedagogical understanding of trauma for 
quite some time. Indeed, trigger warnings pale in comparison to the pedagogical 
approaches of trauma-sensitive or trauma-responsive schools. As detailed in Helping 
Traumatized Children Learn – Volume 2, approaches in trauma-sensitive schools include 
fostering a community where adults: share and understanding of trauma and its impact on 
learning, support all students to feel safe, address student’s needs in a holistic way, 
connect students to the school community, embrace teamwork, and anticipate and adapt 
to changing needs (TLPI 26-27).  
 
23 Since in the U.S. contexts, post-secondary education is not guaranteed, or seen as a 
fundamental right for all, institutions of higher education are able to disregard and 
exclude bodyminds in ways that k-12 institutions cannot (legally). While there is 
certainly much work to be done around disability education at the k-12 level, it is also not 
unsurprising that innovated pedagogical strategies for working with traumatized students 
are arising out of k-12 settings.  
 
24 Most notably the work of feminist philosopher, Susan Wendell. See, Garland-
Thomson’s 2005, Signs article for a fuller literature review.  
 
25 See or the National Center on Universal Design for Learning. Or Burgstahler, Sheryl, 
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“University Design of Instruction (UDI): Definition, Principles, Guidelines, and 
Examples.” DO-IT Disability Opportunities Internetworking, and Technology. University 
of Washington.Edu. 2012. Web. 2013.  
 
26 I would argue that trigger warnings have garnered so much attention within higher 
education preciously because of structural ableism within the academy.  Until institutions 
of higher education are fully committed to education every bodymind, the pedagogical 
options for recognizing and addressing the complexity of every student will be contained 
to limiting measures like trigger warnings. Such warnings may be what we have available 
now, but they should not be implemented in exchange for more transformative 
institutional changes.   
 
27 Very little in this debate has addressed the experience of instructors who may be 
triggered or experience traumatization in the classroom. This, of course, highlights the 
assumed able-bodyminded instructor and contributes to ableist logics within the 
academy. While this piece focuses on attending to students with trauma, I believe that 
such pedagogy allows for, and perhaps even requires, attending to the affective 
experience of the instructor.  
 
28 It should be noted however, that the successes of these approaches are limited in that 
“fewer than a half of students with mental illnesses seek mental health services” (Salzer 
1). 
 
29 I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty in fully knowing or speaking the truth of 
one’s experience or bodymind - especially to power. Nor, do I mean to assert that anyone 
is ever fully able express their own truth given the limitations of language and culture. 
However, the refusal of acknowledge trauma or potential triggers because “one can never 
know” works to dismiss and erase the agency of both the (assumed) able-minded 
responder and the episteme of the disabled bodymind who may be triggered.  
 
30  See, Ben-Moshe, Liat, et al. Building Pedagogical Curb Cuts: Incorporating 
Disability in the University Classroom and Curriculum. New York: Syracuse University, 
2005. Print.  	
 
31 Previously a quarterly journal, Electric Lit became a non-profit in 2014. It is 
“committed to publishing work that is intelligent and unpretentious, to elevating new 
voices, and to examining how literature and storytelling can help illuminate social justice 
issues.” 	https://electricliterature.com/about/mission/ 
 
32 See chapter 3, “unconformable v. traumatized.” This is not about opting out but about 
having tools/skills pedagogy that helps us opt in as we are.  
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33 Sitpoint theory is a neologism offered by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson that critiques 
the ableist assumptions underlying feminist standpoint theory (Interrogating 346).   
 
34 For instance, a family member of someone who is experiencing the symptoms 
recognized as PTSD might tell a friend that their loved one is “having a bit of a personal 
crisis” rather than say outright that they are “struggling with processing their trauma.”  
 
35 I read 16 interviews and reviews—only Electric Lit and The New York Times use the 
word trauma. Electric Lit discusses sexual abuse, NYT talks about flashbacks. NYT 
includes one sentence on Jude’s “limp.” 
 
36 As many disability activists and scholars have argued, this saying presumes that people 
should only care about (dis)ability and disabled people’s lives when it impacts them. 
Furthermore, as Jasbir Puar succinctly argues in her preface to The Right to Maim not 
everyone will become disabled, some people and populations will not live long enough. 
Among the people that do become disabled, some will have more access to resources 
than others to help mitigate the impacts of their disabilities. This creates a differential 
experience of disability/debility – all of which is flattened out by the popular saying (Puar 
xiv).   
 
37 See Margarit Shildrick’s “This Body is Not One: Dealing With Difference”  	
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